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ARTICLES
REFLUAT STERCUS*:
A CITIZEN'S VIEW OF CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION IN U.S. DOMESTIC COURTS
OF HIGH-LEVEL U.S. CIVILIAN AUTHORITY
AND MILITARY GENERALS FOR TORTURE
AND CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT
BY BENJAMIN G. DAVIS'
* Refluat Stercus is a Latin command that describes the effort to hold high-level civilian
authority and military generals criminally responsible for their acts. It is derived from a
military adage (almost a military common law principle) known well to generations of
soldiers that "shit rolls down hill". In Latin, that is translated as "fluit stercus." To "make
shit roll up hill" is "refluat stercus." "Refluat Stercus" pulls together many streams of re-
sponsibility. The idea is broader than just command responsibility and really is focused on
vindicating international law rules in U.S. domestic courts through all available means so
as to criminally prosecute the principals and accessories (both before and after the fact)
that put in place horrendous violations of positive international law - not just the persons
at the bottom of the hierarchy in government which is the traditional approach as de-
scribed in this article.
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Beyond the word, the thing: torture and cruel inhuman and
degrading treatment - an Abu Ghraib photo2
"The extraordinary conclusion by the [United States] that some
individuals have no right not to be tortured or abused while in
detention is simply wrong."3
2 Benjamin G. Davis, Semper Fidelis: Keep Our Honor Clean, Presentation to the Ex-
ecutive Council of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.law.utoledo.edulstudents/faculty/BDavis/asil/Semper%20Fidelis%2OFinal.htm
3 Mary Ellen O'Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation, 66 OHIO ST. L.J.
1231, 1239 (2005).
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FOUR CITATIONS FOR REFLECTION
Citation # 1
"Remember those who are in prison, as though you were in pris-
on with them; those who are being tortured, as though you your-
selves were being tortured." Hebrews 13:3
Citation # 2
"We share with the parties to the [Rome] Statute a commitment
to ensuring accountability for genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity - look, for example, to our unflagging support
for the tribunals established to prosecute crimes committed in
such disparate places as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and
Sierra Leone. We also believe that our domestic system is capable
of prosecuting and punishing our own citizens for these crimes." -
John B. Bellinger III, U.S. Dep't of State Legal Adviser, Remarks
at the Hague, Netherlands: The United States and International
Law (June 6, 2007) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/rls/86123.htm.
Citation # 3
"From the moment a soldier enlists, we inculcate loyalty, duty,
honor, integrity, and selfless service," Taguba said. "And yet
when we get to the senior-officer level we forget those values. I
know that my peers in the Army will be mad at me for speaking
out, but the fact is that we violated the laws of land warfare in
Abu Ghraib. We violated the tenets of the Geneva Convention.
We violated our own principles and we violated the core of our
military values. The stress of combat is not an excuse, and I
believe, even today, that those civilian and military leaders
responsible should be held accountable." - Army Major General
Antonio M. Taguba (Ret'd.). Seymour M. Hersh, The General's
Report, NEW YORKER, June 25, 2007 (emphasis added), available
at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/06/25/070625fafact
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_hersh?printable=true.
Citation # 4
"From that moment [January 11, 2002], well before previous ac-
counts have suggested, Cheney turned his attention to the practic-
al business of crushing a captive's will to resist. The vice presi-
dent's office played a central role in shattering limits on coercion
of prisoners in U.S. custody, commissioning and defending legal
opinions that the Bush administration has since portrayed as the
initiatives, months later, of lower-ranking officials.
The vice president's office pushed a policy of robust inter-
rogation that made its way to the U.S. naval prison at Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba .... and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.
Cheney and his allies, according to more than two dozen
current and former officials, pioneered a novel distinction be-
tween forbidden "torture" and permitted use of "cruel, inhuman
or degrading" methods of questioning. They did not originate
every idea to rewrite or reinterpret the law, but fresh accounts
from participants show that they translated muscular theories,
from Yoo and others, into the operational language of govern-
ment." Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, Angler: The Cheney Vice
Presidency, Pushing the Envelope on Presidential Power, WASH.
POST, June 25, 2007 (emphasis added), available at
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/cheney/chapters/pushing-the-env
elope-on-presi/index.html.
INTRODUCTION
This article examines criminal prosecution in U.S. domes-
tic courts of high-level U.S. civilian authority and military gener-
als for torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The
concerns are with what the United States has done in the past to
criminally prosecute this group of high-level individuals, 4 why
the United States should conduct such prosecutions, 5 how and
4 See infra Part I.
5 See infra Part II.
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where should such prosecutions occur, 6 when should such prose-
cutions occur, 7 and who should be prosecuted.8 This subject is
important because, recently, the German Federal Prosecutor de-
clined for the second time to open a War Crimes Trial against
present and former high-level civilian authority and generals of
the U.S. regarding detainee treatment. 9 The International Crim-
inal Court is gathering information, but is taking no action, with
regard to complaints raised about actions of U.S. high-level civi-
lian authority or military generals in the War on Terror.10 Over
the past few years, several civil complaints have been filed in
United States courts by detainees regarding horrendous acts of
torture and/or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.11 These
cases have been rejected on state secrets, federal officer immuni-
ty, political question, or similar doctrines. 12 The U.S. Congress
6 See infra Part III.
7 See infra Part IV.
8 See infra Part V.
9 See Press Release, Center for Const. Rts., German Federal Prosecutor's Office Dis-
misses Rumsfeld War Crimes Case, Critics Call Move Political Capitulation to U.S. Pres-
sure (Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www.commondreams.org/cgibinlnewsprint.cgi?file
=/news2007/0427-08.htm (noting the decision of "Germany's Federal Prosecutor" in April
2007 not to proceed with "an investigation"); see also Scott Lyons, German Criminal Com-
plaint Against Donald Rumsfeld and Others, ASIL INSIGHTS, Dec. 14, 2006,
http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/12/insightsO61214.html (indicating the criminal com-
pliant filing against senior U.S. Officials); but see U.S. Displeased Over German Hunt for
CIA Agents, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L., Mar. 5, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international
0,1518,469884,00.html [hereinafter U.S. Displeased] (discussing the existence of German
investigation of CIA agents).
10 See Int'l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor: Iraq Response (Feb. 9, 2006),
available at http:/www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTPlettertosendersreIraq-9
_February2006.pdf (asserting that no investigation would be continued into the situation
in Iraq).
11 See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007) (alleging that the de-
tainee was "beaten, drugged, bound, and blindfolded" during interrogation by CIA opera-
tives); see also In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88
(D.D.C. 2007) (highlighting the "horrifying" nature of allegations against the Untied
States officers); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (contending that
American procedures violated basic tenets of international law); see also Boumediene v.
Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (claiming violation
of Constitution, common law and law of nations)(the author notes that this reversal does
not affect his analysis); see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d. 250, 287 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (asserting American officers were aware of substantial likelihood that the prisoner
would be tortured). See generally Julian G. Ku and John C. Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld:
The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 179, 179 (2006) (noting the historical importance of Hamden v. Rumsfeld).
12 See Bush, 476 F.3d at 994 (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
claim); see also El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 313 (dismissing the claim on state secrets grounds);
see also Arar, 414 F.Supp.2d. at 287 (claiming that the plaintiff lacked standing for the
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has put in place a series of Combatant Status Review Tribunals 13
and post-Hamdan Military Commissions. 14 Allegations of torture
are routinely redacted from the versions of these proceedings
that are made available.15 The United States Supreme Court has
reversed itself recently and decided to take an early post-
Hamdan look at the Combatant Status Review Tribunals and the
post-Hamdan Military Commissions.16 Lower courts have ac-
cepted Congressional habeas corpus stripping. 7 Outrageous gov-
ernment conduct against an American civilian on American soil
has been let pass by our courts as long as evidence from that
process is not introduced as part of the criminal trial.18 The Pres-
court to hear the claim); see also In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F.
Supp. 2d at 109 (discarding the claim due to qualified immunity of the defendant); see also
Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (contending that American procedures violated basic te-
nets of international law).
13 See 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2007) (referencing the power of combatant status review tri-
bunals); see also 10 U.S.C. § 948d (2007) (referring to the establishment of combatant sta-
tus review tribunals); see also 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2007) (citing other provisions relating to
combatant status review tribunals).
14 See 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 948b (a)-(g) (2006). For a critique of these Military Commissions
as applied, see also Benjamin G. Davis, No Third Class Process for Foreigners, 103 Nw. U.
L. REV. COLLOQUY 88 (2008), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview
/colloquy/2008/32[LRCol12008n32Davis.pdf.
15 See Combatant Status Review Tribunal hearing of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/transcriptISN10024.pdf (noting the following exchange:
"DETAINEE: CIA peoples. Yes. At the beginning when they transferred me
[REDACTED].
PRESIDENT: What I'm trying to get at is any statement that you made was it because
of this treatment, to use your word, you claim torture. Do you make any statements be-
cause of that?").
16 Compare Al Odah v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 3067, 3067 (2007) (granting petition to
hear claim of habeus corpus) with Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d at 994 (asserting that
the court does not have jurisdiction to hear habeus corpus claims).
17 See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 994 (depriving court jurisdiction over habeas petitions);
see also El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 313 (stating that the state secret privilege applied to dis-
covery sought by plaintiff because litigation could not occur without disclosure of state
secrets); see also In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F.Supp.2d at 119-
20 (dismissing plaintiffs claims that were alleging torture); see also Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d.
at 287-88 (granting the United State's motion to dismiss).
18 Order Denying Defendant Padilla's Motion to Dismiss for Outrageous Government
Conduct, United States v. Padilla, No. 04-6001-CR-COOKE (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2007),
available at http://www.discourse.net/archives/docslPadilla-motion-denied.pdf ("Mr. Padil-
la fails to present a cognizable claim of outrageous government conduct entitling him to
dismissal of the indictment. The objectionable conduct Padilla claims violated his due
process rights occurred during his military detainment in isolation of the crimes charged.
Padilla also fails to adequately explain why excluding any unlawfully obtained evidence
would not be an appropriate remedy in this case. Applying the exclusionary rule to bar
inclusion of any illegally obtained evidence would sufficiently satisfy due process con-
cerns. This may ultimately be a moot point since the government has averred not to util.
[Vol. 23:3
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ident has issued a July 20, 2007 Executive Order interpreting
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions that appears to
further enshrine departures from the object and purpose of the
Geneva Conventions and other international law.19
While low level soldiers have been court-martialed and
prosecutors in Italy2°, Germany2' and Switzerland 22 are investi-
gating potential crimes related to extraordinary renditions by
lower level U.S. intelligence officers, U.S. high-level civilians and
generals have not suffered criminal prosecution as to actions tak-
en during the current war on terror. Rather, they have remained
at high-levels in the federal government or moved on to other ca-
reers at the World Bank, in the federal courts, academia, or the
private sector.23
Are we enshrining the old military adage of "different spanks for
different ranks"? 24 Given the failure of overseas processes and
domestic civil processes to address command and other responsi-
bility of this select group, this article examines whether and how
criminal prosecution of them in U.S. domestic courts might be
done.
ize any Naval Brig evidence in its case. However, should the government decide to make
use of any such evidence, an appropriate hearing will be scheduled to determine to what
extent it is admissible.").
19 Exec Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007). For analysis of that Ex-
ecutive Order, see Benjamin G. Davis, Gutting the Geneva Conventions in the 'War on
Terror', JURIST, July 25, 2007, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/07/
gutting-geneva-conventions-in-war-on.php.
20 See Devika Bhat, Italian Judge Orders First 'Rendition' Trial of CIA Agents, TIMES
ONLINE, Feb. 16, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article
1395637.ece (reporting that "[a]n Italian judge has ordered 26 Americans and five Italians
to stand trial for the kidnapping of a terror suspect in Milan in 2003, in what will be the
first criminal court case over the CIA's extraordinary rendition programme"); see also
Frederic L. Kirgis, Alleged CIA Kidnapping of Muslim Cleric in Italy, ASIL INSIGHTS, Ju-
ly 7, 2005, http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/07/insightsO50707.html (commenting on ar-
rest warrants issued by "an Italian judge" for thirteen U.S. CIA agents).
21 A German court has opened a case with regard to the extraordinary rendition of
Khaled E1-Masri. U.S. Displeased, supra note 9.
22 Alexander G. Higgins, Switzerland Approves Probe of CIA Flight, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED, Feb. 15, 2007, available at http://ib.store.yahoo.net/lib/realityzone/UFN
Switzerlandprobe.htm ("Switzerland on Wednesday followed Italy and Germany in rais-
ing the threat of criminal prosecution of CIA operatives involved in anti-terrorism opera-
tions in Europe.").
23 See the list of persons of interest in part VI of this article.
24 James W. Smith III, A Few Good Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib Courts-Martial and the
Failure of the Military Justice System, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 671, 677 (2006).
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This article examines criminal prosecution in United
States domestic courts of United States high-level civilian au-
thority and/or military generals (whether in courts-martial, fed-
eral courts or state courts) for violations of international humani-
tarian and/or international criminal law. Considering the United
States as having international obligations with regard to interna-
tional humanitarian and/or international criminal law violations
committed 25 by its high-level civilian authority and military gen-
erals, 26 this article focuses on one aspect of international huma-
nitarian law and/or international criminal law concerning the
current War on Terrorism - torture (including torture, cruel in-
human or degrading treatment and whether seen as war crimes
or otherwise).27 The article examines the possibility of a U.S. do-
25 The sense of the word "committed" will be discussed below in the article. See, e.g., pp.
19-20.
26 The external perspective is a vision that examines the United States international
obligations looking outward to other nations. It is to be contrasted with the United States
foreign relations law perspective that examines United States international law obliga-
tions through the framework of the Constitution downward. The essence of the external
perspective is the rule of treaty and customary international law that a state may not use
its internal law to extract itself from its international law obligations. Thus, the Constitu-
tional, federal and state law debate is of interest but the view of such debates is tempered
by the sense that these laws are all variations on internal law. See Benjamin G. Davis, A
Citizen Observer's View of the U.S. Approach to the War on Terrorism, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 465 (2008).
27 1 recognize that in addition to torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment are
prohibited in various international instruments and customary international law. As to
torture, it would appear patently obvious that present and former high-level U.S. civilians
and military generals put in place over the past years a system of secret black sites, ex-
traordinary renditions, detention facilities (including but not limited to Guantanamo),
and interrogation methods to permit torture as defined by treaty and customary interna-
tional law. For a detailed analysis of the common plan, see Jordan J. Paust, Above the
Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret Rendi-
tions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. REV.
345, 345 (2007) [hereinafter Paust 1](describing the "torture" or "violence to life and per-
son" that were "portrayed in photos from Abu Ghraib Prison"); see also Jordan J. Paust,
Responding Lawfully to al Qaeda, 56 CATH. U.L. REV. 759, 759-60 (2007) [hereinafter
Paust 2] ("Canada is considering a U.S. request for their extradition to stand trial for con-
spiracy to commit war crimes and attempted war crimes in the United States."). See gen-
erally Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law
Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811,
812 (2005) [hereinafter Paust 3] ("A common plan to violate customary and treaty-based
international law concerning the treatment and interrogation of so-called 'terrorist' and
enemy combatant detainees and their supporters captured during the U.S. war in Afgha-
nistan emerged within the Bush Administration in 2002."). For a discussion of black site
torture and the recent devastatingly critical International Committee of the Red Cross
report, see, e.g., Jane Mayer, The Black Sites: A Rare Look Inside the C.LA. 's Secret Inter-
rogation Program, NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2007, at 46, available at
REFLUATSTERCUS
mestic criminal prosecution as a response to allegations that
such international crimes have been committed 28 by actors who
are U.S. high-level civilian authority and military generals. The
concerns are with what the United States has done in the past to
criminally prosecute this group of high-level individuals, why the
United States should conduct such prosecutions, how, when and
where should such prosecutions occur, and who should be prose-
cuted?
While there is a rich debate about whether torture by the
United States has occurred in the War on Terrorism, 29 for the
purposes of this article that debate is primarily relevant to the
evidence gathering, prosecutorial discretion, and defendant iden-
tifying processes. While, based on the information that has come
out, it is beyond doubt (let alone reasonable doubt) that high-
level U.S. civilian authority and/or military generals decided it is
in the United States' best interest to breach international law ob-
ligations prohibiting torture30 - our inquiry is more focused. To
paraphrase John Bellinger's remarks - our concern is whether
our domestic system is capable of prosecuting and punishing our
own citizens who are high-level civilian or military generals for
these international crimes. 31
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/08/13/O70813fa-fact -mayer (commenting on
the "black sites" and the "unusually harsh treatment" that those detainees were subject
to).
28 Definition of "committed" will be addressed later in this article. See, e.g., infra pp.
19-20.
29 See note 275 for a number of references. For utilitarian arguments for and against
torture, see ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE
THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 257 (Yale 2002) [hereinafter DERSHOWITZ 1]; see
also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, TORTURED REASONING, IN TORTURE: A COLLECTION (Sanford
Levinson ed., Oxford 2004) [hereinafter DERSHOWITZ 2]; see also Jeannine Bell, "Behind
This Mortal Bone" The (In)effectiveness of Torture, 83 IND. L.J. 339, 339 (2008); see also
Alan M. Dershowitz, Can We Even Discuss Torture?, LONDON TIMES HIGHER EDUC.
SUPPLEMENT, June 11, 2004 [hereinafter Dershowitz 3]. See generally Alan M. Dersho-
witz, Commentary, Stop Winking At Torture and Codify It, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 2004 [he-
reinafter Dershowitz 4].
30 See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation, 66 OHIO ST. L.
J. 1231, 1235-36 (2005)(discussing how the United States has countenanced every con-
ceivable method of torture from waterboarding to chaining prisoners for 24 hours without
any break or relief).
31 "We also believe that our domestic system is capable of prosecuting and punishing
our own citizens for these crimes." John B. Bellinger II, U.S. Dep't of State Legal Advis-
er, Remarks at the Hague, Netherlands: The United States and International Law (June
6, 2007), available at http:/lwww.state.govls/l/rls/86123.htm.
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If our domestic system is capable of prosecuting and pu-
nishing our high-level civilians or military generals for these
crimes, then this contribution will demonstrate how such prose-
cutions would be undertaken - in short to provide a roadmap.
This roadmap would appear of use to those who sense an injus-
tice in that only low-level persons (all essentially uniformed mili-
tary) have been subject to criminal prosecution and punishment
for war crimes related to the War on Terrorism. This reality
raises the specter of the "different spanks for different ranks"
problem. 32 The effort here is to see how "similar spanks for high-
er ranks" might occur. If the conclusion is that we are not capa-
ble in our domestic system of prosecuting and punishing our own
citizens who are high-level civilian or military generals for these
crimes, then this contribution will demonstrate the discontinuity
between what we support abroad and what we are capable of
doing at home. We will understand the limits of our internal sys-
tem and ponder what, if anything, to do.
This article is particularly timely in light of the First
Chautauqua Declaration of August 29, 2007 by which prosecu-
tors from the international criminal tribunals from the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal for Nuremberg, the International Crim-
inal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers of the Cambodian Courts,
and the International Criminal Court urged "[t]hat ending im-
punity by perpetrators of crimes of concern to the international
community is a necessary part of preventing the recurrence of
atrocities. That it is no longer about whether individuals agree
or disagree with the pursuit of justice in political, moral of prac-
tical terms; now, it is the law."33 Our interest is in applying such
32 This phrase is more vulgarly known in the military as "shit rolls down hill". This ar-
ticle is in essence about making "shit roll uphill" or in Latin - Refluat Stercus. REFLU A
T means: "Let it flow back," a command as in "let us go." REFLU I T means: "It does
flow back," a statement. Similarly, FLUAT means: "Let if flow," and FLUIT means: "it
does flow." I thank Dr. Nicholas P. Russo of St. Francis de Sales High School of Toledo,
Ohio, for the Latin lesson. Depending on what happens, it is possible that in a certain
number of years, someone might write an article entitled "Refluit Stercus" to herald a
change. The First Chautauqua Declaration appears to - at least for internal disputes to a
given country - herald such a development. See The First Chautauqua Declaration n.33,
Aug. 29, 2007 (on file with author).
33 Id.
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law through the United States domestic courts for criminal pros-
ecution of high-level US civilians and generals with regard to tor-
ture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as this seems
the most possible path to punishing those perpetrators.
Of course, domestic criminal prosecution of fellow citizens
requires political will, particularly in the United States system
where the prosecutor is not independent of the Executive and
there is no equivalent of the partie civile as in civil law systems.
Building political will is beyond the scope of this article which is
written from the point of view of a citizen evaluating what can be
done with such high-level civilians and military generals in cases
of violations of peremptory norms of international law. It is also
useful to be aware that the kind of defendants that are the sub-
ject of this article are persons who have access to far more levers
of power as compared to such a citizen. 34 Co-opting civil society
through influencing public opinion and somatizing35 citizens to
block investigation and prosecution are efforts that high-level ac-
tors are capable of doing. If such persons can prevent an investi-
gation from happening or turn an investigation in a direction
away from them, they run little risk of prosecution for underlying
crimes. With that kind of power, they would have little need to
put in place a cover up and run the risk of obstruction of justice
type prosecutions. At least as described in the next section, in the
absence of obstruction of justice cases these high-level civilians
are able to successfully organize their absolution and the gener-
als are at most likely to have administrative discipline.
34 Having stood in the winter wind and snow in a field to protest war crimes and torture
at a January 2004 Presidential visit in northwestern Ohio, while vast police and military
forces surrounded the few average citizens corralled in a little pen, I know just how mi-
nuscule a citizen's protest on these issues can be. Moreover, even after Abu Ghraib had
broken, having been required to stand far away from the organizers of the designated pro-
test site by those who thought bringing up war crimes and torture were not "unifying
themes" for the Democratic-led demonstrators at a Presidential visit in August 2004 at
Fort Meigs, Ohio, I also know that there seems to be little hope in looking to one or the
other party to lead on these issues . . . Having led the effort to have the American Society
of International Law pass its Centennial Resolution on the Use of Armed Force and
Treatment of Detainees I recognize how fleeting the efforts of citizens can be when com-
pared to the acts of state organs like the Military Commissions Act of 2006. But, these are
the tools a citizen has to insist on compliance with international norms by his state and so
we make the best use of our meager resources.
3 See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 6 (1949) (Stating that "every sound you made
was overheard, and, except in darkness, every moment scrutinized").
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As part of sapping the political will to conduct these types
of criminal prosecutions, one notes the use of moral and utilita-
rian arguments in favor of torture in certain circumstances (the
ticking time-bomb, for the greater good, the need to relativize ab-
solute prohibitions). 36 The search for what seems to be a Kantian
categorical imperative morphed through a Carl Schmittian 37 view
of "total war" might lead persons to believe that, for the survival
of a way of life, the moral position would be to torture or cruelly,
inhumanely and degradingly treat persons. A utilitarian (ra-
tional choice) would try to balance the nature of the cost (the tor-
ture of a few persons) with the benefit (it works and we receive
some actionable intelligence to avoid a nuclear explosion). 38 The
36 See generally ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007) (considering the proper role of judges in light
of the American response to al-Qaeda); Yuval Shany, The Prohibition Against Torture and
Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment and Punishment: Can the Absolute Be Relati-
vized Under Existing International Law?, 56 CATH. U.L. REV. 837, 838 (2007) (reviewing
"the theoretical underpinnings of the absolute international law prohibition against tor-
ture").
37 See Scott Horton, State of Exception, Bush's war on the rule of law, HARPER'S
MAGAZINE, Sept. 2007, available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/07/0O081595. This
source discussed Carl Schmitt's work as the source of what is called "lawfare" role of law
in warfare. It stated that
Carl Schmitt also laid the foundations for a new attitude toward warfare and the
role of law in the conduct of war. In his early masterwork, The Concept of the Po-
litical (1927), Schmitt derided the weakness of liberalism and its efforts at con-
sensus building and instead embraced the legitimacy of a process of extreme de-
monization of political adversaries. Guaranteeing legal rights to an enemy was
thus senseless and counterproductive. In its place, Schmitt advanced the notion
of "total war" ("Total Enemy, Total War, Total State," 1937), suggesting that the
neatly delineated warfare of prior ages, in which uniformed, professional armies
met on a field of war, was in decline in favor of a new kind of all-encompassing
warfare. Schmitt ridiculed the law of armed conflict, saying it reflected ideologi-
cal principles rooted in nineteenth-century English liberalism. At the same time,
he turned to the legal concept of piracy as a basis for treating adversaries as per-
sons completely beyond the help of law and the courts, free to be dealt with just
as the executive pleased without being bothered by lawyers ("The Concept of Pi-
racy," 1937).
Id.; see Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Executive Power v. International Law, 30
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 73 (2006) (describing further critiques of international law). See
generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH, & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
38 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International
Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (2002) (arguing that ra-
tional choice theory accounts for international behavior, and this theory is not inconsis-
tent with the persistent use of moral language in international affairs); see also Bell, su-
pra note 29, at 346-61 (showing utilitarian critique of the utilitarian argument for
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literature is replete with discussions of scenarios that are ulti-
mately suppose to lead us to either one of two conclusions - some
torture is permitted ex ante (torture warrants)3 9 or some torture
is to be forgiven ex post (outlaw and forgive through jury nullifi-
cation or non-prosecution). 40 In either case, we would be in as-
pects of the state of exception. 41
This article does not engage with that debate as I am fo-
cused on the legal position. However, for purposes of garnering
political will to undertake these types of criminal prosecutions it
might be useful that I state my approach to these moral and uti-
litarian arguments in favor of torture. I categorically reject the
moral and utilitarian arguments for torture. The moral argu-
ment by definition posits that the one deciding to do the torture
is doing it for some good and that such person is therefore good.
Yet, our moral history connotes the opposite - particularly with
the state: the torturer in all epochs in memory comes to be seen
as a symbol of evil not the victim. The torturer with a moral con-
science recognizes that the actions he is doing to other people are
transgressive of a fundamental moral norm. The torturer with-
out a moral conscience is by definition a sociopath incapable of
making reasonable moral choices. In either case, the torturer is
not a force of good but of evil.
The torturer may seek to rationalize, as we have seen, his
transgressive act through minimizing what he is actually doing
torture); see also Tom Rick's Inbox, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2007, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/contentlarticle/2007/10/12/AR2007 101201885.htm
l?referrer=emailarticlepg (discussing military persons' views of interrogation techniques).
39 See Dershowitz 4, supra note 29, at M-5; see also Dershowitz 3, supra note 29; see also
DERSHOWITZ 1, supra note 29; see also DERSHOWITZ 2, supra note 29, at 257. All of these
articles touch upon the role of torture in our response to terrorism.
40 See generally POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 36 (commenting on the judges role);
Shany, supra note 36, at 838 (reviewing the absolute international law prohibition
against torture).
41 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., 2005). 'The essential
contiguity between the state of exception and sovereignty was established by Carl Schmitt
in his book Politische Theologie (1922). Although his famous definition of the sovereign as
'he who decides on the state of exception' has been widely commented on and discussed,
there is still no theory of the state of exception in public law." Id. at 1. The state of excep-
tion may be similar to a setting of gross lawlessness regarding international law on the
internal plane (see discussion infra at footnote 214 and the accompanying text). Even in a
democratic state, this type of setting magnifies the concern of depending solely on internal
law. See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
WARTIME (1998) (commenting on the state of civil liberties in wartime during World War I
and World War II).
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(use of euphemism) or arguing for the benefits of what he has
done. The problem with this justification of torture is that be-
cause of the transgressive nature of the act, the reliability of the
rationalizations are as suspect as the reliability of the evidence
that comes out of the torture. 42 The transgressive act of torture,
unless countenanced, raises the risk of vulnerability for the
guilty act ("being thrown under the bus"). To avoid or reduce
that vulnerability, a rational torturer would (like his victim) say
42 I have come to call this the "Abu Zubaydah trope," often used in discourse about "en-
hanced interrogation techniques." See President's Remarks on the War on Terror, 42
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1569 (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.
gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2006-presidential-documents&docid=pd1 lseO6-txt-15.pdf.
"[T]he CIA used an alternative set of procedures.... the procedures were tough, and they
were safe, and lawful and necessary. Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures,
and soon he began to provide information on key Al Qaeda operatives." Id. at 1571. Presi-
dent Bush further stated that "questioning the detainees in this program has given us
information that has saved innocent lives by helping us stop new attacks -- here in the
United States and across the world." Id. at 1570-71. Presidential candidates have argued
in favor of "enhanced interrogation techniques" as part of their campaigning apparently to
demonstrate a "tough on terror" position to an electorate. See Adam Nagourney & Marc
Santora, Terror Attack Scenario Exposes Deep Differences Among G.O.P. Hopefuls, N.Y.
TIMES, May 16, 2007, at A17, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res
=9A06E2D71331F935A25756COA9619C8B63.
Senator John McCain of Arizona, a prisoner of war in Vietnam, said he would not
resort to torture because the United States would lose more in world opinion than it
would gain in information. "When I was in Vietnam, one of the things that sustained
us, as we went -- underwent torture ourselves -- is the knowledge that if we had our
positions reversed and we were the captors, we would not impose that kind of treat-
ment on them," Mr. McCain said. "It's not about the terrorists, it's about us. It's about
what kind of country we are."
Former Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani of New York said he would back "every method"
short of torture that interrogators could think of because "I don't want to see another
3,000 people dead in New York or any place else."
Former Gov. Mitt Romney of Massachusetts said he would support "not torture but
enhanced interrogation techniques. [sic] And taking a tougher line than President
Bush and Mr. McCain, who have said they would like to shut down the detention cen-
ter at Guantdnamo Bay, Mr. Romney said he wanted the facility doubled in size.
Id.; see also Associated Press, Bush: U.S. 'does not torture people' President Responds to
Report that 2005 Memo Relaxed Interrogation Rules, MSNBC, Oct. 5, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21148801/. "'When we find somebody who may have infor-
mation regarding a potential attack on America, you bet we're going to detain them, and
you bet we're going to question them .... The American people expect us to find out in-
formation .... This government does not torture people."' Id. See generally Milan Markov-
ic, Can Lawyers Be War Criminals?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 347 (2007). "After Septem-
ber 11, 2001, the Bush Administration was determined to stop Al Qaeda, but the United
States lacked human intelligence - spies inside the terrorist organization. Officials with-
in the government reasoned that their best hope for gathering intelligence was by ques-
tioning captured terrorist suspects ... like Abu Zubaydah." Id. at 347-38.
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precisely those things that appear to give the impression that the
torture has worked. Otherwise, the torturer's transgression was
without meaning or use - a crime with no reward for the crime.
It is possible such unrewarded crime would be of interest to a
given torturer, but in that case the torturer would appear to be
willing to do the transgressive act whether or not a reward was
possible. Again, such a torturer would be a sociopath and not of
interest to an analysis of rational choice. In professing the relia-
bility of what he is saying, the victim is speaking to the torturer
so as to be relieved of his pain. In the same way, the torturer is
speaking to absolve his guilt to the relevant audience outside of
the cell that questions the validity of the practice to relieve his
own risk. That relevant audience outside the cell, given the un-
animity condemning such practices in the positive law of treaties
and customary international law, is the local community but ex-
tends out through linkages to the world community. The tortur-
er in his justification seeks to hold back the condemnation of that
world community for as long as possible by any means necessary.
If the torturer is successful in holding back that world
community until his death, he has managed a salvation but only
on earth. To the extent such persons are not made to do an ex-
piatory act through the revelation of the truth and being brought
to justice in their life then the transgressive act goes unpunished.
The transgressive act becomes integrated in the peace of a com-
munity. That peaceful community would integrate that trans-
gressive act as part of its nature, laying the seeds for the state
again to rise in some future moment against some unfavored per-
sons and repeat the transgressive act. Such a peace is an uneasy
peace as the recourse to what is absolutely prohibited remains a
temptation in any crisis to the state when there is no memory of
consequences for the transgressive act.
Rather than wait 40-50 years for the expiatory moment of
apology or not prosecute the heinous underlying transgressive
act, I am suggesting that we should root out the transgressor and
the transgressive act with regard to torture and cruel inhuman
and degrading treatment. As a peremptory norm, it is something
that is worth addressing in an early, rather than later, manner
and in the most harsh way. This type of resistance to the illegal
act maintains the absolute ban on such action, does not relativize
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human reaction, and keeps these actions illegitimate and beyond
the ken.
PART I. FLUIT STERCUS43 - DIFFERENT SPANKS FOR DIFFERENT
RANKS
United States criminal prosecution of U.S. high-level civi-
lian authority or military generals for violations of international
humanitarian law or international criminal law is an under-
examined area.44 One possible reason for this lack of analysis
might be that such criminal prosecutions under international law
have never been done in U.S. domestic courts.45 But, just because
something like this has not been done before, does not mean that
we cannot envision how it should occur now.
To help understand how to address such criminal prosecu-
tion now, it is useful to situate such a domestic prosecution in a
historical context that is both domestic (internal to the US) and
international (external to the US). In order to accomplish this, I
first situate this domestic prosecution for these international
crimes with these defendants in contrast with other criminal
prosecutions of other defendants domestically or similar defen-
dants internationally (A); I next look at the foreign experience
with prosecution for high-level civilians or generals in interna-
tional and national courts that might help us understand what is
being done if such a domestic U.S. experience was to be underta-
ken at this juncture (B); and then I look at the American histori-
cal experience with criminal prosecutions that might appear to
resemble what we are seeking to discuss in this article (C).
4 See supra, note 32. Fluit stercus literally means "it does flow" or, as is often said in
the military, "shit rolls down hill."
44 Since the Green Beret 'Medic" Case, following the controversial war in Vietnam, the
"Nuremberg defense," a soldier's defense to an allegation of committing war crimes, has
gained significant momentum. See Anthony A. D'Amato et al., War Crimes and Vietnam:
The "Nuremberg Defense" and the Military Service Resister, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1055-56
(1969). This source states that "the case does stand for the important precedent that a
war-crimes defense is available, in relevant circumstances, to in-service resisters." Id. at
1056.
45 In a recent analysis, where discussions of such prosecutions are described in both in-
ternational tribunals and national tribunals of various countries, there appears to be no
mention of such criminal prosecutions in the United States. See generally MIREILLE
DELMAS-MARTY & ANTONIO CASSESSE, JURIDICTIONS NATIONALES ET CRIMES
INTERNATIONAUX [NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES] (2002).
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A. Situating these US domestic criminal prosecutions in the
world
There are cases of high-level defendants being prosecuted
for violations of international law in other fora around the
world. 46 These cases may help inform our thinking about the U.S.
domestic court setting, but I wish to emphasize that our interest
in them is only as an aid to our reflection. Our concern is that
too much of a focus in this article on these other types of cases
with other types of defendants may confuse rather than clarify
our understanding of how these cases would operate inside the
United States. So the presentation will attempt to be sufficient
but succinct, so that we can move to the next issue of why it is
important to bring such prosecutions and the further issues dis-
cussed in the remaining sections of the article.
International or hybrid tribunals: The types of criminal
prosecutions of interest for these U.S. high-level civilians or mili-
tary generals are not prosecutions in international tribunals such
as in the international or hybrid tribunals that the United States
has assisted in setting up since World War II such as the Inter-
national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the International Mili-
tary Tribunal for the Far East, the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court in East Timor, the Spe-
cial Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia, or the International Criminal Court.47 The
46 In this section of the article, these cases are discussed in detail.
41 Some may wonder why I do not list the Iraqi High Tribunal, International Court of
Justice, or the Lockerbie Tribunal. As to the Iraqi High Tribunal, there are significant
questions about whether the international minimum standard of justice is provided in
that tribunal, created pursuant to the invasion and war in Iraq. See Nehal Buta, Judging
Dujail: The First Trial Before the Iraqi High Tribunal, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Nov. 2006, at 7,
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/iraqllO6/iraqllO6webwcover.pdf. "[T]he
court is a newly created institution in a recently reconstituted legal system, in which law-
yers and judges were previously isolated from developments in international criminal law
and had no experience in investigating and trying complex international crimes." Id.; see
also Eric H. Blinderman, Lessons from the Saddam Trial: Article: Judging Human Rights
Watch: An Appraisal of Human Rights Watch's Analysis of the Ad-Dujayl Trial, 39 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 99, 101 (2006/2007). Blinderman noted that the Human Rights Watch
found that the Iraqi High Tribunal did not meet essential fair trial standards in the Ad-
Dujayl trial and therefore "the credibility of the entire [Iraqi High Tribunal] process [was]
doubtful." Id.; see also Michael P. Scharf, Lessons from the Saddam Trial: Foreword: Les-
sons from the Sadaam Trial, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2006/2007). Sharf com-
mented on how the Iraqi High Tribunal was snakebitten. Id.; see also Geoffrey Robertson,
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creation of these international tribunals by the allies after World
War II or through the United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions more recently created international tribunals acting on the
international law plane rather than on the domestic law plane.
These types of tribunals have had statutes/treaties specially
created to articulate the crimes they will address and their juris-
diction and procedures. These tribunals were for the most part
outside of the domestic court systems of individual countries or
(in the case of Cambodia) specially inserted into the domestic
court system of the country.
There appear to be two very distinct groups of these in-
ternational tribunals. The International Military Tribunal for
Nuremberg ("Nuremberg trials") and the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East ("Tokyo trials"), respectively, addressed
international crimes committed by the Nazis and the Japanese
both internally and externally to their home countries. The focus
of the tribunals was not only on the horrors inflicted by each re-
gime on its own population, but also on the horrors committed by
such regimes outside of their territories. I call this an inter-
nal/external tribunal.
After a long period of silence, the world renewed the in-
ternational criminal tribunal paradigm with the creation in 1993
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via. This tribunal was focused on the international crimes that
occurred in the former Yugoslavia and was created by U.N. reso-
Symposium: Milosevic & Hussein on Trial: Keynote Address: Ending Impunity: How In-
ternational Criminal Law Can Put Tyrants on Trial, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 649, 649-50
(2005). Robertson comments that a question of bias will arise during the trial of Saddam
Hussein. Id at 650. I have had personal qualms about some aspects of the statute and
what I have seen of the proceedings. On the other hand, the tribunals which I am discuss-
ing here have not been challenged to my memory for failure to provide an international
minimum standard of justice for the defendants. Of course, the lack of jury trial in the
International Criminal Court system has been a concern raised by the United States.
However, the actual operation of that court appears very new and nothing indicates at
this time that it will act without the appropriate prudence and serenity required. As to
the International Court of Justice, the simple answer is that the focus of this paper is in-
dividual criminal responsibility and not state responsibility - the only parties to cases at
the ICJ are by definition states. As to the tribunal for Lockerbie, that appears to resemble
the type of ad hoc state to state tribunals that in the past have addressed a specific prob-
lem - more transient and less stable as a model when one is thinking about conspiracy
with regard to multiple crimes that may have occurred over numerous nations (such as,
for example extraordinary renditions). For a discussion of the question of terrorism re-
lated trials such as Lockerbie, see generally Symposium: "Terrorism on Trial," 36 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 287 (2004).
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lution.48 The international crimes being addressed were those
committed within the former Yugoslavia as it dissolved. Such a
tribunal provides significant decisions that help expand the Nu-
remberg legacy, while operating within a structure that is an in-
ternational tribunal dealing with international crimes resulting
from the dissolution of a state. In contrast to the Nuremberg or
the Tokyo trials, and while recognizing the succession of state is-
sues that also affect this tribunal as new states emerged from the
former Yugoslavia, I view the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia as an international tribunal dealing
with internal cross ethnic/religious-based international crimes.
Said tribunal will wind up its work in the next few years and at
that point the question remains whether a rump version will re-
main in a dormant capacity to prosecute any fugitives (Mladic
and Karadzic) or some kind of transfer of jurisdiction will be
made to domestic courts in the Balkans to follow-up on any cases
of defendants who are currently fugitives.
Similar to the focus in the International Criminal Tribun-
al for the Former Yugoslavia on international crimes performed
by leaders against their nationals in their territories, the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 49 and the Special Court
for Sierra Leone 50 have in practice and by statute had an internal
focus. In this sense, territorial jurisdiction where the crime was
committed is the key basis for the jurisdiction of these tribunals.
At the same time, in addition to their jurisprudence with regard
to high-level leaders in Sierra Leone or Rwanda, there are two
significant aspects to these two tribunals for purposes of this ar-
ticle. For Sierra Leone, the arrest of Charles Taylor, the former
head of Liberia, by the Special Court of Sierra Leone raised the
48 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (noting the purpose of the court
was "to establish an international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons re-
sponsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the terri-
tory of the former Yugoslavia").
49 See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing "an international
tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwan-
da").
50 See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (requesting the Secretary-
General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create inde-
pendent special court to prosecute for "crimes against humanity, war crimes and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law ... committed within the territory of
Sierra Leone").
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specter of a (present or former) head of state from another coun-
try being held to account for international crimes relating to the
territory of jurisdiction - in this case Sierra Leone. 51 A foreign
head of state being tried brings an external element to the work
of the Special Court of Sierra Leone while it maintained its focus
on crimes that occurred within the Sierra Leonean territory. 52
For Rwanda, the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda granted jurisdiction over crimes that occurred in
Rwanda or had been committed by Rwandans in neighboring
countries.53 This language created the possibility of crimes that
were committed by Rwandans in neighboring countries (spill-
over crimes) being addressed by such an international criminal
tribunal, in addition to crimes that relate to the territory of
Rwanda. As a practical matter, the difficulties in terms of re-
sources available to conduct such investigations and prosecutions
have limited the actual number of cases involving crimes com-
mitted outside Rwanda by Rwandans.
Finally, the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of
Cambodia 54 form a hybrid created by treaty and inserted in the
domestic court system of that country. While only getting started
51 See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Prosecution's Second Amended
Indictment (May 29, 2007), available at http://www.sc-sl.orgIDocuments/SCSL-03-01-PT.
263.pdf (accusing Taylor, Leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia and the Presi-
dent of the Republic of Liberia with crimes against humanity, violations of the Geneva
Convention and other serious violations of international humanitarian law).
52 "1. The Special Court shall, except as provided in subparagraph (2), have the power
to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra
Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders who, in committing such crimes,
have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra
Leone." Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1(1), Jan. 16, 2002, available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.html.
53 "1. Decides hereby, having received the request of the Government of Rwanda
(S/1994/1115), to establish an international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting
persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanita-
rian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for ge-
nocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, be-
tween 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 and to this end to adopt the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda annexed hereto S.C. Res. 955, supra
note 49.
54See Introduction: Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2008) (explaining that the
ECCC is one "special new court" that was created due to the Cambodian-UN agreement,
but that operated independently of the UN).
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recently, its focus again is internal to one nation: on the heinous
crimes committed against persons in Cambodia. 55
These four international criminal tribunals are examples
of essentially internally-focused international criminal tribunals
that do not address in a significant manner situations where few
international crimes occur in the territory of the state of the
leader, but the leaders of that state commit crimes outside of that
state. The work of these tribunals is thus distinguishable from
the case we are seeking to examine of high-level U.S. civilians
and generals whose principal alleged international crimes would
be outside the United States.
The next emerging international tribunal structure is the
International Criminal Court.56 In theory the International
Criminal Court is in a position to address international crimes
that are both internal to a given state (i.e. leaders against their
populations) and external to a given state (leaders of one nation
against the leaders and populations of another state).57 In prac-
tice, its first referrals (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ugan-
da, Central African Republic and the Sudan)58 continue with the
traditions of the recent tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and what is expected in Cambodia by fo-
cusing on the internal type international crimes. This cautious
approach in its first years is completely understandable as the
International Criminal Court attempts to create its credibility as
an institution and take on cases that it finds itself capable of
handling within its resource constraints. One could imagine the
International Criminal Court taking on more external violation
55 See Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, ch.
1, art. 1, NS/RKMI1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/
cabinet/law/4/KRLaw as amended27Oct-2004_Eng.pdf (stating that the purpose of
ECCC is to prosecute senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and others responsible for
crimes committed during period between April 17, 1975 and January 6, 1979).
56 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999,
available at http://www.icc-cpi.intflibrary/about/officialjournallRomeStatute-English.pdf
(establishing an International Criminal Court).
5 7 Id.
58 Situations and Cases, International Criminal Court, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/cases.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2008).
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cases 59 as it develops as an institution but at what point is still
uncertain.
The ad hoc creation of an international tribunal to ad-
dress international crimes of the United States high-level civi-
lians or military generals appears extremely unlikely as a U.N
Security Council creation would be blocked by the United States
or (presumably) the United Kingdom (if not other permanent
members). Moreover, the United States is unwilling to extradite
Americans to such international tribunals. Such international
tribunals appear to be anathema to the United States.60 Moreo-
ver, for the International Criminal Court and even putting aside
questions of jurisdiction, the primary aspects of the cases that
would be brought against the U.S. high-level civilians or military
generals would not be with regard to international crimes in-
flicted on the American population on American soil - the focus
59 Particularly when it comes to the crime of aggression to be defined (or redefined) for
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court at the end of the decade.
60 See American Service Members Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7433
(2002).
Members of the Armed Forces of the United States should be free from the risk of
prosecution by the International Criminal Court, especially when they are stationed
or deployed around the world to protect the vital national interests of the United
States. The United States Government has an obligation to protect the members of its
Armed Forces, to the maximum extent possible, against criminal prosecutions carried
out by the International Criminal Court.
22 U.S.C. § 7421(8).
In addition to exposing members of the Armed Forces of the United States to the risk
of international criminal prosecution, the Rome Statute creates a risk that the Presi-
dent and other senior elected and appointed officials of the United States Govern-
ment may be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court. Particularly if the Pre-
paratory Commission agrees on a definition of the Crime of Aggression over United
States objections, senior United States officials may be at risk of criminal prosecution
for national security decisions involving such matters as responding to acts of terror-
ism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and deterring ag-
gression. No less than members of the Armed Forces of the United States, senior offi-
cials of the United States Government should be free from the risk of prosecution by
the International Criminal Court, especially with respect to official actions taken by
them to protect the national interests of the United States.
22 U.S.C.A. § 7421(9). Recently, the President and Congress relaxed prohibitions on mili-
tary assistance to many countries adhering to the ICC statute. The authority was exer-
cised this fall to allow resumption of military education and training programs with twen-
ty-one ICC parties. See John R. Cook, President and Congress End Limits on Military
Training for Parties to ICC Treaty, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 213, 214 (2007).
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of jurisdiction of the recent tribunals described above and in part
the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. The focus would be on in-
ternational crimes that had their effects primarily on leaders and
persons outside the United States - something that would re-
quire a return to a vision more like Nuremberg or Tokyo - tri-
bunals created as an ad hoc measure by allies. It is difficult at
this juncture to see how such a tribunal would be able to be
created. Moreover, the International Criminal Court appears to
be not yet at a stage where it would venture to address those
types of crimes.61
For similar reasons to the international criminal tribun-
als62 and given its current approach to selecting cases, this sub-
ject does not concern itself with broader issues of the Interna-
61 One of the particularly interesting things about the First Chatauqua Declaration is
the quote of Robert H. Jackson at Nuremberg in which he said, "We are able to do away
with domestic tyranny and violence and aggression by those in power against the rights of
their own people only when we make all men answerable to the law." The First Chautau-
qua Declaration, supra note 32. This quote focuses on the internal aspect of Nuremberg.
Our focus in this article is on essentially external crimes to the United States which
would be analogized to the external to Germany aspect of the international crimes prose-
cuted at Nuremberg. On crimes external to Germany addressed at Nuremberg it should
be noted that some of the defendants crimes covered vast areas while others were focused
on a given state. As a means of highlighting the external to Germany crimes, please note
the following summary for the Nazi defendants.
"Von Papen, Schacht and Fritzsche were acquitted. Goering [the Final Solution], von
Ribbentrop [Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Russia and the Final Solution], Keitel [Cze-
choslavakia, Poland, Belgium, Holland, and other countries], Rosenberg [Norway and
oppression of Jews], Kaltenbrunner [Einsatzgruppen activities and concentration
camps], Frank [Poland and Jews], Frick, Streicher, Sauckel [slave-labor], Seyss-
Inquart [the Netherlands], Jodl [Holland, Belgium, Norway, Poland, Greece and Yu-
goslavia] and Bormann were sentenced to death by hanging. Hess [Austria, Czechos-
lovakia and Poland], Raeder, and Funk were sentenced to life in prison, while Speer
[slave labor] and von Schirach [deportation of Vienna Jews] received sentences of 20
years, von Neurath [Bohemia and Moravia] - 15 years, and Doenitz - 10 years."
Robert H. Jackson Center, Nuremberg Timeline, http://www.roberthjackson.org/
InternationalLaw/time capsule/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2008). See generally Defendants in
the Major War Figures Trial, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/
meetthedefendants.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2008). This is a good place to find profiles
of those defendants at the Nuremberg trials. Id.
62 While this institutional analysis leads to the conclusion that we cannot expect this
type of prosecution from these international tribunals, their work has important aspects
for purposes of this article. What is of interest from these tribunals is there ability and
commitment to prosecute high-level leader defendants. This ability helps us understand
approaches to investigation and prosecution that might provide useful insights for a U.S.
domestic court criminal prosecution. To that extent, U.S. prosecutors may borrow from
these tribunal experiences to the extent these experiences might be relevant.
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tional Criminal Court and United States resistance to its juris-
diction (including the bilateral agreements to prevent United
States Citizens from being brought before that court).63 This sub-
ject's primary interest with regard to the International Criminal
Court is the manner in which our inquiry helps us understand
the potential extent of United States complementarity with re-
gard to these specific types of defendants.
Turning from international tribunals to domestic tribun-
als, this article is not about criminal prosecution of Americans in
the domestic courts of other countries for alleged violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law and/or international criminal law
(or other local domestic law) in the War on Terrorism (Germa-
ny,64 Italy,65 Afghanistan, or Iraq66 for example). These efforts
might be seen as alternative approaches to criminally prosecut-
ing the high-level civilians and generals that are at the heart of
this paper, but our interest is more U.S. domestic than compara-
tive. The whole discussion of universal jurisdiction statutes is
very interesting and passionate. However, to date these foreign
tribunals have either declined to criminally prosecute high-level
U.S. civilians or military officers (Germany, twice) or undertaken
investigations of subalterns (Italy, Sweden, or Switzerland).
These domestic courts appear to be taking traditional approaches
that jurisdiction is proper on territorial or passive personality
grounds. As the crimes that occur in one or more of these states
are committed allegedly by subordinates to those of concern in
63 See Press Release, U.S. Signs 100th Article 98 Agreement (May 3, 2005), available at
http:/Iwww.state.gov/rlpa/prslps/2005/45573.htm ("U.S. persons will not be surrendered to
the International Criminal Court without our consent."); see also U. S. Dep't of State, Bu-
reau of Political-Military Affairs, Fact Sheet: The International Criminal Court (Aug. 2,
2002), available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2002/23426.htm ("The U.S. strongly
opposes the Rome Statute as seriously flawed, but will work together with other nations
to avoid any disruptions that might be caused by the treaty. The treaty itself provides for
this, specifically in Article 98. We intend to pursue Article 98 agreements worldwide.").
64 A German court has opened a case with regard to the extraordinary rendition of
Khaled El-Masri. U.S. Displeased, supra note 9.
65 See Bhat, supra note 20 (reporting that "[an Italian judge has ordered 26 Americans
and five Italians to stand trial for the kidnapping of a terror suspect in Milan in 2003, in
what will be the first criminal court case over the CIA's extraordinary rendition
programme"); see also Kirgis, supra note 20 (describing the legal issues surrounding the
accusation that CIA agents kidnapped Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr in Italy).
66 See Geren v. Omar, 128 S. Ct. 741 (2007) (not yet assigned a docket number); see also
Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 741 (2007). Both cases involve U.S. citizens being detained
abroad by the United States and awaiting transfer to Iraqi authorities for criminal
charges against them in Iraq.
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this paper, such domestic court systems appear not able or will-
ing to go up the proverbial "chain of command," whether for rea-
sons of prosecutorial discretion, political, or resource constraints
in investigation and evidence. With the advent of a U.S. domes-
tic court prosecution, the tendency might be increased not to go
up the chain of command precisely because of the U.S. efforts.
So, in either case, overseas domestic court prosecutions appear
more of interest as points of pressure on political deciders with
regard to horizontal enforcement of international peremptory
norms. It is possible that evidence developed in these proceed-
ings might be of use in the U.S. domestic prosecutions here envi-
saged, but the hope would have to be that there was sufficient
compatibility with regard to the gathering and maintaining of
evidence to make this evidence gathering useful assistance.
This article is not concerned with the jurisprudence re-
garding prosecutions of vanquished external/internal enemies of
the United States (sometimes by military commissions) for viola-
tions that approach the levels of international criminal law or in-
ternational humanitarian law in the United States courts. 67
Thus, cases in which the defendants may be high-level civilians
or generals that are not American but are in American domestic
courts are of interest mainly to provide comparative footnotes
here and there to contrast with the cases of prosecution of high-
level Americans for the international crimes under discussion.
We are focusing on Americans as a means of highlighting how we
have and could approach ourselves.
Similar to the prosecutions of vanquished exter-
nal/internal enemies for alleged violations of international law,
67 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); see also The Civil War Court Martial Trial of
Captain Wirz (1865), available at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrialsWirz/
Wirz.htm (last viewed Feb. 6, 2008). These cases do not concern United States civilian
authority or military officers, though Captian Wirz was an American who served the Con-
federacy as the Commandant of the Andersonville Prison during the Civil War. See The
German High Command Trial of Wilhelm Von Leeb and Thirteen Others, United States
Military Tribunal, Nuremberg (1948), http://www.law.nyu.edu/kingsburyb/fallO1/intllaw/
PROTECTED/Unit3/PDF/unit3_llllhighcommandcase.pdf (last viewed Feb. 6, 2008); see
also U.S. v. Wilhelm List, Case No.7, International Military Tribunal No. V (1947),
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study-collections/nuremberg/documents/index.
php (last viewed Feb. 6, 2008); see also The Tokyo War Crimes Trials, the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East (1948), http://www.cnd.org/mirror/nanjing/NMTT.html
(last viewed Feb. 6, 2008). These cases concern vanquished external enemies of the Unit-
ed States.
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this subject is not focusing on the criminal prosecution in United
States domestic courts of A1-Qaeda, Taliban or other suspects (for
example, Zacarias Moussaoui, 68 the Lackawanna cell,69 John
Walker Lindh,70 and Jose Padilla 71 and others 72). To the extent
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment within the
United States has happened to these defendants, 73 that, of
course, is of interest to this inquiry. However, other than the tor-
ture aspect, these are cases in U.S. domestic fora that do not con-
cern the kind of potential defendants that interest this discus-
sion. As a corollary, except for evidence gathered about torture
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of these individuals,
this paper is not about the efforts of detainees to contest their de-
tention in the War on Terrorism through habeas corpus filings
(the recent Supreme Court and other lower court cases). 74
This paper is not concerned generally with cases of fo-
reigners or U.S. domestic corporations who have allegedly vi-
olated international law abroad and who are sued in civil cases
under the Alien Tort Statute75 or the Torture Victim Protection
68 See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13323
(E.D. Va. July 11, 2002) (concerning part of Moussaoui's criminal proceedings in the U.S.).
69 See Michael Powell, No Choice But Guilty, WASHINGTON POST, July 29, 2003, at A01,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlac2lwpdyn?pagename=article&contentld=
A59245.2003Jul28&notFound=true (describing the charges brought against a Lackawan-
na terror cell and the pleas accepted as well as the legal backdrop in which they occurred).
70 See United States v. Lindh, 198 F. Supp. 2d 739 (E.D. Va. 2002) (regarding the
charges brought against the John Philip Walker Lindh, United States citizen, whose
charges allege that the Defendant contributed services to al-Qaeda).
71 See United States v. Padilla, No. 04-6001-CR-COOKE, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84497
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2006) (adjudicating terror charges brought against United States citi-
zen Jose Padilla).
72 A compilation of terror related cases is available at http://news.findlaw.comllegal
news/us/terrorismcases/index.html (last viewed Feb. 6, 2008).
73 See, e.g., United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001-CR-COOKE, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26077 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2007) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment
based on outrageous government conduct).
14 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 678-79 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (not-
ing the President's "broad constitutional authority to protect the Nation's security in the
manner he deems fit"); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 470, 470-72 (2004) (contesting the
legality of executive detention at Guantanamo Bay); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
509, 509 (2004) (challenging the detention); see also Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426,
430 (discussing whether the President had the authority to detain Padilla); see also
FindLaw Legal News: Special Coverage: War on Terror: Cases, FINDLAW,
http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/terrorismlcases/index.html (listing links to
documents filed in detainee cases) (last visited Feb. 6, 2008).
75 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2007).
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Act 76 or some other tort statute. Nor does it concern criminal
prosecutions of such persons or entities. These cases might, as
with the detainee discussion above, be of interest to the extent
evidence is elicited in them with regard to the international
crimes and defendants of which we are concerned, but our prima-
ry interest is not in civil process but in criminal process for a se-
lect group. Corporate criminal liability or foreigner criminal lia-
bility related to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment are not considered central because, in this vision, the
actions that these entities would have undertaken are only of in-
terest as they pertain to the criminal liability of the select group
of high-level civilians and military generals that we are consider-
ing as potential defendants. For similar reasons, this subject is
not concerned with the prosecution of military contractors
(whether through Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction,7 7 the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, or in domestic federal or state
criminal courts). Interest in them would be only to the extent
that higher level civilians or generals were making use of them to
violate international humanitarian law and/or international
criminal law.
This paper does not concern international law defenses
that could be raised by lower-level U.S. soldiers who might be
court-martialed or prosecuted in U.S. domestic courts.78 Lower-
level soldier cases are interesting where information has been
found of potential crimes that were not prosecuted (No Gun Ri in
Korea, Tiger Force in Vietnam, see below) in the past for lower-
level persons, or, when prosecution happened for low-level per-
sons (Song My/My Lai or Abu Ghraib), but no prosecution was
76 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992).
77 See generally Ian Kierpaul, Comment, The Mad Scramble of Congress, Lawyers, and
Law Students After Abu Ghraib: The Rush to Bring Private Military Contractors to Jus-
tice, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 407 (2008) (commenting on the actions of the military in Abu
Ghraib).
78 See Mike Barber, Mistrial end Watada Court Martial, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Feb. 7, 2007, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/302733courtmartial07ww
.html (asserting defense of illegality in Lt. Ehren Watada's court-martial proceedings); see
also Peter Boylan, It's 'Back to Square One' for Watada, Feb. 24, 2007,
http://www.thankyoult.org/content/view/1044/23 (reporting that the Army refiled the
charges against Lt. Watada); see also Martha Baskin, The Case of Lt. Ehren Watada: A
'Citizens' Hearing' on the Legality of U.S. Actions in Iraq, YES! ONLINE,
http://www.yesmagazine.org/article.asp?ID=1619 (last visited Sept. 10, 2008) (reporting
on Lt. Watada's situation).
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done of higher level persons. Thus, the subject addresses crimi-
nal prosecutions of persons who are NOT U.S. high-level civilians
or generals only to the extent they help shed light on the situa-
tions of U.S. high-level civilians or generals. 79
This article is nof interested in courts-martial of generals
for reasons unrelated to the laws of war. For example, courts-
martial, demotions or retirements for conduct such as having sex
with subordinates (Major General David Hale),80 alleged homo-
sexuality (Rear Admiral Selden G. Hooper),81 insubordination
(Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell),8 2 diary entries on
military secrets (Major General Robert Grow)8 3 on the surface
appear not to be of interest as the acts do not appear to be do-
mestic equivalents or even echoes of what might be international
crimes. It is possible that there are underlying issues concerning
these persons actions and that these courts-martial were oppor-
tunities to remove someone from the service without at the same
time revealing criminality of others, but it is very hard to see
that type of reality being present.
Cases where U.S. high-level civilians or military generals
are criminally prosecuted in U.S. domestic courts for crimes that
appear closer to the international crime paradigm are of course of
great interest to this study. It is hoped that this short explana-
tion of the linkages to other types of criminal prosecutions helps
the reader situate our discussion better. It should be noted that
this article is not intended to be prescriptive in terms of recom-
mendations of changes to the law or regulations etc.8 4 Rather, we
are focused on just how we might go about doing such prosecu-
79 Thus, the non-court-martial of Major General Samuel Koster with regard to My Lai
is of more interest than the court-martial and acquittal of Captain Ernest Medina and the
court-martial of Lieutenant William Calley that are typically the subjects of command
responsibility or war crimes discussion. See Victor Hansen, What's Good for the Goose is
Good for the Gander: Lessons from Abu Ghraib: Time for the United States to Adopt a
Standard of Command Responsibility Towards Its Own, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 392
(2006/2007).
80 See Chris Plante, Retired General May Face Reduced Rank in Sex Case, CNN.com,
July14, 1999, http://www.cnn.comfUS/9907/14/army.general.sex/ (reporting how Maj. Gen.
David Hale used his rank and power to coerce sex from wives of subordinates).
81 See ELIZABETH LUTES HILLMAN, DEFENDING AMERICA, MILITARY CULTURE AND THE
COLD WAR COURT-MARTIAL 114 (2005) (Commenting on Admiral Hooper's situation).
82 See id. at 219 n.33 (noting Mitchell's incident).
83 See id. (commenting on Major Grow's dismissal).
84 There are other published articles which have called for the adoption of command re-
sponsibility. See Hansen, supra note 79; see also Smith III, supra note 24.
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tions in the present state of the law.8 5 Thus, we are primarily de-
scriptive of what has been done to criminally prosecute in U.S.
domestic courts, why it should be done, how should it be done,
where should it be done, when should it be done and to whom
should it be done.
I settled on this approach because I felt for practitioners,
academics, and the ordinary citizens of our country it was impor-
tant to demystify how this criminal process might occur. I also
thought it would be of interest to our colleagues around the world
who are concerned about how the United States is acting in the
War on Terrorism. As one can see above, the task requires me to
draw on domestic and international approaches to these crimes
as well as domestic and international criminal law and military
law issues. Constitutional, U.S. foreign relations law, and inter-
national law jurisprudence and doctrine from a wide range of
sources had to be integrated to help reach the level of under-
standing necessary to try to make this synthesis. I consider this
effort as one step in a process of bringing out more clearly how
international law can and should play a role in the United
States. I have emphasized the citizen's role here in bringing this
out because I have been somewhat dismayed by what appears to
be obfuscation at the highest levels of government and the courts
about international law. Maybe these are persons who have at-
tempted to make a virtue of their ignorance; maybe they are
seeking merely to protect themselves from civil or criminal liabil-
ity; or maybe they are seeking to turn a blind eye to awful things.
Our task in the next sections is to shed light in a way that I hope
will be of use to the reader.
85 Thus, we are unable to take into consideration such ideas as a proposed National Se-
curity Court which has been advocated for by Glenn Sulmasy, Momentum for a National
Security Court, JURIST, July 13, 2007, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/
07/momentum-for-national-security-court.php; Glenn Sulmasy, The National Security
Court: A Natural Evolution, JURIST, May 10, 2006, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu]
forumy/2006/05/national-security-court-natural.php; Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal,
Op-Ed., The Terorrists' Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/07/11/opinion/llkatyal.html; Benjamin G. Davis, Against a US Terrorists'
Court, JURIST, July 12, 2007, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/07/against
-us-terrorist-court.php.
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B. Relevant foreign experience with domestic court prosecutions
for international crimes
As noted above, criminal prosecutions of U.S. high-level
civilians or military generals under international law have never
been done in U.S. domestic courts. In contrast, vindication of in-
ternational law rules in other national courts as a result of war
crimes and other aspects of armed conflict has occurred.
In the 20th Century,8 6 after World War I, the (in)famous
Leipzig trials (domestic trials) occurred as a consequence of Ar-
ticles 228 to 230 of the Treaty of Versailles pursuant to which the
defeated German state recognized the right of the Allied Powers
to try persons accused of having committed acts in violation of
the laws and customs of war and was obliged to hand over Ger-
man suspects to the Allied Powers for prosecution.8 7 Germany
preempted the Allied Powers by authorizing the Supreme Court
of the Reich at Leipzig to try individuals.88 The Allied Powers ac-
quiesced. The conventional wisdom is that this was an unsatis-
factory experience (and the United States opposed such actions
against Kaiser Wilhelm) as leaders were acquitted, given light
sentences, or, when jailed, were permitted to escape.8 9
After World War II 100,000 collaboration cases (preponde-
rantly trying French for their collaboration with the Nazis) were
tried in French courts. 90 It has been noted that post-World War II
86 See Hansen, supra note 79, at 349, for an excellent review of the history of command
responsibility from 1439 to the present; see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE 1-37 (1980) for a discussion of
the origins of international criminal law more broadly back to circa 1280 B.C.
87 Similar provisions were placed in the 1920 Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Pow-
ers and Turkey (Treaty of Sevres), signed at Sevres August 10, 1920, but never ratified
and subsequently replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne. See LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 22-24
(1992).
8 Id.
89 See Hansen, supra note 79, at 352 (citing Commission on the Responsibility of the Au-
thors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties: Report presented to the Preliminary
Peace Conference, March 29, 1919, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (1920)) (discussing
how command responsibility developed); see also SUNGA, supra note 87, at 24 (highlight-
ing that of the 901 cases of alleged war criminals, 888 were acquitted or summarily dis-
missed, 13 were convicted with inadequate sentences that were not served as they es-
caped (citing U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 48 (1948))).
90 MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 110 (2007); see
also Yale L.J. Co., Wartime Collaborators: A Comparative Study of the Effect of Their Tri-
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proceedings occurred in three waves (1) military and civilian pro-
ceedings in the immediate aftermath of the war in Europe and
the Far East; (2) civilian proceedings that resurged in a variety of
jurisdictions in the 1960's with regard to Nazi atrocity; and (3) a
handful of high profile cases, again with regard to Nazi atrocities,
in the 1980's and 1990's.91
In Argentina 92 and Chile, 93 processes for addressing inter-
national law violations in internal domestic courts have been on-
going since the 1980's. These efforts to remove immunities of
high-level civilians and to proceed with prosecutions for actions
in the "dirty war" are another ongoing saga by which domestic
courts are seeking to address these types of crimes within a coun-
try.
In Argentina, on March 24, 1976, the army overthrew the
elected democratic government, disbanded the Parliament, re-
voked the justices of the Supreme Court of National Justice, and
put in place the Process of National Reorganization. 94 A heavy
price was paid in this state of exception. In 1980, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of
American States issued a report in minute detail of what it called
a criminal plan to combat terrorism in Argentina. After years of
dictatorship, elections installing a new government, parliament,
and a new formation of the Supreme Court of National Justice
occurred and a new Constitution, replacing that of 1853, was ap-
proved in 1994. Dealing with the question of the equality of fed-
eral laws and treaties in Argentina, the Supreme Court of Na-
als on the Treason Law of Great Britain, Switzerland and France, 56 YALE L.J. 1210, 1226
(1947) (describing the process by which collaborators were tried in French courts).
91 DRUMBL, supra note 90, at 111.
92 For an eloquent discussion of Argentina as it relates to this topic see James Bacchus,
The Garden, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 308, 311-14 (2005) (discussing "disappearances" in
Argentina under military rule and the outrage that continues to exist over them); see also
Charles H. Brower II, Nunca Mas or Deja Vu?, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 525, 526-27 (2007) (com-
paring atrocities committed by the Argentine junta to current treatment of enemy comba-
tants by US government).
93 See MICHAEL E. TIGAR, THINKING ABOUT TERRORISM: THE THREAT TO CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 75 (2007) (noting how initially Chilean commissions
granted widespread amnesty to military leaders, but have since been undone by Chilean
courts); see also U.S. Dep't of State, Hinchey Report: CIA Activities in Chile (Sept. 18,
2000), available at http://foia.state.gov/Reports/HincheyReport.asp (outlining the CIA's
role in Chile during the 1960s and 1970s).
94 See DELMAS-MARTY & CASSESSE, supra note 45, (providing the basis for this discus-
sion).
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tional Justice came to determine that the new Constitution ob-
liged the court to (1) consider treaties superior to federal laws, (2)
the provisions of the Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights were self-executing (application directe), and (3) when de-
ciding on matters, the judges were to conform their decisions to
the interpretations of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. This structure was hoped would help to protect the state
from the return of terror as it had been in the period of the state
of exception. While difficult, the incorporation of international
law in the internal law of Argentina over the years that followed
coupled with the discovery of an old norm of the Constitution
permitted the putting in place of universal jurisdiction in Argen-
tina against the authors of the period of the state of exception.
Thus, the court systems began to address the crimes that oc-
curred in Argentina in a manner that vindicated international
law rules.
In 1970 in Chile, Salvador Allende was elected Presi-
dent. 95 On September 11, 1973, General Augusto Pinochet led a
military coup against the Allende government and maintained
control over the country for the next 17 years. Hundred were tor-
tured and at least 3 000 political opponents were murdered or
simply "disappeared." In 1978, the Pinochet government issued a
Decree 2191 granting a general amnesty to immunize Pinochet
and other government and military officials from prosecution for
crimes committed between September 1973 and March 1978. In
1990, Pinochet agreed to a transition to democracy. A new gov-
ernment was elected which created a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission that detailed 3 197 cases of murder and disappear-
ance as well as thousands of cases of torture. Victims filed hun-
dreds of criminal complaints against Pinochet and other mem-
bers of his government. Because of that amnesty most of these
cases stalled in lower courts. Efforts to prosecute Pinochet in
Chile accelerated with the efforts of the Spanish authorities to
have Pinochet extradited to Spain during his visit to London in
1998. The dual criminality requirement was satisfied for acts of
torture after September 29, 1988, the date the United Kingdom
95 The discussion of Chile in this paragraph is based on the excellent presentation in
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-
ORIENTED APPROACH 667-688 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter DUNOFF ET AL. Casebook].
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passed legislation giving effect to its obligations under the 1984
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment and Punishment. 96 After a series of proceed-
ings on the extradition that riveted the Chilean nation and due to
Pinochet's failing health, the United Kingdom Foreign Minister
Jack Straw returned Pinochet to Chile. On August 9, 2000, the
Chilean Supreme Court effectively stripped Pinochet of his im-
munity from prosecution as those who "disappeared" were to be
considered kidnap victims under Chilean law for which the crime
was still continuing after the amnesty. Other claims of immunity
were also struck down. In December 2006, with criminal charges
still pending, Pinochet died. As with Argentina, the Chilean
court system addressed crimes that had occurred in Chile, but
through an artful interpretation of Chilean domestic law that
still vindicated international law rules.
Potential or future transfer/referral of cases from the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to na-
tional courts in Yugoslavia (or other countries) or the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to national courts in
Rwanda (or other countries) are another development through
which national courts are being asked to address international
crimes of high-level civilians. Gacaca procedures 97 (with some
trepidations about whether the international minimum standard
for justice is being applied) in Rwanda are another effort. In the
Republic of South Africa, in addition to the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission, there have been criminal trials for apartheid
era leaders for acts that as domestic crimes might be considered
vindications of international law rules.98 In Europe, state to state
cases in the European Court of Human Rights have provided im-
portant jurisprudence regarding torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment.99 Israel has also been a source of decisions
96 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
97 Amnesty Int'l, Rwanda: Gacaca a Question of Justice, AI Index AFR 47/007/2002,
Dec. 17, 2002, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAFR470072002.
98 See, e.g., Celean Jacobson, Apartheid Era Security Minister Pleads Guilty in Murder
Plot, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 17, 2007 (commenting on former law and order Minister
Adriaan Vlok's guilty plea).
99 Republic of Ireland v. United Kingdom 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1978), reprinted in
DUNOFF ET AL. Casebook, supra note 95, at 457-58.
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about proper treatment of persons with regard to allegations of
torture, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.100
The particular issue with these cases for the purposes of
what is seeking to be vindicated in this article is that in each of
them they are, in a sense, vindicating international law norms
due to a country's former leaders or high-level persons having in-
jured persons of that country. Persons from other countries come
into the discussion only to the extent the acts that were directed
in the country also picked up non-citizens who were in the coun-
try (for example, a Spaniard in Chile during Pinochet). The non-
citizens are a kind of collateral damage (with the important right
of diplomatic protection from their home states), but the essence
of the conflict appears much more internal to the individual so-
ciety. Even if actions that are being reviewed occurred in other
countries (Klaus Barbie (the butcher in Lyon) with regard to
Vichy France, Adolf Eichmann in Israel with regard to the Holo-
caust, and Erich Priebke with regard to partisans in Italy), the
act for which a domestic court (France, Israel, or Italy in these
cases) is vindicating an international law rule is for an act done
in that country or to victims from that country by nationals from
abroad. 101 The return of the national to the home country might
100 See Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, 38 I.L.M. 1471
(1999), reprinted in DUNOFF ET AL. Casebook, supra note 95, at 458-60 (commenting on
proper interrogation methods); see also Shany, supra note 36, at 840-64 (highlighting one
interesting discussion of the Public Committee Against Torture case); see also Amos N.
Guiora, Where Are Terrorists to Be Tried: A Comparative Analysis of Rights Granted to
Suspected Terrorists, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 805, 805 (2007) (Using Israel as one source in
the discussion about where to try terrorists).
101 Although Adolf Eichmann's crimes against humanity did not happen in Israel, the
Israeli Supreme Court decision analyzing that case as to universal jurisdiction very care-
fully understood that concept as a rule of forum conveniens and noted that many victims
and documentation with regard to the crime were in Israel making it a proper place for
the crimes to be examined. With European Jewish emigration to Israel after World War II
and the refusal of West Germany to pursue such a prosecution of Eichmann, Israel be-
came a natural site for this criminal trial in a manner similar to the cases in France and
Italy noted above. This particular idea comforts the idea of domestic courts criminally
prosecuting defendants for international crimes that occurred or with victims residing in
that state and not international crimes that occurred or with victims residing outside of
that state. A notable recent innovation appears to be the amending of the Senegalese
constitution to permit Senegalese courts to hear a case against Hissene Habre, former
leader of Chad, for international crimes allegedly committed by him during his tenure as
leader of Chad. See Thijs Bouwknegt, Hissene Habre trial in sight, INT'L JUST., July 24,
2008, http://www.rnw.nl/internationaljustice/specials/Universal/080723-habre; see also
Lula Ahrens, Habrg trial in Senegal to go through despite death sentence in Chad, INT'L
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open the way for prosecution on the overseas event in the home
country, but these again appear to be marginal aspects of an es-
sentially internal debate within a country. It is not surprising,
given this history, that the international tribunals since Nurem-
berg and Tokyo have followed essentially this same approach -
nationals on nationals in a territory.
After Nuremberg and Tokyo, we might look to German
domestic court decisions against former Nazis or Japanese do-
mestic court decisions in the post-World War II as a possible ex-
ample of those kinds of national domestic court cases that ad-
dress external crimes. There were certainly numerous decisions
during the occupation of Germany of military commissions re-
garding lower-level Nazis for their acts and in subsequent Ger-
man court proceedings.10 2 My attention has not as of yet been
pointed to such domestic court decisions in Japan. These cases
appear for the most part to be cases that logically flow from Nu-
remberg or Tokyo - put another way, after the top ranks, lower-
level spanks. 10 3 However, given the horrendous specificity of the
Nazi experience and World War II, the defeated status of Ger-
many and Japan after World War II, the post-war international
criminal tribunals that addressed high-level leaders and generals
(Nuremberg and Tokyo) as opposed to the domestic courts, these
experiences appear to have many elements that differ directly
from what I am seeking to explore in the current American situa-
tion. I am not convinced these experiences in domestic courts
would yield sufficient high-level cases to be meaningful as a com-
parative situation to the United States process I am describing.
What they do demonstrate is - possible decades later - the wil-
lingness of these states to confront a profoundly evil past and in-
sist on individual criminal responsibility at the lower-level. This,
in itself, is extremely significant in demonstrating painfully de-
veloped political will to judge oneself.10 4
JUST., Aug. 18, 2008, http://www.rnw.nllinternationaljustice/specials/Universal/O80818-
HabreChad
102 One exception would be the subsequent prosecution of Hans Fritzsche after Nurem-
berg in Germany. See Defendants in the Major War Figures Trial, supra note 61 (Hig-
hlighting that Fritzsche was acquitted).
103 Id. (listing all of the defendants in the major war figures trial).
104 I thank Professor Michael Scharf for discussing different types of tribunals at a con-
ference at Michigan State University in 2005 that helped me to think through this prob-
lem. In fact, it appears there are difficulties at three levels in finding the comparative
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In sum, when we look more directly at domestic court prosecu-
tion, with the exception of the Leipzig experience of a defeated
country taking on the prosecution of former high-level leadership
as part of the post-war settlement, what we tend to see is a fur-
ther intensification of the focus on prior leadership crimes
against nationals of the country in the territory with a few colla-
teral injuries to foreigners who were in the way or, actions
abroad to problematic citizens abroad.
As to vindicating international law rules through criminal
prosecution of fellow countrymen who were high-level civilians in
domestic courts, the French experience appears instructive.
French domestic courts in the 1990's convicted persons for crimes
against humanity (as harmonized between international law and
cases in other domestic fora to what we are seeking to do in a U.S. domestic prosecution
before domestic courts. First, the cases of high-level defendants whose crimes were signif-
icant and horrendous both internally in their country and externally in other countries
appear to be handled in specially constructed international tribunals and post-war occu-
pation commissions. Nuremberg and Tokyo are examples of that type of international
tribunal. The next group of cases concern high-level persons who have committed signifi-
cant crimes with regard to different ethnic and/or religious groups in their own country.
Here the international criminal tribunal is operating as a substitute for the domestic
courts in addressing the crimes of high-level persons from this inter-ethnic conflict
(whether or not the conflict has spillover effects across borders). As discussed above; ex-
amples of this would appear to be the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sier-
ra Leone.
Next, there are the special international tribunals created in states that are addressing
the high-level defendants for their international crimes against the persons of that state
or that occurred in that state. Here, I would list the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia as an internationalized internal domestic court with key components
seeking to have non-national prosecutors and judges for the cases. Next we might look at
the Iraqi High Tribunal as a still less international tribunal and more of a specialized na-
tional-international law court different from the ordinary courts - prosecutors and judges
are Iraqi nationals applying international law in a specialized court that is a substitute
for the ordinary courts. In the current state of its referrals, one might look at the Interna-
tional Criminal Court as a court of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia level in that its referrals appear to mirror through an international tribunal
the courts that address crimes done in inter-ethnic conflict that essentially is within a
given country (Uganda, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic)
with some possible spillover to neighboring countries. At the same time, it may have pre-
tentions and possibilities to move to the broader internal and external crimes that we as-
sociate with the Nuremberg or Japanese military tribunals in the near or not so near fu-
ture. Whatever the pretentions, with the exception of Nuremberg and Japan after World
War II, the cases that come out of these tribunals appear to be focused on a national lea-
dership with regard to the treatment of nationals in a national territory with some spil-
lover effects to the region.
REFLUATSTERCUS
domestic French law) 10 5 for actions in World War II (Klaus Bar-
bie, Paul Touvier and Maurice Papon cases). In contrast to the
Barbie (German) or Touvier (low-level member of the milice) cas-
es, the case of Maurice Papon is particularly instructive as he
was a high-level civil servant both during World War II and with
Charles de Gaulle and successive French governments after the
war. His is an example of how a state - with the assistance of
the mechanism of a civil party (partie civile) unknown in the
American system - was able to criminally prosecute such a high-
level civilian for horrendous international crimes in its domestic
courts.
Papon was a high-level French civil servant during World
War II who acted in the German occupied part of France as sec-
retary general of the Gironde prefecture in Bordeaux. 10 6 He es-
caped prosecution immediately after the war and went on to have
a sterling career in the French bureaucracy under Charles de
Gaulle and others being posted to very prominent positions in the
civil service and being active in political circles at the highest le-
vels. 10 7 In 1994, Papon was convicted of complicity in crimes
105 DRUMBL, supra note 90, at 119. Barbie, the German head of the intelligence section
of the Gestapo in Lyon with the task to "destroy the French Resistance," was convicted on
July 4, 1987 for crimes against humanity and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. The
French Touvier was convicted on April 20, 1994 for complicity in crimes against humanity
for his involvement in the killing of seven Jewish hostages during his service in the mi-
lice. Like Barbie, Touvier was sentenced to life in prison, but in addition "a symbolic one
franc was awarded in damages upon request by civil parties." Id.
106 See Craig R. Whitney, Maurice Papon, Convicted Vichy Official, 96, Dies, N. Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007, at B8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/world/europe
/18papon.html (describing Papon's life).
107 See id.
After the war, Mr. Papon rose through the bureaucracy. He became prefect of po-
lice in Paris, one of the country's top security posts, in 1958, when divisions over
how to deal with Algeria's war for independence threatened to bring on civil war in
France. After de Gaulle agreed to take power under a new French Constitution, he
confirmed Mr. Papon in the key police position.
In Paris Mr. Papon again presided over police actions that would not be fully ex-
posed until decades later, when it became clear that the forces of order had taken
the law into their own hands, beating up and killing scores of Algerians in the riot-
torn year of 1962, just before the colony achieved its independence.
A career in Gaullist politics followed his retirement from the civil service in 1967.
It was not until 1981, when he was France's budget minister, that he was con-
fronted with his past. Mr. Slitinsky, whose father died in Auschwitz after being ar-
rested by the French police in Bordeaux in 1942, had found documents showing
that Mr. Papon had signed the transport order, and many more besides.
It took until 1983 for French judicial authorities to investigate and indict him,
and 14 more years to bring him to trial.
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against humanity for his involvement in the deportation of Jews
to concentration camps during World War 11.108 The substantive
law applied in his case appears to have been a medley of French
domestic law and international law, as represented by the Nu-
remberg Charter and the International Military Tribunal judg-
ments. 10 9
It would appear to me unfortunate to dismiss the Papon
prosecution as just another echo of the World War II aftermath
criminal prosecutions. While his 1994 conviction was for his col-
laboration during World War II - the nearly 40 years of service
at the highest levels of the French civil service subsequent to the
war and after the 1953 amnesty 10 would appear to have demon-
strated that his reputation had been rehabilitated significantly if
not completely in the higher circles of French society. It was the
insistent efforts by his fellow citizens whose families had suffered
due to Papon's actions that countered that process of rehabilita-
tion to finally force the case to come forward. His country found
a way to prosecute him for his earlier acts, further demonstrating
that even such a commis d'etat was not above the law.
To sum up this section, to the extent we have found such
apparently rare prosecutions, the foreign domestic court expe-
rience appears to be primarily focused on prosecution of high-
level civilians or generals for international crimes committed
against their own people in their own territory. The internation-
al criminal tribunal experience breaks into the following two
groups: 1) Nuremberg and Tokyo addressing internal and exter-
nal international crimes 2) the other international criminal tri-
bunals addressing essentially internal international crimes. The
domestic court prosecutions are under domestic law that might
be harmonized with international criminal law.
Id. For a rich discussion of the trial, see generally RICHARD JOSEPH GOLSAN, THE PAPON
AFFAIR: MEMORY AND JUSTICE ON TRIAL (Richard J. Golsan ed., Lucy B. Golsan & Richard
J. Golsan trans., 2000).
108 See DRUMBL, supra note 90, at 119 (explaining that though Papon was convicted in
1998 and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, his sentence was suspended in 2002 when
he was released from prison).
109 Id.
110 The crimes against humanity were considered imprescriptible by the French courts.
See Whitney, supra note 106, at B8. In his article Whitney touched on Vichy's conviction.
Id.
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Taking Papon and following this path, in the absence of
any evidence of U.S. criminal prosecutions in domestic courts of
high-level civilians or generals for violations of international law,
we might look to cases in which international law rules are vin-
dicated in U.S. domestic criminal prosecutions of U.S. high-level
civilians or generals under the relevant U.S. domestic law as the
relevant U.S. practice.111 The U.S. domestic experience is the
subject of the next section.
C. American experience in general
Moving the inquiry from the international law plane to a
domestic law plane, there appear to be very few cases of U.S.
criminal prosecution for crimes under domestic law of high-level
civilians or generals that might be said to vindicate international
law rules - though not necessarily applying them.112 In short,
criminal prosecutions for a variety of offenses occur to present or
former high-level civilian authority or military generals, 11 3 but,
at least for the entire 20th century to the present, not with regard
to violations of international humanitarian law or international
criminal law.
In contrast, at the lower end of the spectrum in the un-
iformed services and in civilian authority, whether in Vietnam
with Lieutenant William Calley,11 4 or more recently with scan-
dals related to Afghanistan1 5 or Abu Ghraib,11 6 - courts-martial
-, This process seems, in some sense, reversed from the experience.
112 Taking this domestic law approach is to try to interpolate from a given criminal set-
ting a relationship with a background rule of international law that was violated and that
was vindicated by the criminal prosecution. One needs a link between a high-level inter-
national norm and the criminal prosecution, even if the relationship is only tangential for
this approach to be a vindication of international law. Otherwise, the cases may be more
mundane domestic law cases where international law issues are not of any interest even
for the relevant subset of defendants that interest us: high-level civilians or generals.
113 Famous American Trials: The My Lai Courts-Martial 1970, http://www.law.umkc.
edulfaculty/projects/ftrials/mylailgeneva.html (listing the laws of war from the Geneva
Conventions in 1949).
114 See id. (specifying the charges against Lieutenant Calley).
115 See Andrea Weigl, Passaro Convicted of Assaulting Afghan, NEWS & OBSERVER, Aug.
18, 2006, http://www.newsobserver.com/nation-world/passaro/story/476483.html (identify-
ing the first CIA operative to be convicted for "beating an Afghan prisoner").
116 See Josh White, Army Officer is Cleared in Abu Ghraib Scandal, WASH. POST, Jan.
10, 2008, at A06, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/
01/09/AR2008010903267.html (stating that Lieutenant Colonel Steven L. Jordan was the
"only Army officer charged with a crime" in the Abu Ghraib Scandal).
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of some current soldiers and federal prosecutions of discharged
soldiers or low level civilians (David Passarro most recently -
CIA contract officer) 11 7 have occurred for what could be viewed as
domestic law equivalents of violations of international humanita-
rian law and/or international criminal law. 118
Thus, the question arises whether there have been cases
regarding generals or high-level civilians in domestic law that
have targeted conduct that might - on the international plane -
have been considered related to a violation of international hu-
manitarian law and/or international criminal law. We will look
first at high-level civilians (1) and then at military generals (2).
We then look at what are the lessons from these cases (3).
1. High-level civilians
We can note that prosecutions of then present or then
former high-level civilians in the Executive Branch close to the
President, Legislative Branch or Judiciary have occurred in most
every administration since the beginning of the republic. 119 How-
117 See Andrea Weigl, Passaro Jury Reaches Partial Verdict, NEWS & OBSERVER, Aug.
17, 2006, http://www.newsobserver.com/nation-worldlpassaro/story/475921.html (reciting
the allegations against Passaro who was charged with assaulting and inflicting serious
bodily injury to one of the detainees during interrogation).
118 This is not to give the impression that these types of criminal prosecutions are au-
tomatic for lower level officers and soldiers. The Pulitzer prize winning series of the Tole-
do Blade in 2003 on the Tiger Force in Vietnam is a remarkable tale of just how war
crimes could occur without anyone being punished in the military. See Michael D. Selah &
Mitch Weiss, Day 2: Inquiry Ended Without Justice, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 20, 2003,
http://toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/99999999/SRTIGERFORCE/1 10200129.
Apparently, no intention of opening an investigation or prosecution of generals, however,
formed part of this matter, so we speak of it only as an aside. A description of Vietnam
War crimes in the context of military resister defenses is provided in D'Amato et al., su-
pra note 44, at 1055-56.
119 See John F. Harris & Allan Lengel, Berger will Plead Guilty to Taking Classified
Paper, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A16706-2005Mar31.html (stating former National Security Advisor Sandy
Berger's involvement in the destruction of classified materials); see also David Johnston,
Poindexter Wins Iran-Contra Case in Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1991, at Al, A8,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9DOCE1DF173DF935A2575-
2C1A967958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all (listing the charges against Elliott Ab-
rams, Oliver North, Admiral Poindexter, and others in the Iran-Contra scandal); see also
Carol D. Leonnig & Amy Goldstein, Libby Loses Bid to Stay out of Jail for Appeal, WASH.
POST, June 15, 2007, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content
/article/2007/06/14/AR2007061400198.html (explaining the involvement of Vice President
Cheney's former chief of staff, Lewis "Scooter" Libby, in the Valerie Plame case); see also
Bill Miller, Cisneros Pleads Guilty to Lying to FBI Agents, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1999, at
Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/special/cisneros/stories/
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ever, for high-level civilians, only seven of these prosecutions (El-
liott Abrams, 120 Alan D. Fiers, Jr., 121 Clair E. George,1 22 Robert C.
McFarlane, 23 Oliver L. North, 124 John M. Poindexter, 125 and
Lewis Libby, 126 discussed infra) and two pre-trial pardons (Duane
R. Clarridge 127 and Caspar W. Weinberger, 128 see infra) could be
cisneros09O899.htm (noting the various transgressions of Henry Cisneros and Mike Espy
in the Clinton Administration); see also Jeff Stein, Back-stabbing, CIA Style, SALON, Feb.
3, 2000, http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2000/O2/03/cialindex.html (describing ex-
CIA chief John Deutch's mishandling of classified materials); see also Paragons of Corrup-
tion, FREEDOM MAGAZINE, http://www.freedommag.org/englishlvol27i6/page28a.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2008) (detailing criminal activity of former Federal Judge Alcee Hastings
that ultimately led to his impeachment and removal from office); see also Watergate Ca-
sualties and Convictions, http://watergate.info/casualties/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2008) (speci-
fying the various Watergate prosecutions and convictions).
120 See LAWRENCE E. WALSH, U. S. COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA, FINAL
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS VOLUME I:
INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 375, Aug. 4, 1993, available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/ (click on the link entitled "Chapter 25" to access this
information).
Elliott Abrams in January 1981 joined the Reagan Administration as an assistant
secretary of state for international organization affairs and later became assistant
secretary for human rights. On April 19, 1985, Secretary of State George P. Shultz
offered Abrams the position of assistant secretary of state for inter-American af-
fairs (ARA), overseeing South and Central American and Caribbean issues.
Id. Abrams is currently serving as Deputy National Security Advisor for Global
Democracy Strategy.
121 Fiers was Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's ("CIA") Central American Task
Force from 1984 to 1988. He cooperated with the Office of the Independent Counsel and
pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress
about secret efforts to aid the Nicaraguan contras. See id. at Ch. 19.
122 George was Deputy Director for Operations in the CIA from 1984 to 1987. He was
indicted on ten counts of perjury, false statements and obstruction in connection with
congressional and Grand Jury investigations. See id. at Ch. 17.
123 McFarlane was the U.S. National Security Adviser from 1983 to 1985. He pleaded
guilty to four misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress. See id. at
Ch. 1.
124 North was a Marine Lieutenant Colonel assigned to the National Security Council
staff from 1981 until he was fired in 1986. He was indicted on 16 felony counts including
aiding and abetting in the obstruction of a congressional inquiry, and destruction of doc-
uments. See id. at Ch. 2.
125 Poindexter was National Security Adviser from 1985 to 1986. He was indicted on
seven felony charges including conspiracy and obstruction of Congress. See id. at Ch. 3.
126 Libby was the Chief of Staff to the Vice President of the United States, Dick Cheney,
from 2001 to 2006. He was indicted on federal obstruction and perjury charges. See I.
Lewis Libby Jr., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, available at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/people/l/index.html (follow "Libby, Lewis I. Jr." hyperlink).
127 Clarridge was a Career CIA Officer indicted for false statements about a secret
shipment of U.S. HAWK missiles to Iran. See WALSH, supra note 120, at Ch. 18, available
at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm.
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tangentially related to alleged violations of international huma-
nitarian law or international criminal law (violations of the laws
of war).129 The manner by which one gets to this conclusion is
from analyzing the underlying international action related to the
seven prosecutions and two pardons (the U.S. involvement in the
Contra War in Nicaragua or the Iraq War) as being in violation of
international law (in violation of treaty obligations, not in self-
defense, and as aggressive wars). If that underlying internation-
al action is considered a violation of international law, then the
domestic criminal prosecution might in some sense be seen as a
vindication of that international law rule.
I fully recognize that the connection between the type of
domestic conviction presented and the international law rule
may appear extremely tenuous in these cases. Yet, there is an
adage with regard to criminal prosecutions of high-level civilians
that it is the cover-up more than the actual underlying crime
that ends up being the basis for conviction. Thus, convictions for
improper use of classified materials, obstruction of justice, per-
jury, and crimes of that nature may be the primary way to vindi-
cate international law rules in the U.S. domestic courts in prose-
cutions of high-level civilians in the United States.' 30 It may also
be relevant to note that in all seven of the prosecution cases
noted, the ultimate result was a Presidential pardon,' 31 or com-
mutation of any conviction that occurred. 132 Thus, in the end,
there is an indication that President's are amenable to eliminat-
ing criminal convictions for the type of persons that we are seek-
ing to examine for prosecution in this setting. In the absence of a
criminal investigation1 33 that leads to a cover-up or in the ab-
128 Weinberger was Secretary of Defense from 1981-1987. See Caspar Willard Wein-
berger, COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, (6th ed. 2007), available at http://www.encyclopedia
.comldoc/1E 1-WeinbrgrCW.html.
129 See generally United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v.
Poindexter, 859 F.2d 216, 217-218 (D.C. Cir. 1988); WALSH, supra note 120, at xxiii. It is
striking that the executive clemency did not extend to the non-high-level civilians that
were convicted of crimes in this matter. Id.
130 Unlike the others, Poindexter was also convicted of conspiracy. See WALSH, supra
note 120, at xxiii.
131 See id. (reporting the Presidential pardon in each of the seven noted cases).
132 See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on Ex-
ecutive Clemency for Lewis Libby (July 2, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2007/07/20070702-3.html (discussing Lewis Libby's appeals).
133 The types of activities recently revealed about the Central Intelligence Agency in the
"Family Jewels" suggests that many types of activities for which such operatives worried
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sence of a cover-up, the evidence suggests that high-level civi-
lians are not prosecuted in United States courts for domestic
crimes that even tangentially vindicate rules of international
humanitarian law and/or international criminal law.
2. Generals
Courts-martial of generals are extremely rare.13 4 Anecdot-
al evidence suggests that the norm for general officers is, if any
punishment is received, to receive nonjudicial punishment (re-
primand, demotion, and/or retirement) rather than court-
martial. 135 The last court-martial of a general that suggests, at
least tenuously, a relation to international humanitarian law or
about the legality were simply kept classified. See The National Security Archive: The
CIA's Family Jewels, http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
(follow the "CIA's 'Family Jewles' - full report" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). The
report notes that "[t]he purpose of this memorandum is to forward for your personal re-
view summaries of activities conducted either by or under the sponsorship of the Office of
Security in the past which in my opinion conflict with the provisions of the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947." Id.
134 For a remarkable study of the court-martial that confirms at least for the cold war
period the rarity of courts-martial of generals, see ELIZABETH LUTES HILLMAN,
DEFENDING AMERICA, MILITARY CULTURE AND THE COLD WAR COURT MARTIAL (2005). "In
the twentieth century, very few American flag officers (generals or admirals) have been
court-martialed. Two notable exceptions are the 1925 court-martial of Major General Billy
Mitchell and the McCarthy-era court-martial of Major General Robert Grow. Charged
with making diary entries about military operations that fell in the hands of Soviet intel-
ligence agents, Grow was court-martialed in 1952, just five years before Hooper." Id. at
219. For a discussion on Mitchell, see MICHAEL S. SHERRY, THE RISE OF AMERICAN AIR
POWER: THE CREATION OF ARMAGEDDON 22-46 (1987); see also DOUGLAS WALLER, A
QUESTION OF LOYALTY: GEN. BILLY MITCHELL AND THE COURT-MARTIAL THAT GRIPPED
THE NATION (2004).
'35 Of 244 cases since 1999 involving unprofessional relationships, adultery, fraterniza-
tion and sodomy, the majority - 89 per cent - were disposed of with non-judicial punish-
ment. All of the 27 who ended up with a court-martial were men, mostly first lieutenants
and captains." Nicole Gaudiano, Illegal Affairs: The Service's Top Lawyer Didn't Follow
His Own Rules, A. F. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2005, at 16.
[The if any punishment is received is important as, for example, there is the case
of] General Joseph W. Ralston, who withdrew his nomination to be chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1997 after admitting he had had an affair 13 years earlier.
Ralston moved on to become the head of U.S. European Command and supreme
allied commander Europe, NATO, and retired as a four-star general in March 2003.
That was the same month Air Force 1st Lt. Philip Perez, a financial officer, was
court-martialed at Ellsworth Air Force Base, S.D., for relationships with two wom-
en. Perez ultimately was found guilty of adultery and fraternization and conduct
unbecoming. He was sentenced to dismissal. The case remains on appeal.
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international criminal law was in 1902.136 For at least for the
past 100 years, none of the courts-martial of generals have been
for violations of international humanitarian law or international
criminal law (violations of the laws of war). It has been said that
"[n]o Air Force general officer has ever been taken to court-
martial for any offense."137 And that "[tlhe leadership has a repu-
tation of protecting its own."'38 There is an adage in the military
that there are "different spanks for different ranks."139 This em-
bodies the idea that lower level non-commissioned soldiers are
more likely to be court-martialed than their officer counterparts
and that the lowest level of officers are more likely to be court-
martialed than are the higher level officers.
With regard to generals, the case of Brigadier General Ja-
cob H. Smith in the Spanish-American War stands out as the one
court-martial of a general that has a strong relationship to rules
of international law. In 1902 in the Samar campaign in the Phil-
ippines, Brigadier General Smith ordered his troops to kill all
persons capable of bearing arms. When questioned as to what
this meant he defined persons capable of bearing arms as all
males over ten years of age. Information as to that order was re-
vealed in the court-martial of a Lieutenant Waller who had re-
fused to obey that order. Ultimately, Smith admitted making the
order and in May of 1902, Smith faced court-martial for his order
on the grounds of conduct to the prejudice of good order and mili-
tary discipline. He was found guilty and sentenced to be admo-
nished by the reviewing authority (verbal reprimand). Secretary
of War Elihu Root recommended that he be retired and President
Theodore Roosevelt accepted the recommendation and retired
him with no further punishment.140
Beyond that court-martial, another approach to this ques-
tion might be to look for cases where lower level soldiers were
court-martialed for related facts while their higher ups were not.
136 See Arlington National Cemetery Website: Jacob Hurd Smith: Brigadier Gener-
al, United States Army, http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jhsmith.htm (Sept. 26, 2006)
[hereinafter Brigadier General Smith] ("In May of 1902, Smith faced court-martial for his
orders .... ).
137 Nicole Gaudiano, One-Star Faces Administrative Punishment; Female Subordinates
Said General Asked To Rub Their Feet, A. F. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2005, at 10.
13s Prosecuting Leaders, A. F. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at 52.
139 Smith III, supra note 24, at 677.
140 Brigadier General Smith, supra note 136.
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The two principal groups of cases that come to mind would ap-
pear to be the following: (a) the investigation but absence of
courts-martial of Major General Samuel W. Koster and Brigadier
General George H. Young, Jr. with regard to Song My/My Lai as
contrasted with the court-martial of Lieutenant William Calley
and acquittal of Captain Ernest Medina;141 and (b) the demotion
and other non-judicial discipline of Brigadier General Janis Kar-
pinski with regard to Abu Ghraib. These cases might help make
explicit the line between prosecution, retirement and demotion
that affects general officers.
a. Major General Samuel W. Koster and Brigadier General
George H. Young, Jr.
Following revelations of the My Lai Massacre of March
16-19, 1968, then General William Westmoreland ordered on No-
vember 26, 1969 that Lieutenant General William R. Peers ex-
plore the nature and scope of the original Army investigations of
the alleged My Lai (4) incident of March 16, 1968. In his report
dated March 14, 1970 ("the Peers Report"), Lieutenant General
Peers listed a number of omissions and commissions by Major
General Samuel W. Koster and Brigadier General George H.
Young, Jr. that can be summarized as (a) failure to make such
official report thereof as their duty required them to make; (b)
suppressing information concerning the occurrence of such of-
fenses acting singly or in concert with others; and (c) failure to
order a thorough investigation and to insure that such was made
or failure to conduct an adequate investigation, or failure to
submit an adequate report of investigation, or failure to make an
1 See generally Jordan P. Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War Crimes Jurisdiction
Over Civilians in Federal District Courts, 50 TEX. L. REV. 6 (1971) (commenting on the
United States' decision to "not seek to prosecute United States ex-servicemen who have
violated the international law of war in Vietnam"); Richard A. Falk, Son My: War Crimes
and Individual Responsibility, 3 TOL. L. REV. 21 (1971) (providing commentary on the
rules of international law); Alfred P. Rubin, Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident, 49 OR.
L. REV. 260 (1970) (describing the My Lai incident and that the international law used to
regulate conduct in times of conflict must be respected); Jordan J. Paust, Legal Aspects of
the My Lai Incident - A Response to Professor Rubin, 50 OR. L. REV. 138 (1971) ("The pur-
pose of this article is to provide a broader understanding of the legal questions concerning
the protection of the alleged My Lai victims under the 1949 Geneva Civilian Conven-
tion."); Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: Who is Responsible for War Crimes?,
War/Peace Report (1970), reprinted in 3 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Ri-
chard A. Falk ed., 1972) (analyzing War Crimes responsibility).
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adequate review of a report of investigation, as applicable. This
information was forwarded to the appropriate convening authori-
ty for court-martial.1 42 Subsequent to that investigation, Major
General Samuel W. Koster resigned from his new posting as the
commandant of West Point and he was reassigned to Fort Meade.
His commander at Fort Meade decided to drop all charges
against Major General Samuel W. Koster for lack of evidence and
because of his long service. After a public outcry about the
charges being dropped, General Koster was demoted a rank to
brigadier general and stripped of his Distinguished Service Med-
al, and a letter of censure was placed in his file.1 43 With regard to
Brigadier General George H. Young, Jr., he was stripped of his
Distinguished Service Medal and given a letter of censure. 144
b. Brigadier General Janis Karpinski
After the Abu Ghraib scandal came to light and a series of
investigations and reports were made, it was determined that
Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, commander of the 800th Mil-
itary Police Brigade and in charge of military prisons in Iraq,
would be reprimanded, demoted to colonel and relieved of her du-
ties. The U.S. military did not bring criminal charges against
her. 145
Finally, two further cases that raise a general question
about the willingness to investigate are the (c) No Gun Ri massa-
142 1 U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, REPORT OF THE DEP'T OF THE ARMY REVIEW OF THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE MY LAI INCIDENT: REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION
(1971), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frdlMilitary-Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-I.pdf.
143 Patricia Sullivan, Samuel Koster, General Charged in My Lai Slayings, B. GLOBE,
Feb. 12, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/obituaries/articles/2006/02/
12/samuel kostergeneral charged-in-my laislayings.
144 A Star is Lost, TIME, May 31, 1971, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,944406,00.html?promoid=googlep.
145 See Head of Abu Ghraib Prison Speaks Out, ABCNEWS, May 12, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/IraqCoverage/story?id=751870&page=l. As to her supe-
riors, charges against former Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Major General Barba-
ra Fast and Major General Walter Wojdakowski were found to be without substance. See
U.S. Army Details Abuse Investigations Findings, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, May 6, 2005,
http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2005fMay/09-97556.html. Former Army Major General
Geoffrey Miller who headed Guantanamo and then went to Iraq at the time of the Abu
Ghraib scandal retired on July 31, 2006 and was awarded the Distinguished Service Med-
al. See Josh White, General Who Ran Guantanamo Bay Retires, WASH. POST, Aug. 1,
2006, at A06, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/07/
31/AR2006073101183.html.
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cre during the Korean War, for which information is only now be-
coming more available, and (d) the allegations of violations by the
Tiger Force in Vietnam. These two cases may shed light on our
structural inability in America, at different points in time, to ad-
dress criminality allegedly done in service to the state by high-
level civilians or generals. 146
c. No Gun Ri
As noted in the 2001 review of the event, during the Korean War,
the villagers' account of what occurred at No Gun Ri is as follows:
The Korean villagers stated that on July 25, 1950, U.S.
soldiers evacuated approximately 500 to 600 villagers from
their homes in Im Gae Ri and Joo Gok Ri. The villagers said
the U.S. soldiers escorted them towards the south. Later that
evening, the American soldiers led the villagers near a river-
bank at Ha Ga Ri and ordered them to stay there that night.
During the night, the villagers witnessed a long parade of
U.S. troops and vehicles moving towards Pusan.
On the morning of July 26, 1950, the villagers continued
south along the Seoul-Pusan road. According to their state-
ments, when the villagers reached the vicinity of No Gun Ri,
U.S. soldiers stopped them at a roadblock and ordered the
group onto the railroad tracks, where the soldiers searched
them and their personal belongings. The Koreans state that,
although the soldiers found no prohibited items (such as
weapons or other military contraband), the soldiers ordered
146 Each of these cases raises the question as to whether they are anecdotal examples or
paradigmatic. I have looked back over the last 100 years with a focus on criminal prosecu-
tions of high-level civilians or generals. Courts-martial of lower-level uniformed persons
that have a potential general or above aspect have been of interest. And cases of no crimi-
nal prosecution of anyone when one would think that one should have been done to vindi-
cate international law have also been of interest to try to understand what is occurring in
this arena. One line I decided to draw in my analysis was at cases such as the fire-
bombing of Dresden, the Tokyo Bombing, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki. Clearly there were
no criminal prosecutions of high-level civilians or generals with regard to those enormous-
ly important (and controversial) events during World War II. It is possible that excluding
these cases may reduce the breadth of the examples that I am seeking to understand.
However, I am uneasy with trying to elucidate whether these cases are clearly or not
clearly international crimes in order to take steps further towards looking at high-level
responsibility. I believe making that determination is beyond the scope of my effort. That
is not to belittle the importance of the discussions of these and similar events, but rather
to recognize the limits I have placed on my research in order to make this a topic that I
can address in a manageable manner. I might turn to those other settings in a further
work.
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an air attack upon the villagers via radio communications
with U.S. aircraft. Shortly afterwards, planes flew over and
dropped bombs and fired machine guns, killing approximate-
ly 100 villagers on the railroad tracks. Those villagers who
survived sought protection in a small culvert underneath the
railroad tracks. The U.S. soldiers drove the villagers out of
the culvert and into the larger double tunnels nearby (this
report subsequently refers to these tunnels as the "double
railroad overpass"). The Koreans state that the U.S. soldiers
then fired into both ends of the tunnels over a period of four
days (July 26-29, 1950), resulting in approximately 300 addi-
tional deaths. 47
After examining the incident, the 2001 No Gun Ri review con-
cluded that:
During late July 1950, Korean civilians were caught be-
tween withdrawing U.S. Forces and attacking enemy
forces. As a result of U.S. actions during the Korean War
in the last week of July 1950, Korean civilians were killed
and injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review
Team did not find that the Korean deaths and injuries oc-
curred exactly as described in the Korean account. To ap-
praise these events, it is necessary to recall the circums-
tances of the period. U.S. forces on occupation duty in
Japan, mostly without training for, or experience in, com-
bat were suddenly ordered to join ROK [Republic of Korea]
forces in defending against a determined assault by well-
armed and well trained NKPA [North Korean People's
Army] forces employing both conventional and guerilla
warfare tactics. The U.S. troops had to give up position af-
ter position. In the week beginning July 25, 1950, the 1st
Cavalry Division, withdrawing from Yongdong toward the
Naktong River, passed through the vicinity of No Gun Ri.
Earlier, roads and trails in South Korea had been choked
with civilians fleeing south. Disguised NKPA soldiers had
mingled with these refugees. U.S. and ROK commanders
had published a policy designed to limit the threat from
NKPA infiltrators, to protect U.S. forces from attacks from
the rear, and to prevent civilians from interfering with the
flow of supplies and troops. The ROK National Police were
supposed to control and strictly limit the movements of in-
147 U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL, No GUN RI REVIEW i-ii (2001), avail-
able at http://www.army.mil/nogunri/BookCoverJan01Summary.pdf.
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nocent refugees.
In these circumstances, especially given the fact that
many of the U.S. soldiers lacked combat-experienced offic-
ers and Non-commissioned officers, some soldiers may
have fired out of fear in response to a perceived enemy
threat without considering the possibility that they might
be firing on Korean civilians.
Neither the documentary evidence nor the U.S. veterans'
statements reviewed by the U.S. Review Team support a
hypothesis of deliberate killing of Korean civilians. What
befell civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July
1950 was a tragic and deeply regrettable accompaniment
to a war forced upon unprepared U.S. and ROK forces. 148
Given the mass killing of civilians and that, low level soldiers
remembered having orders to act in that manner, the review
takes the view that it was not deliberate killing of civilians (a
war crime) but a deeply regrettable accompaniment of war - an
accident or mistake. On April 14, 2007 (six years after the 2001
No Gun Ri review) it was reported that:
Six years after declaring the U.S. killing of Korean War
refugees at No Gun Ri was "not deliberate," the Army has
acknowledged it found but did not divulge that a high-level
document said the U.S. military had a policy of shooting
approaching civilians in South Korea.
The document, a letter from the U.S. ambassador in
South Korea to the State Department in Washington, is
dated the day in 1950 when U.S. troops began the No Gun
Ri shootings .... 149
148 Id. at xiv-xv.
149 Charles Raney, Shooting Refugees, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 14, 2007, available at
http://nl.newsbank.com/nlsearch/we/Archives?p-product=APAB&p-theme=apab&p-action
=search&p-maxdocs=200&s-dispstring=No%2OGun%2Ri&p-field advancedO=&p-text_
avancedO=("No%2OGun%2ORi")&xcal numdocs=20&p-perpage=10&p-sort=YMD-date:D
&xcal_useweights=no. An order to a United States war ship to fire on refugees on the
beach also was revealed in this period. See Jae-Soon Chang, Refugees throng beach, U.S.
ship opens fire: 'Forgotten war' yields up another secret, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 14, 2007,
available at http://nl.newsbank.com/nlsearch/we/Archives?pproduct=APAB&p-theme=
apab&p-action=search&p-maxdocs=200&s-dispstring=No%2Gun%2Ri&p-fieldadvanc
ed-O=&ptext-advancedO=("No%20Gun%20Ri")&xcal-numdocs=20&p-perpage=lO&p_
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d. Tiger Force in Vietnam
In 1967, a Tiger Force was alleged to have committed war
crimes in Vietnam. 150 Though the Army substantiated 20 war
crimes by 18 Tiger Force soldiers committed in 1967 - with nu-
merous eyewitnesses - no charges were filed. An investigation of
a U.S. unit in Vietnam reached the Pentagon and White House
but no courts-martial occurred. After a four and one half year
investigation the matter was not pursued in 1975.151
sortYMDdate:D&xcal useweights=no. "A half-century on, the cold, matter-of-fact words
leap from the typewritten page of a U.S. warship's journal: 'DeHaven received orders from
the SFCP to open fire on a large group of refugee personnel located on the beach."' Id. In
2000, there was much debate about the veracity of the No Gun Ri reporting that appears
to be dispelled by the April 14, 2007 revelations. See Incident at No Gun Ri, PBS ONLINE
NEWSHOUR, May 31, 2000, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshourlbb/media/jan-
juneOO/nogunri_5-31.html; see also No Gun Ri: Update, PBS ONLINE NEWSHOUR, June 8,
2000, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/media/media-watchlnogunri_6-8.html.
This late evidence of an order in the No Gun Ri setting is an eerie reminder of the paper
with a handwritten order of then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said to be hang-
ing on a column outside a small administrative office in the detention area at Abu Ghraib.
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, TESTIMONY OF FORMER BRIGADIER GENERAL JANIS
KARPINSKI, THE FORMER HEAD OF ABU GHRAIH, FOR THE GERMAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
AGAINST DOD DONALD RUMSFELD AND OTHERS (2005), available at http://ccrjustice.org/
files/abu%20KarpinskiTestimony2006.pdf. It was noted by Brigadier General Janis Kar-
pinski that:
[t]he Sergeant showed me the one page log he was talking about. Then he pointed
out a memo posted on a column just outside of their small administrative office.
The memorandum was signed by the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and
it discussed Authorized Interrogation techniques including use of loud music and
prolonged standing positions, amongst several other techniques. It was one page.
It mentioned stress positions, noise and light discipline, the use of music, dis-
rupting sleep patterns, those types of techniques. There was also a handwritten
note out to the side in the same ink and in the same script as the signature of the
Secretary of Defense. The notation written in the margin said 'Make sure this
happens!" This memorandum was a copy; a photocopy of the original, I would im-
agine. I thought it was unusual for an interrogation memorandum to be posted
inside of a detention cell block, because interrogations were not conducted in the
cell block, at least to my understanding and knowledge. Interrogations were con-
ducted in one of the two interrogation facilities outside of the hard site.
Id.
150 For more on Vietnam and War Crimes and Individual Responsibility, see Tom J.
Farer et al., Vietnam and the Nuremberg Principles: A Colloquy on War Crimes, 5
RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 1, 58 (1973); see also Waldemar A. Solf, A Response to Telford Taylor's
"Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy", 5 AKRON L. REV. 43, 68 (1972), re-
printed in 4 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 141.
151Michael D. Sallah & Mitch Weiss, DAY 2: Inquiry Ended without Justice: Army subs-
tantiated Numerous Charges . then Dropped Case of Vietnam War Crimes, THE BLADE,
Oct. 20, 2003, available at http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dlllarticle?AID=/
99999999/SRTIGERFORCE/1 10200129.
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3. Lessons from these cases - fluit stercus
What do we learn from these cases? From the military
cases, such as General Smith, we note the general's admission
that he had given the order to kill all men over the age of ten and
Lieutenant Waller's refusal to obey that order. In that case, the
battlefield order admitted is a clear violation of the laws of war
that leads to the court-martial. One apparent lesson for high-
level civilians or generals is that one should never admit the or-
der. From the Song My/My Lai cases we note the instinct to cov-
er up the crime that the generals demonstrated. A second lesson
would be to consider "simplifying the investigation" and hold in-
formation closely. However, with the photographic evidence and
external information that contradicted the official report, the re-
sult was that the generals, and, by extension, the American gov-
ernment's position of denial was simply untenable. A third les-
son is that when one does not control the public scrutiny, one has
to control the inevitable investigation. In the context of an unpo-
pular war, some retribution was necessary, but notwithstanding
the recommendations of the Peers Report, no court-martial oc-
curred. In the case of General Karpinski's demotion, the pres-
ence of grave images that pointed out fundamental violations of
the laws of war showed the failures of the command structure at
Abu Ghraib. A fourth lesson is to highlight misfeasance of the
general staff through which non-judicial punishment as discip-
line appears more appropriate rather than malfeasance where a
criminal prosecution might be seen as more appropriate.
No Gun Ri and the Tiger Force cases comfort us in consi-
dering these to be the lessons. The common theme appears to be
to protect internally the information, contradict the low-level
"whistleblower," and, if there are investigations, delay the
movement, if at all, to the next step of the prosecution of anyone.
If one can keep it quiet, then there will be no prosecution up the
chain of command. If an investigation is forced by the lower level
persons, the investigations appear to be delayed, diverted or
downgraded in priority until - at some point - they disappear.
Many might think that overall this manner of dealing
with problems (maybe even a system - whether formal or infor-
mal in its operation) works well enough. The system recognizes
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that mistakes/errors/atrocities/bad things occur sometimes. The
match of evidence and crime are much clearer at the lower levels
and so criminal prosecution for some malfeasance, if at all, is
much easier to accomplish with limited prosecutorial resources.
Something becoming public may change the calculus somewhat,
but accountability is provided through low-level criminal prose-
cution and higher-level demotion, retirement, etc. for misfeas-
ance. On the whole, the essential method for dealing with these
matters is in the political arena (change those who are in office or
bring in a new team). If there are criminal prosecutions, low-
level persons may be charged, but the high-level persons need on-
ly to change behavior or be retired and new ones brought in to do
the task correctly. The approach takes into account the funda-
mental reality that the high-level persons may have significant
tenure in the uniformed service (they are, by definition, good sol-
diers to get where they are) or the high-level civilians have dem-
onstrated the right attributes (loyalty, competence, etc.) that
those with prosecutorial discretion hesitate (or are not encour-
aged by their higher-ups) to pursue through the criminal prose-
cution path. This approach may amount to different spanks for
different ranks, or more prosaically, (and as known to every mili-
tary person I have met) "shit rolls down hill" or fluit stercus.
But, the weakness of this method is that when the central
figures are the high-level civilians or military generals, the me-
thod does not really grapple with the criminality of their acts.
The method gives the higher-level civilian or military generals a
form of absolution when they may well have been the cause of the
criminal act. 152 The criminal taint on the lower-level persons
leaves an impression that they were "rotten apples" when they
are in fact following a course of conduct that may very well have
been dictated by their superiors. These same superiors are per-
mitted to not face a risk of deprivation of liberty for their crimi-
nal act. While this is convenient for the higher-level persons, it
seems that it confuses the issue as to the underlying situation.
Misfeasance at lower levels subject to discipline may or may not
be the result of misfeasance at higher levels that should also be
disciplined. Malfeasance that leads to criminal charges at lower-
152 See S. G. METROVI6, THE TRIALS OF ABU GHRAIB (2007), for a sociological look at
this phenomenon.
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levels may be the result of misfeasance at the higher-levels, but
it may also be due to malfeasance at the higher levels also. That
type of malfeasance at higher-levels is rarely, if at all, captured
in a manner that is consistent with criminal sanction in these
settings where we are attempting to vindicate international law
rules.
Even when there is a court-martial of the kind that hap-
pened to General Smith or convictions such as happened in the
Iran-Contra or Iraqgate cases, the light penalty for Smith (re-
tirement) is a defacto pardon, and the Presidential pardons in the
Iran-Contra or Iraqgate setting a dejure pardon of the malfeas-
ance by the principal actor that may have instigated the actions
of the higher-level persons. The political will to seek criminal
prosecution as a result of the publicity that surrounds these ex-
ercises puts some pressure on the Executive to take action
against the high-level civilians or generals, but the examples
above suggest a clear hesitancy on the part of the Executive to
examine in depth the roles of the higher-level persons. It is a de-
facto kind of absolution.
This type of defacto absolution may extend to the lower
level persons. For example, in the No Gun Ri, Tiger Force, and
Family Jewels settings, criminal prosecutions did not occur for
the lower-level persons. To the extent what happened could be
portrayed as a mistake or overzealousness, an effort succeeds at
minimizing what has occurred. Someone who comes to this cul-
ture as a reservist might not appreciate the subtleties of what is
expected, but those who are fulltime for an extended period in
this setting would understand that promotion and success is not
encouraged by calling to account high-level civilians or military
generals above one's grade when crimes occur as a result of what
the high-level persons put in place.
I am struck how, in this system, the high-level civilians or
generals which may have caused the criminality operate in a
manner similar to what has been termed "thanatophores.."153
Thanatophore is a psychological construct to describe persons in
organizations who create and fan pathological behavior. 154 Tha-
13 Emmanuel Diet, Le Thanatophore. Thavail de la mort et destructivitg dans les insti-
tutions, in SOUFFRANCE ET PSYCHOPATHOLOGIE DES LIENS INSTITUTIONNELS: ELEMENTS
DE LA PRATIQUE PSYCHANALYTIQUE EN INSTITUTION (Rene Kaes et al. eds., 1996).
154 Id.
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natophores introduce a form of fear of death in the organization
that moves beyond normal concerns to dysfunctionality. 155 By
having their actions, even when they are malfeasance, masked at
most as misfeasance, if anything at all, one senses that high-level
civilians or generals appear to have a reduced concern with
downside consequences for risky behaviors. Or, maybe to put it
another way, the hydraulic pressures on these persons make
them more susceptible to participating in risky behaviors. Main-
taining perspective on what one was doing would be difficult in
this setting particularly when there is a pressure of an incessant
nature.156 The battle between personal ethical concerns and the
pressures on the high-level civilians or generals may be terribly
difficult on a personal level.
But while one may have great sympathy for the positions
of these persons, the key is that they have voluntarily as-
sumedlsought these positions of responsibility. And, to the ex-
tent that they create/reproduce behaviors that are criminal as a
matter of international law, they are placing the United States in
breach of its international obligations. Masking as misfeasance
may solve their personal concerns, but they do not address the
impact that their acts have on the United States' international
obligations and duties. Moreover, the lower-level persons find
themselves in a terribly difficult situation where they fear being
"thrown under the bus" if a public outcry occurs. This reality
places pressure on those low-level persons to surround them-
selves with legal counsel in order to protect themselves from
criminal prosecution down the road. Leaving aside personal eth-
ics and revulsion, this lower-level reaction leads to a diversion of
personal and organizational resources into a form of preemptive
self-defense by responding with lawyers to potential illegality
coming from above. But that response is only possible with those
with the wherewithal to commandeer such resources. In the ab-
155 See id. I do find the thanatophore construct from organizational design theory is a
powerful idea to help explicit organizations dysfunctionality; I have examined this phe-
nomenon in the setting of international commercial arbitration in a previous article. See
Benjamin G. Davis, The Color Line in International Commercial Arbitration: An American
Perspective, 14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 461 (2004).
156 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY (2007) (describing the difficult
situation that high-level civilians face when balancing personal ethical concerns against
pressure from above).
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sence of such ability to commandeer such resources, the lower-
level person is left to his or her own devices.
In the next section we discuss why fluit stercus should be
changed to "make shit roll uphill" or refluat stercus with regard
to at least torture and cruel, inhuman and/or degrading treat-
ment in the War on Terrorism.
PART II. WHY REFLUAT STERCUS? OR WHY IT SHOULD BE DONE?
A. General discussion
Since 9/11, U.S. constitutional, U.S. foreign relations law,
and U.S. international law scholars have opined about torture
and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, as well as other
aspects of the War on Terrorism. 157 In government, famous me-
mos have been written (some or maybe many still classified) in
which lawyers in the Department of State, Department of Jus-
tice, Department of Defense and the Intelligence Services have
opined on the subject. 158 Executive Orders on the subject have
been carefully drafted with brilliant legal assistance. Closed and
open hearings have been held in Congress with regard to allega-
tions of this type of treatment. Military commissions have been
presented with allegations by detainees of ill-treatment that we
can only see in redacted form. Civil cases have been brought
against high-level government types on behalf of present or for-
mer detainees with regard to their treatment in places of deten-
tion by the United States or in the extraordinary rendition sys-
tem of a virtual moving gulag. Medical associations have passed
divergent resolutions about the topic. A President and Presiden-
tial candidates and media have opined in various ways about the
merits of torture and cruel, inhuman and/or degrading treat-
ment, as well as "enhanced interrogation techniques." Laws have
been passed in Congress and signed by the President (with sign-
ing statements) in which efforts are made to define what is pro-
hibited "now," which is narrower than what was prohibited as
157 See sources cited infra note 276.
158 See generally KAREN J. GREENBERG & JOSHUA L. DRATEL, THE TORTURE PAPERS
(2005) (containing memos and reports that demonstrate the U.S. Government's attempt to
authorize the way for torture techniques and coercive interrogation practices).
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the law stood before 9/11. I would like to call this panoply the in-
ternal U.S. foreign relations law vision.
External to these American processes, the U.N. Commit-
tee Against Torture has heard evidence presented by the United
States about its practices in the War on Terrorism. A committee
of the European Parliament has investigated at length the Unit-
ed States' extraordinary rendition scheme. Some foreign prose-
cutors have looked into and, in some cases, begun the process of
investigating and prosecuting persons for alleged illegal acts
done in their countries by American operatives. High-level
American civilians have been dispatched to the capitals of the
world to address and hopefully mollify concerns of leaders of oth-
er states. Apologies to the leaders may be given when errors oc-
cur, but not to the detainee who was maltreated. I would like to
call this panoply the external international vision.
In the internal U.S. foreign relations law vision, commen-
tators are skeptical about the possibility of prosecutions of high-
level civilians (and by extension military generals) for these
crimes. 159 More generally, the difficulty of prosecution by one
part of the Executive Branch of persons of another part of the
Executive Branch, who by definition are close to the President,
for these types of war crimes is a structural hurdle. 160 As to high-
level civilians, whether one is a believer in a unitary executive or
otherwise, in the absence of a special counsel, U.S. attorneys
serve at the pleasure of the President, it appears that any U.S.
attorney might hesitate to prosecute a high-level civilian who, if
still serving or having recently served, may in all likelihood
please the President. Also, the President's plenary power to par-
don might dissuade prosecutors from devoting scarce resources to
the prosecution of such high-level civilians or generals.
Even if a criminal prosecution were sought to be mounted,
a second hurdle might be concerns with how the relevant law ap-
plies. For example, changes in the law as a result of the Military
159 See Milan Markovic, Can Lawyers Be War Criminals?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 347,
368 (2007) ("To Yoo and Bybee, the prospect of a domestic investigation, let alone prosecu-
tion, is probably too remote to consider.").
160 Of course, prosecutions of high-level civilians in other branches of government do oc-
cur, so we might also look beyond the Executive Branch at other high-level civilians in
Congress or the Executive to see how prosecution might occur with regard to them. See
infra Part VI concerning high-level Congress or Judiciary defendants.
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Commissions Act of 2006,161 the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005,162 and the Defense Authorization Acts of 2005 and 2006163
might appear to make a prosecution more difficult.1 64 In addition,
there are issues related to the federal officer immunity doctrine,
the public authority defense, state secrets privilege, and political
question doctrine that might make the prosecution a thorny
process for even an intrepid prosecutor.
In the court-martial setting, there may be structural im-
pediments or difficulties to convene a court-martial for such high-
level persons. The convening authority is supposed to be a un-
iformed person above the potential defendant. As one moves up
in the level of generals, the number of potential convenors of a
court-martial for a general are reduced. While we prefer to stay
with the state of the law as it is for this inquiry to see how to op-
erate in this setting, we must also recognize that proposals have
161 10 U.S.C. §§ 948(a)-(e) (2006).
162 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-l(a) (West 2006).
163 See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2005,
Pub. L. No. 108-375, 118 Stat. 1811 (2004); see also National Defense Authorization Act
For Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3136 (2006).
164 Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization blog, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/
08/cia-cruelty-authorization-act-of-2006.html (Aug. 14, 2006, 15:11 ESTI).
I don't think so. To the extent officials violated the standards of Common Ar-
ticle 3 with respect to Al Qaeda prior to June 29, 2006 (the date of Hamdan), they
could not be prosecuted for such violations of CA3 (as incorporated in the War
Crimes Act), even without the Administration's amendment, because the Presi-
dent had determined that CA3 does not apply to the conflict with Al Qaeda, and
due process would prevent any prosecutions for conduct undertaken in reasona-
ble reliance on that presidential determination. (Regardless of what one thinks of
the merits of the Common Article 3 question, the reliance would be deemed rea-
sonable, since the legal conclusion was adopted by the President and affirmed by
four Supreme Court Justices [Correction -- That should be three Justices: Justice
Alito did not join that part of Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion.] And even if
you disagree with me on that due process question, trust me: No Justice Depart-
ment, not even in the most anti-Bush Administration imaginable, would ever
prosecute someone for violation of a law that the President had determined was
inapplicable.)
This is not to say that such persons could not be prosecuted under some other
law -- say, for violation of the UCMJ, or the assault or torture statutes, or even
other parts of the War Crimes Act. But the Administration's proposal (at least
the version we've seen so far) would not affect those other statutes or provide
immunity for past violations of them. It would only affect Common Article 3 vi-
olations of the War Crimes Act -- and prosecution for those violations would be
impossible and inconceivable, anyway.
So, it's not really (or primarily) about "immunity" for past conduct; it is, in-
stead, about immunity for future cruel treatment and torture.
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been made with regard to the Uniform Code of Military Justice to
address perceived problems in the operation of the court-martial
at the higher levels. 165
Moreover, the tendency not to proceed down the court-
martial route for generals described in the previous section
makes such criminal prosecutions more unlikely as it stands to-
day. Consistent with the idea of keeping concerns about mal-
feasance at the lowest level, even with regard to the investigation
of the alleged crimes, the mechanisms in place may be of such a
nature as to be easily diverted (inspector generals and criminal
investigations) due to intra-department/branch and/or inter-
department/branch culture or collusion to keep focus away from
the higher level civilians and/or generals. There is also the resi-
dual concern that these high-level civilians and generals are by
definition, "good soldiers," and if the crimes they commit violate
international humanitarian law or international criminal law,
they may have been done with great patriotism and at the re-
quest of still higher-ups.
Those in favor of prosecutions note concerns, alleging defi-
ciencies in the law. Those deficiencies in the law for senior com-
manders are said to have serious consequences for the mili-
tary. 166 The concerns are that there may be: (1) a perception, and
a reality, that military members are treated inequitably, which
undermines discipline; (2) a difficulty for commanders and other
senior leaders to conform their conduct and the conduct of their
subordinates to the requirements of the law; and (3) a difficulty
for officers to place the proper emphasis on law of war com-
pliance. 167 In addition, on the international plane, failures in this
regard: (1) adversely affect the United States' credibility and ef-
fectiveness on the world stage; and (2) cut to the very essence of a
military organization having provided commanders the authority
to execute their duties without affixing appropriate responsibility
on them when their command failures contribute to violations of
the laws of war. 168 A space between U.S. domestic law standards
165 See Hansen, supra note 79 (proposing a standard of command responsibility); see al-
so Smith III, supra note 24, at 71 (exploring "what, if any, changes can be made to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice").
166 Hansen, supra note 79, at 344.
167 Id.
168 Id.
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and international law standards is a further source of concern, as
we are treating ourselves differently from those upon whom we
seek to have the law enforced overseas (different folks get differ-
ent strokes).169
Given the lack of prosecution of high-level civilians and
military generals, the United States' aggressive efforts to be ex-
cluded from the international criminal jurisdiction of entities
such as the International Criminal Court by unsigning the Sta-
tute and entering Article 98 agreements, the United States' un-
willingness to turn over Americans to foreign authorities for
criminal prosecution in other countries, 170 and the prosecution of
169 Even concerns about the manner in which the international law standard operates
itself might be noted. Compare Anthony D'Amato, Superior Orders vs. Command Respon-
sibility, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 604, 604 (1986) (commenting on the conceptual paradox of a
military commander being held responsible for an order that his subordinate was legally
required to ignore), with Howard S. Levie, Some Comments on Professor D'Amato's "Para-
dox" 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 608, 608 (1986) (stating that Professor Levie's arguments do not
have merit).
170 See Press Statement, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Signs 100th Article 98 Agreement
(May 3, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/r/paprs/ps/2005/45573.htm. It states
"that U.S. persons will not be surrendered to the International Criminal Court without
[the United States'] consent". See Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep't of State, The International Crim-
inal Court (2002), http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/23426.htm. It also demonstrates the
United States' unwillingness by stating that "the U.S. strongly opposes the Rome statute
as seriously flawed, but will work together with other nations to avoid any disruptions
that might be caused by the treaty. The treaty itself provides for this, specifically in Ar-
ticle 98. We intend to pursue Article 98 agreements worldwide." See American Service-
members' Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7433 (2000 & Supp. II 2003). 22
U.S.C. § 7421(8) states the following:
Members of the Armed Forces of the United States should be free from the risk of
prosecution by the International Criminal Court. especially when thev are sta-
tioned or deployed around the world to protect the vital national interests of the
United States. The United States Government has an obligation to protect the
members of its Armed Forces, to the maximum extent possible, against criminal
prosecutions carried out by the International Criminal Court.
22 U.S.C. § 7421 (9) states:
In addition to exposing members of the Armed Forces of the United States to the
risk of international criminal prosecution, the Rome Statute creates a risk that
the President and other senior elected and appointed officials of the United
States Government may be prosecuted bv the International Criminal Court. Par-
ticularlv if the Preparatory Commission agrees on a definition of the Crime of
Aggression over United States objections, senior United States officials may be at
risk of criminal prosecution for national security decisions involving such matters
as responding to acts of terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, and deterring aggression. No less than members of the Armed
Forces of the United States. senior officials of the United States Government
should be free from the risk of prosecution bv the International Criminal Court.
especially with respect to official actions taken by them to protect the national in-
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low level military persons for acts that appear to have been policy
cause some unease. In particular, the prosecution of lower level
persons to the exclusion of higher-level persons who most likely
ordered the lower level actions might appear profoundly unfair,
but also be the best (or optimal) we can do. The hope is that by
redefining the law and better training, the result will be that cor-
rections by errant persons will be made over time. For the en-
hanced interrogation techniques, very sophisticated processes of
authorization and determination of techniques are put in place to
professionalize any interrogation and make sure it occurs within
strict guidelines governed by "brilliant" exegesis on what is tor-
ture, what is cruel, inhuman and/or degrading treatment, and
"what is permitted where" in the world by the United States or
by its allies.
More direct proponents of torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment argue it is a tool needed in the arsenal of
self-defense of the United States. They explain the benefits of
the enhanced interrogation techniques in helping the U.S. get ac-
tionable intelligence that has saved American lives. Proposals
for integrating court supervision of detention and interrogation
regimes (torture warrants) are posited as reasonable ideas as we
address the tradeoffs between liberty and security in a world that
is said to have fundamentally changed on 9/11.171 Moral argu-
ments are met with utilitarian calculus. Legal arguments with
regard to statute and treaty law are analyzed in a purely intra-
American echo chamber with the trump card always seeming to
be the Presidential Constitutional Power as Commander-in-
Chief. International law is looked to only to the extent it can be
"properly" interpreted to concord with the views posited.
terests of the United States.
Recently, the President and Congress relaxed prohibitions on military assistance to
many countries adhering to the ICC statute. The authority was exercised this fall "to al-
low resumption of military education and training programs with twenty-one ICC par-
ties." John R. Crook, President and Congress End Limits on Military Training for Parties
to ICC Treaty, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 213, 214 (2007).
171 A fascinating discussion of the idea of 9/11 is presented in Le aconceptn du 11 Sep-
tembre, Dialogues & New York. GIOVANNA BORRADORI, JACQUES DERRIDA & JORGEN
HABERMAS, LE (tCONCEPP) DU 11 SEPTEMBRE, DIALOGUES A NEW YORK (2004). This French
language translation of Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues With Jurgen Habermas
and Jacques Derrida (2003) provides very interesting meditations on the meaning of 9/11
as a philosophical matter.
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Criminal prosecution of high-level civilians and military
generals is a manner of aggressive internal resistance to the il-
legal acts alleged committed by such persons. The focus on ag-
gressive resistance is made to maintain the illegitimacy of such
acts by denying the said actors any acquiescence that might legi-
timize their path of operation. This type of resistance to illegali-
ty is an internal United States mechanism for enforcing the in-
ternational norm.
In this next section, prior to engaging directly with the
debate described above, I prefer to anchor my thinking in first
principles of treaty and customary international law. The reason
is that debates within a state, particularly the United States, ap-
pear to be made based on the law within that state. Our fami-
liarity with international law in those debates is a subject of
great concern as frequently what is in fact being discussed is U.S.
foreign relations law and not international law. Thus, rules of
interpretation that are perfectly valid within the United States
that derive from constitutional or statutory methodologies devel-
oped over the years may inform a given internal argument and
be persuasive as far as they go. 172 However important, they are
merely internal ruminations in one state. How these ideas re-
fract through that one country is of less interest than how these
ideas refract in the domain of concern - international law, not
U.S. foreign relations law. By starting from first principles in in-
ternational law I hope that I can give some meaning that has va-
lidity for ourselves as well as other states that are also subject to
international obligations on the international plane. To stay in
the U.S. foreign relations law vision risks focusing too much on
an approach that would be, at a minimum, covering one state,
and at a maximum, comparative but not international.
Following the approach described above in this section
and looking for the positive law that should help understand the
rumination in the rich discussion described above within the
172 A classic example is the United States' efforts to reinterpret the Treaty on the Limi-
tation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, during the Reagan Administration in 1983-1985,
and subsequently with the Bush Administration withdrawal in December 2001 and
agreement to the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions of 2002. See DUNOFF ET AL.
Casebook, supra note 95, at 35. See generally Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435; see also Treaty on Strategic
Offensive Reductions of 2002, U.S.-Russ., May 24, 2002, 41 I.L.M. 799.
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United States, I first draw the attention to the international law
obligations of the United States with regard to torture and cruel,
inhuman and/or degrading treatment. Next, I look at those obli-
gations in light of the doctrine of 'oacta sunt servanda" and the
doctrine of the inability of internal law extracting a state from its
international law obligations.
B. First principles: International law obligations of the United
States with regard to torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment.
Many have written about the treaty and customary inter-
national law obligations of the United States in this area and its
apparent complexity and nuances may be daunting to both the
initiated and the uninitiated.17 3 However, we are fortunate to live
at a time when an effort of great significance has recently oc-
curred in which foreign relations law and international law scho-
lars from around the world attempted to synthesize the obliga-
tions of each nation with regard to the use of armed force and the
treatment of detainees. The subject of intense debate over a
three month period, the American Society of International Law
Centennial Resolution on the Use of Force and Treatment of De-
tainees ("ASIL Centennial Resolution") was overwhelmingly
adopted by the American Society of International Law at its Cen-
tennial annual meeting (and also its largest annual meeting in
history with 1600 in attendance) on March 30, 2006.
This adoption of a resolution was only the eighth time in
the 100 year history of the institution in which such a resolution
was passed. Pursuant to Article IX of the Constitution of the So-
ciety 174 and a policy statement of the Executive Council adopted
173 See generally Paust, supra note 27; Mary Ellen O'Connell, The ASIL Centennial An-
nual Meeting Adopts a Resolution on the Use of Armed Force and the Treatment of Detai-
nees, ASIL INSIGHTS, May 19, 2006, http://www.asil.org/insights/2O06/05/insights060519.
html; A. John Radsan, The Collision Between Common Article Three and the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 959 (2007); Davis, supra note 26. All of the above ar-
ticles comment on the United States international law obligations.
174 Constitution of the American Society of International Law, ASIL, Mar. 29, 2007,
available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/ASILConstitution-Regulations.pdf. Article IX states:
All resolutions relating to the principles of international law or to international
relations which shall be offered at any meeting of the Society shall, in the discre-
tion of the presiding officer, or on the demand of three members, be referred to
the appropriate committee or the Council, and no vote shall be taken until a re-
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in April 1966, there is a reason why such resolutions are rare.
Under the policy statement,
The Council in the future will recommend that the So-
ciety adopt resolutions urging action by persons out-
side the Society in only two types of circumstances:
(i) Resolutions relating to technical matters primarily
of professional interest to international lawyers and
scholars.(note: not of concern to this discussion)
(ii) Resolutions relating to principles of international
law or international relations, when all of the follow-
ing conditions have been satisfied:
(a) The matter is one which is generally considered by
members of the Council to involve a matter of truly
fundamental importance in promoting the establish-
ment and maintenance of international relations on
the basis of law and justice.
(b) The matter is one in respect of which most mem-
bers of the Society can reasonably be expected to be in-
formed without the preparation of a special committee
report.
(c) There is no significant disagreement within the So-
ciety as to the desirability of the proposed action.17 5
The three criteria of (1) fundamental importance, (2) rea-
sonable information of the diverse members from around the
world, and (3) where there is no significant disagreement as to
the desirability of the proposed action represent extremely high
hurdles to the passage of any resolution. Notwithstanding those
high hurdles, the ASIL Centennial Resolution was adopted with-
out dissent as to the content of the resolution and only minimal
dissent as to the opportunity of adopting such a resolution. As
port shall have been made thereon. Resolutions may be submitted for considera-
tion by the Executive Council in advance of any meeting of the Society by deposit-
ing them with the Executive Director not less than 15 days prior to the meeting.
Id.
175 Jose E. Alvarez, Lessons from a Resolution, PRESIDENT'S COLUMN, May 18, 2006,
available at http://www.asil.org/ilpost/president/presO6O518.html.
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the process was described by Jose E. Alvarez, President of the
American Society of International Law:
Like many Society members, I learned a great deal
from the ASIL forum in which the Ben Davis (and
subsequent draft) resolutions were debated. Thanks
to the world-wide web, it is now possible to gather -
nearly instantaneously - the reactions of many across
the planet. The responses that I read resonated with
the many discussions that I have had since 9/11 in my
travels as President-Elect and previously, as a mem-
ber of the Society. It became clear to me that some
version of the Davis resolution ought to be adopted,
not only because the vast majority of our members ex-
pected it, but also because the world - including our
fellow societies of international law - were also sitting
in judgment. On this occasion - when the actions of
many governments, including our own, seemed to be
testing not only the existence but the value of the most
fundamental precepts of international law, including
the foundational instruments of the post-war world
order - it seemed to me that the Society could best
"raise awareness of both the existence and the value of
international law" (in [former ASIL President Anne-
Marie] Slaughter's words) by adopting a resolution
that affirmed that such instruments remain legally
binding and in the national interest. (A particularly
galvanizing moment came during the General Meeting
when no one responded to the challenge presented by
two supporters of the resolution who asked for those
who disagreed with its contents to indicate their disa-
greement.) The Society needs to protect its legitimacy
as a Society that stands for international law and
adopting the rare resolution on matters of truly fun-
damental importance may be essential in this re-
spect. 176
On March 30, 2006 then, a broad consensus was reached on rules
of international law by a group that included many, if not all of
the greatest publicists of this generation on concerns that are
central to the subject of this article.
176 Id.
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For purposes of finding the international law that under-
pins this article we may start with the synthesis of rules of the
ASIL Centennial Resolution which states:
The American Society of International Law, at its cen-
tennial annual meeting in Washington, DC, on March
30, 2006, Resolves:
1. Resort to armed force is governed by the Charter of
the United Nations and other international law (jus
ad bellum).
2. Conduct of armed conflict and occupation is go-
verned by the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,
and other international law (jus in bello).
3. Torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment of any person in the custody or control of a state
are prohibited by international law from which no de-
rogation is permitted.
4. Prolonged, secret, incommunicado detention of any
person in the custody or control of a state is prohibited
by international law.
5. Standards of international law regarding treatment
of persons extend to all branches of national govern-
ments, to their agents, and toall combatant forces.
6. In some circumstances, commanders (both military
and civilian) are personally responsible under interna-
tional law for the acts of their subordinates.
7. All states should maintain security and liberty in a
manner consistent with their international law obliga-
tions.177
Of particular relevance for this article are points 2
through 5 which (1) reaffirm the applicability of the Geneva Con-
ventions but mention also other international law (both treaty
and customary international law applicable as international hu-
177 Resolution Adopted, ASIL, Mar. 30, 2006, http://www.asil.org/events/am06
/resolutions.html.
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manitarian law), (2) confirm that torture and cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment of any person in the custody or control of a
state is prohibited by international law, (3) remind all of the con-
tours of the ban on prolonged, secret, incommunicado detention,
(4) remind that these international law obligations fall upon a
state not just some subdivisions, and, most significantly for this
work, (5) highlight individual personal responsibility for com-
manders (both military and civilian) for the acts of their subordi-
nates. Subsequent to the adoption of the article, an ASIL Insight
was prepared by a very distinguished scholar of the law of armed
force which explicated the reasoning of the resolution. 178 Profes-
sor Mary Ellen O'Connell has explained clearly the relevant in-
ternational law in her Insight which is annexed to this article
(Annex 1) that underpins the ASIL Centennial Resolution. Her
analysis as regards the American international obligations is
comforted by the work of others, 179 including the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan.180
My task is to focus on two points regarding those interna-
tional obligations as they relate to the United States - "pacta
sunt servanda" and "internal law affect on international obliga-
tions"
C. First principles: 'pacta sunt servanda"
I have been drawn to two of the articles of the authorita-
tive (as treaty or customary international law) Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties With regard to the United States
treaty obligations. First, Article 26 "Pacta sunt servanda" states
that 'Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith."181 Under this provi-
sion, the question that continually arises for me with regard to
international obligations of the United States with regard to tor-
ture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is whether the
arguments made over recent years to attempt to extract our-
selves from the obligations on all states described by the ASIL
178 O'Connell, supra note 173.
179 See Paust 3, supra note 27; see also Paust 1, supra note 27; see also Paust 2, supra
note 27. All of Professor Paust's three articles echo Mary Ellen O'Connell's work.
180 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
181 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/englishconventions/11-11969.pdf.
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Centennial Resolution under both treaty and customary interna-
tional law comport with compliance with our treaty obligations in
good faith - including those sections that are considered custo-
mary international law such as Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. Independent of any moral arguments that one
might seek to make, the "pacta sunt servanda" language requires
us to look at the arguments that attempt to limit the United
States' obligations to less than those of other states and ask
which arguments applied in the War on Terrorism as regards
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment comport with
good faith. Those who focus on internal law in critiques of par-
ticularly customary international law18 2 intentionally disregard
the point that it is a settled fact across nations that treaties and
customary international law form parts of international law that
are binding on states, including the United States. Put more
bluntly, international law is an obligation of the United States
(as on all other states) whether as a matter of internal law it is
considered federal or state law.
The "pacta sunt servanda" codified in the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties reflects a fundamental rule, but it is
not the only one that I have found of assistance in thinking
through this issue.
D. First principles: inability of internal law extracting a state
from its external law obligations
The second rule is Article 27 - Internal law and observance
of treaties which states that "A party may not invoke the provi-
sions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty."18 3 This second long established rule codified in the Vien-
182 See John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?,
59 STAN L. REV. 1175 (2007) (commenting on the interplay between domestic law and in-
ternational law).
183 See Vienna Convention, supra note 181, at art. 27. The article goes on to say, "[t]his
rule is without prejudice to article 46." Id. Article 46 refers to internal rules with regard
to consent to be bound and states,
1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has
been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding compe-
tence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was
manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State con-
ducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good
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na Convention addresses a topic that appears under-analyzed in
the discussions presented above. All the mechanisms by Con-
gress, Executive Order, Regulation, court decision, or other man-
ner internal to the United States are not able to extract the Unit-
ed States from its international treaty and customary
international law obligations. To the extent these internal rules
(including self-execution or non-self-execution of treaties doc-
trines, Paquete Habana, last in time, Charming Betsey canon,
state secrets privilege, political question doctrine, federal officer
immunity, public authority defense, scope of employment de-
fenses, and Westfall immunity) are inconsistent with the treaty
obligations, they are unable to extract the United States from its
international obligations. More forcefully, no combination of Ex-
ecutive, Legislative, or Judicial action other than denouncing a
treaty (and provided the treaty does not codify rules of customary
international law) overrides the international obligation on the
United States as a matter of positive law. And no defenses in
domestic law that do not have an analog in international law
may override the international obligation upon the United
States.
The corollary to the above two rules is that, whether
through legislation or conduct, when the United States tortures
or cruelly inhumanly or degradingly treats persons, it violates its
international law obligations that are frequently described as of
the highest order (peremptory norms). Relativists might support
such legislation or conduct arguing that it is in the interest of na-
tional security. Absolutists might refer to these rules and state
we need to be in compliance. Both may allude to moral or utilita-
rian grounds to argue why the positive law should be fol-
lowed/not followed. But those arguments from moral or utilita-
rian bases are of little moment as they speak more to the political
will to enforce the law than to the law itself, which is the interna-
tional legal obligation of the United States.
Much has been written about the analyses of internation-
al law made internally in the United States to try to create what
has been termed "a legal blackhole" and which has been roundly
faith.
Id. art. 46. It is irrelevant to the discussion at hand.
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rejected.18 4 These legal opinions - in force a while, some with-
drawn, and some still classified - are internal law interpretations
of international law that are being made to support previously
taken positions, comfort thinking on a position, and/or persuade
others to comply by arguing that what is being asked to be done
is legal.
In the absence of national or international tribunals hold-
ing to task the authors of these internal interpretations, the
question that still can be addressed (as we did at the American
Society of International Law, March 30, 2007 panel) is whether it
is possible to say whether such a legal opinion is simply irres-
ponsible or "out of the ballpark"?185 My answer is in the affirma-
tive. The national and international community have been mak-
ing judgments about these legal interpretations as they have
been revealed to us. The bureaucratic resistance, that has led to
the divulging of some of the more sensitive opinions and debates
since the inception of the War on Terrorism, have permitted an
early opportunity to examine and comment on the interpreta-
tions. I submit that the synthesis of the ASIL Centennial Reso-
lution represented the national and international legal communi-
ty making a collective judgment in which exotic interpretations
that underpin arguments for torture and cruel, inhuman and de-
grading treatment were roundly rejected.
That being said, there are two aspects of the discussions
in the Administration of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment that I wish to discuss.
Leaving to the side the constitutional debates about Pres-
idential powers, I wish to focus on two key aspects of the debates:
(1) the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the Al-Qaeda
and Taliban and (2) the effect of the American Reservations, Un-
184 See sources cited supra note 179.
185 See Richard Bilder & William H. Taft IV, Ethics, Legitimacy, and Lawyering: How
Do International Lawyers Speak Truth to Power?, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW ANNUAL MEETING, Mar. 30, 2007, reprinted in 101 ASIL PROC. 325 (2007). The effort
in a 1990 report by a Joint Committee of the American Society of International Law and
the American Branch of the International Law Association on "The Role of the Legal Ad-
viser of the Department of State" raised, but is considered to not have satisfactorily ans-
wered, this question. In a recent Comment that Professor Richard Bilder and Professor
Deltev Vagts published in 2004 in the American Journal of International Law, they sug-
gested that, as a practical matter, perhaps the only check in such cases is the ex post facto
collective judgment of the national and international legal community. Id.
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derstandings and Declarations to key human rights treaties such
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the Convention Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and De-
grading Treatment or Punishment.
E. The applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the Al-Qaeda
and Taliban
As we know, on February 7, 2002, the President issued an
order (as reiterated in his Executive Order of July 20, 2007186),
determining that the Taliban had waived Geneva Convention
rights and that Al-Qaeda (non-state actors) did not have Geneva
Convention rights.18 7 At the time of that decision, the Depart-
ment of State Legal Adviser William Taft IV argued forcefully
against the United States departing from 60 years of practice and
policy with that interpretation.1 8 8 Others in the Administration
vigorously argued in favor of the new interpretation, and subse-
quently, the Department of State Legal Adviser was changed to
someone (John B. Bellinger III) who more closely conformed his
views to the President's order.
The important point for our discussion is that prior to 9/11
and up until the day the United States denounces the Geneva
Conventions in some future, the Geneva Conventions are an in-
ternational obligation upon the United States. 18 9 At the time of
185 See Exec. Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40, 707 (July 20, 2007) (determining that
"members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces" are not entitled to the protec-
tions afforded to prisoners of war by the Third Geneva Convention); see also Benjamin G.
Davis, Gutting the Geneva Conventions in the "War on Terror, JURIST, July 25, 2007,
available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/07/gutting-geneva-conventions-in-war-
on.php (commenting that President Bush was wrong in his interpretation of Common Ar-
ticle 3 of the Geneva Convention).
187 See generally Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors
Through a Global War on Terror?, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435 (2005) (describing the
trend of non-state actors and their international status).
188 See Memorandum from William H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to Al-
berto Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Feb. 2, 2002), reprinted in MARK DANNER,
TORTURE AND TRUTH 94 (2004); see also Memorandum from William H. Taft IV, Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State , to John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
Dep't of Justice (Jan. 11, 2002), available at http:/bpO.blogger.com/ M OtwEgZgAk/
RxmABQbQWlI/AAAAAAAAAwQsoHXNsk4ivos1600-hltaftmemol.jpg. In his memoran-
dums, Taft disagrees with the President's interpretation and argues that the President's
interpretation is inconsistent with the Convention.
189 "For, regardless of the nature of the rights conferred on Hamdan .... [the Geneva
Conventions] are, as the Government does not dispute, part of the law of war .... And
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the President's decision on February 7, 2002, the considered opi-
nion of the institutional adviser traditionally charged with pro-
viding advice on international law to the President was that the
Geneva Conventions covered the Taliban. Since the revelation of
that decision-making process, myriad commentators have
pointed out the manner in which the opinions upon which the
President made his decision were flawed, as was the President's
decision. 190 Moreover, in the Hamdan decision in June of 2006,
the Court found that at least Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions applied to Al-Qaeda. 91 Of great significance were
the dissents in Hamdan which also did not support the substance
of the Presidential order. Justice Scalia sought to persuade that
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 language had stripped the
question from the consideration of the court. 192 Such an argu-
ment leaves to the side the central issue of the applicability of
the Geneva Conventions to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the War
on Terrorism. Justice Alito took another tack in arguing that the
tribunals foreseen by the President's Military Order met the
standard required under Common Article 3 - without accepting
the applicability of the Geneva Conventions but still saying the
requirement had been met. 193 Justice Thomas provided a detailed
analysis of the American experience of military commissions and
the American precedents to arrive at his dissent. When turning
to the Geneva Conventions and Common Article 3, it is regretta-
ble that in interpreting the treaty, Justice Thomas chose to apply
domestic law rules of interpretation rather than authoritative in-
ternational law rules of treaty interpretation enshrined in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. At a minimum, in an
exercise of treaty interpretation regarding the laws of war, one
would have expected some reference to both U.S. foreign rela-
compliance with the law of war is the condition upon which the authority set forth in Ar-
ticle 21 is granted." Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628 (2006).
190 See sources infra note 276.
19, "We need not decide the merits of this argument because there is at least one provi-
sion of the Geneva Conventions that applies here even if the relevant conflict is not one
between signatories." Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629. "[T]he question whether [Hamdan's] po-
tential status as a prisoner of war independently renders illegal his trial by military
commission may be reserved." Id. at 630 n.61.
192 Id. at 655-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193 See id. at 730-33 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that first, the commissions qualified
as courts, and second, they "were [properly] appointed, set up, and established pursuant
to an order of the President").
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tions law approaches to treaty interpretation and international
law approaches to treaty interpretation and why the Justice de-
termined to accept the approach under one or the other. 194 But,
most significantly for purposes of this discussion, even in the ab-
sence of the use of international law rules of treaty interpreta-
tion, Justice Thomas was constrained to recognize that the inter-
pretation of Common Article 3 made by the majority is both
plausible and reasonable. 195 His concern with the Court was more
with its failure to defer to the President in this setting and, thus,
select the President's interpretation. 196 In a setting where the
President's approach has been seen as exotic, Justice Thomas'
support of deference to the President misses the more fundamen-
tal question as to whether the judicial deference applies with the
automaticity he argues or is to be tempered by judicial evaluation
(implicitly or directly) of the (something like) good faith of the na-
ture of the treaty interpretation by the President. Where the
President's treaty interpretation departs substantially from past
policy and practice of the United States and is questionable as a
matter or international law rules (based on the review of relevant
decisions or treatises as was done by Justice Stevens), 197 it would
seem that the Court could reasonably resist providing the level of
deference that, which might be traditional, was not earned by the
President.
Looking from the external point of view, I find the dissen-
ters' attempt to find ways to avoid contradicting the Administra-
tion position while also recognizing the majority's reasonableness
suggests the forcefulness of the idea that throughout the period
(9/11 to June 30, 2006) the Geneva Conventions (or some part of
them) applied to Taliban and Al-Qaeda. In the period between
194 See id. at 718-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas did look at international
experience with regards to whether conspiracy forms part of the laws of war, though, re-
grettably, he did not take the same approach with the Geneva Convention. See id. at 702
n.14.
195 See id. at 719 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Instead, the Court, without acknowledging
its duty to defer to the President, adopts its own, admittedly plausible, reading of Com-
mon Article 3.") (emphasis added).
196 See id. at 718-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("But where, as here, an ambiguous treaty
provision . . .is susceptible of two plausible, and reasonable, interpretations, our prece-
dents require us to defer to the Executive's interpretation.").
197 See id. at 619-20. Unlike Justice Thomas, Justice Stevens makes extensive refer-
ence in footnotes to the commentaries on the Geneva Conventions as a relevant method
for interpreting the Conventions' provisions. Id.
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prior to 9/11 and the Hamdan decision, the United States had an
international obligation under the Geneva Conventions. To put it
bluntly, the President has been wrong, with devastating conse-
quences (Abu Ghraib, etc.) for the United States. The key inter-
nal act of reinterpreting obligations against our history and prac-
tice was the decision of the President of the United States. He
was wrong and that decision was repudiated by our Supreme
Court at the first opportunity it had to hear the matter. All of
these internal to the United States machinations, from the ex-
ternal perspective appear to be a failed effort by the President
and those who advise him to extract the United States from its
international obligations through artful dodger analysis. 198 After
Hamdan, it was patently clear from the initial draft of the Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006 that the effort was to have Con-
gress extract the United States from its international obligations
by attempting to reinterpret those international obligations.
Senators Graham, Warner and McCain, along with former mili-
tary such as Colin Powell, resisted that effort and, at a minimum,
reduced the Military Commission Act of 2006 to an internal law
phenomenon that would not call into question directly the United
States commitments to its international obligations. That the at-
198 The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration of decision of the case in the Su-
preme Court. See id. at 635. Arguably, the majority in the Court of Appeals decision that
coincided with the President's view, as a matter of law, should be seen as validation of the
President. However, as a matter of international law, the international obligation re-
mained on the United States and the internal court's decision to say the international ob-
ligation does not apply in this case is subject to evaluation for its validity on the interna-
tional plane. One particular weakness with that decision is that the majority included
Judge John Roberts (as he then was) who was also at that time being interviewed and
vetted as a possible Supreme Court nominee. This is not to say that this was an unseemly
quid pro quo - as such impropriety would not exist at this level - however, looking at the
case from an international perspective and seeing what was at stake for the administra-
tion, whatever the rules on disclosures of interest and recusal, it defies logic to think that
Judge Roberts would not have considered whether to disclose or recuse himself in that
setting. His failure to do either weakens the impact of the Court of Appeals decision, as he
failed to remove an appearance of partiality or conflict of interest. Issues of independence
are difficult, but in the world of international commercial arbitration, the sense is that the
better position is to disclose. Whether the American law on judges reaches that standard
is a question for contemplation (particularly in situations where some judges are elected
as opposed to appointed and the potential conflicts that can arise). My point is that the
failure (of character?) of Justice Roberts taints the appeals court decision. His proper re-
cusal of himself from the Supreme Court case, of course, is without question the right de-
cision and further validates the majority decision in the Supreme Court in Hamdan as he
did not take part in any deliberations (a different situation from in the court of appeals).
Id.
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tack on the international law obligations through the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 was now indirect was the compromise
solution that was reached that helped avoid other countries con-
sidering the United States in breach of its obligations under the
Geneva Conventions.
The President's Executive Order of July 20, 2007 contin-
ues an effort within the internal law frame to extract the United
States from its obligations under the Geneva Conventions (while
professing to be complying) because of the departures from the
language of the international obligations under those treaties.
This approach is a further manifestation of that will to create or
preserve a blackhole at all costs.
F. The effect of the American Reservations, Understandings and
Declarations to key human rights treaties such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Convention Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights (from which no derogation is permitted under Article
4(2)) states as follows:
"Article 7
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment. In par-
ticular, no one shall be subjected without his free con-
sent to medical or scientific experimentation."' 199
The United States formulated several RUD's with regard
to the ICCPR, but the one on which I wish to focus is the third
one, to wit:
"(3) That the United States considers itself bound by
article 7 to the extent that 'cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment' means the cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the
Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the
199 Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Mar. 23, 1976), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-ccpr.
htm.
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Constitution of the United States." 200
RUDs that were similar but more detailed were formu-
lated with regard to the Convention Against Torture and Other
Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment.201
Back in the 1990's, a debate soon developed over the effect
of the United States RUDs. 20 2 Whether or not the RUD's were
consistent with the object and purpose of the treaties, of more in-
terest are the arguments in the post-9/11 environment seeking to
consider the RUDs Constitutional standard as not only a subs-
tantive standard but a limit on the application of either treaty
abroad (a geographical limitation).20 3 Similar to the arguments as
to the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to Al-Qaeda and
the Taliban since rejected by the Supreme Court in Hamdan, this
effort argued that, as to these other treaties, there was a "juris-
diction loophole" in the United States' ratification of the treaty
that permitted the United States to conduct cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment abroad without even the constitutional
standard applying.20 4 This debate led in turn to the passage of
200 U.N. Treaty Collection, Declaration and Reservations (Feb. 5, 2002), available at
http:/www.unhchr.ch/htmllmenu3/b/treaty5-asp.htm.
201 Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Convention Against Torture and Other
Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (June 26, 1987), availa-
ble at http://www.unhchr.ch/htmlmenu3/b/h-cat39.htm; Office of the High Comm'r for
Human Rights, Convention against Torture and Other cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Apr. 23, 2004), available at http://www.unhchr.chhtml/menu2
/6/cat/treaties/convention-reserv.htm.
202 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24, vol. I, at 119, U.N. Doc.
A/50/40 (1995), reprinted in DUNOFF ET AL. Casebook, supra note 95, at 480 ("The number
of reservations, their content and their scope may undermine the effective implementa-
tion of the Covenant and tend to weaken respect for the obligations of States Parties.");
see also Paust 1, supra note 27, at 372 ("U.S. compliance with prohibitions reflected in the
reservation to the CAT will fully 'satisfy the obligations of the United States with respect
to the standards' in common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions."); see also Curtis Brad-
ley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 399 (2000) ("The RUDs, we argue, reflect a sensible accommodation of competing
domestic and international considerations.").
203 See Paust 1,supra note 27, at 371 n.60 (discussing U.S. obligations under the CAT);
see also Shany, supra note 36, at 840 ("[T]he sweeping extension of the absolute
prohibition ban to all proscribed forms of ill-treatment falling short of torture is
unsupported by lex lata.").
204 Alberto Gonzales asserted this argument during his January 2005 confirmation
hearings. See Memorandum from Human Rights First, Issues to be Considered During the
Examination of the Second Periodic Report of the United States of America (Apr. 7, 2006)
[hereinafter Human Rights Memorandum], available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/
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the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 in order to have a federal
statute that ostensibly closed this alleged loophole on which poli-
cy had been based in the prior period.
Criticism of that "loophole" approach was immediate by
the negotiator for the United States of the Convention Against
Torture treaty for the United States. It was clear to Abraham
Sofaer, former Legal Adviser at the time of the United States' ra-
tification of the Convention Against Torture and other forms of
Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment, who
said by letter of January 21, 2005 to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, that the RUDs reference to Constitutional standards
were references to substantive standards (not veiled geographical
limitations). 205
What is most significant and, in many ways more impor-
tant, than these internal domestic law reinterpretations is the
perspective of all the other countries who had acceded to the
treaty on the United States' ratification. The new interpretation
was not suggesting there was a violation of U.S. internal law in
the United States providing its consent to be bound under Article
46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. On the in-
ternational plane, the RUDs would be interpreted under the
normal rules of treaty interpretation. The text of the RUDs
speak to substantive standards rather than jurisdictional con-
cepts. With the categoric denials of the principal negotiator
coupled with the text of the RUDs, an effort to find a jurisdic-
pdf/06502-etn-hrf-cat-final-submitted.pdf. That arguments opening would permit high-
level civilians to organize such treatment. Military Generals subject to the Uniform Code
of Military Justice would be unable to avail themselves of that loophole directly, but CIA
and other non-uniformed services would operate under that rule. See Radsan, supra note
173, at 962; see also Human Rights Memorandum, supra note 204.
205 The memorandum stated:
Abraham Sofaer, the respected legal scholar and former legal advisor to the State
Department, provided the following explanation in his January 21, 2005 letter to
the Senate Judiciary Committee concerning the meaning of the U.S. reservation:
'(T)he purpose of the reservation [to CAT] was to prevent any tribunal or state
from claiming that the U. S. would have to follow a different and broader
meaning of the language of Article 16 than the meaning of those same words in
the Eighth Amendment. The words of the reservation support this understand-
ing, in that they related to the meaning of the terms involved, not to their geo-
graphic application.'
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tional loophole - while clever - smacks of a failure to conform in
good faith to our international obligation (whether or not the
RUDs are considered inconsistent with the object and purpose of
the treaty).
Turning to the more substantive point, whether in fact the
internal law constitutional rule formulated by the Supreme
Court as "shocks the conscience" would, through the RUDs, be
applied in a manner that departs from the international law
standard is a practical question. If a matter comes to a court on
these points, the question will be whether the court, in applying
the "shocks the conscience" standard, will vindicate the interna-
tional law rule against cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
(whether in treaty or customary international law). If the court
does, then the Court will have used an internal rule to meet an
international standard. If the court does not apply such a high
standard in its estimation of what "shocks the conscience," then
it remains for other nations (particularly those with the right of
diplomatic protection over their national detainees) to contest the
internal deviation from the international obligation, and the in-
compatibility of the U.S. RUDs with the object and purpose of the
treaty, other treaties, and customary international law. In either
event, the international obligation remains on the United States,
notwithstanding the machinations of the Executive Branch, the
Legislative Branch, and the Judiciary. Even a denunciation of
the treaty would be of no moment to the extent customary inter-
national law covers the same terrain. Assuming a proper de-
nouncing of the treaty, the United States would still have its cus-
tomary obligations. In a word, there is international law and the
question is whether the organs of the United States will be in
compliance with that international law. 20 6
I take the position that the United States' failure to comp-
ly with these international obligations on the United States dur-
ing the period between 9/11 and into the future is a breach of pe-
206 A final brief comment as regards whether the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights Article 2 limits its applicability in territory and jurisdiction to the United
States. It would seem that even if the acts of concern occur outside of the United States,
the decision-making that would occur within the territory and jurisdiction of the United
States would be subject to the international obligations of the United States. Taking a
step back, even the plotting to be "offshore" to then do the acts in non-compliance with
such treaty would be acts in the United States subject to the territory and jurisdiction
elements. Again, an international obligation lies upon the United States.
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remptory norms and is an illegal act. However, in a situation
where the institutional analysis shows the inability of interna-
tional tribunals to react to said breach, the only other non-
domestic manner to enforce compliance would be through hori-
zontal enforcement. However, given the enormous power of the
United States in the world, the analysis of horizontal enforce-
ment has to proceed a bit further than usual in discussions of in-
ternational legitimacy. The reason we need to proceed further is
to understand in the international legal process what is at stake
in the demeanor reaction of other states to the United States act.
At a second level, it also highlights the issues that are present
with regard to vertical enforcement of the international obliga-
tion inside the United States. I have attempted to simplify the
manner of comprehending what is at stake through an elegant
equation: illegal act + acquiescence = legitimacy.
G. Illegal Act + Acquiescence = Legitimacy.
As a general matter, a state may be perfectly willing to in-
cur state responsibility for acts that breach international norms -
even jus cogens or peremptory norms.20 7 That being said, if the
state is able to convince a sufficiently powerful group of other
states of the wisdom of its actions, the likelihood of external re-
sponse to the patently illegal act through some form of horizontal
enforcement of the international norm is diminished or even
eliminated. It is even possible that, for political or other reasons,
there will be cooperation, collaboration, or non-objection by states
to the illegal acts. To the extent that this cooperation, collabora-
tion, or non-objection is across many states, we would be faced
with international acquiescence by other states in the illegal acts
of a given state. That acquiescence in the illegality, in turn,
would inevitably give some legitimacy to the illegal act. 208
In addition to this type of external acquiescence, there can
be internal acquiescence by which the polity acquiesces in the
acts done in their name by the leadership, even if illegal as a
207 The Nuremberg Trials were precisely about this type of action by a state.
208 See generally IAN CLARK, INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY AND WORLD SOCIETY (2007)
(placing historical significance on the concept of world society, while challenging tradi-
tional views of international society).
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matter of internal law - let alone international law. The lack of
external response may bolster the view internally of the legiti-
macy of the act. Even if the act is illegal as a matter of internal
domestic law, the external and internal acquiescence allow the
illegal acts to be considered legitimate. The effect is something
similar to impunity, but not quite the same because there is a
need to foster the acquiescence that engenders the lack of pu-
nishment. That need to foster the acquiescence is felt most
acutely by the high-level civilian authority and military generals
who would have orchestrated the illegal act.
To the extent such high-level persons are able to cause
such acquiescence, they are able to fulfill an almost mathemati-
cal equation in seeking legitimacy: illegal act + acquiescence =
legitimacy.
H. Illegal Act + Resistance209 = Illegitimacy.
The central step to legitimizing the policy in this model is
acquiescence. 210 Acquiescence is not inevitable no matter how
persuasive the argument, no matter how powerful the state.
Another possible response, for whatever reason, is resistance to
the illegal act. Resistance plays the role of preventing acquies-
cence and in turn preventing legitimacy for the illegal act.
The outcome of the struggles between forces of resistance
and acquiescence determines the ultimate legitimacy of the illeg-
al act. If one seeks to ensure that torture is never legitimized
209 1 recognize that the word "resistance" might be an odd term in a discussion of crimi-
nal law, conjuring notions of resisting arrest etc. The term appeared the most appropriate
here as it harks back to the notion of the French who did not submit to the overwhelming
power of the Nazis - the Resistance. It also reminds me of those non-Japanese or non-
Japanese American persons who during World War II protested the internment of their
Japanese and Japanese-American neighbors rather than acquiesced. Resistance conjures
the idea of pushing back against the very powerful; such as, these high-level civilians and
generals.
210 Thus, Antonio Cassese view on Kosovo bombing by NATO is not significant because
it posits how the intervention could be legitimate but because the positing how the act
could be legitimate is actually the acquiescence in the illegal bombing which forges the
legitimacy. Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10
EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1999); cf. Hans Corell, Ethics, Legitimacy, and Lawyering: How
Do International Lawyers Speak Truth to Power?, 101 ASIL PROC. 325, 330-31 (Mar. 30,
2007). Asserting a theory from a position of power such as the Office of Legal Counsel is
an act of seeking acquiescence in the policy that, if successful, leads to legitimacy of the
policy.
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(one is an absolutist), then resistance to the illegal act is essen-
tial. If one seeks the result that the space for torture legitimizing
is reduced or eliminated (i.e. that it operates as an internal norm
of the highest order), then criminal prosecution of high-level civi-
lians and military generals may precisely be the type of resis-
tance to torture that is required.
Criminal prosecution of high-level civilians and military
generals is a form of aggressive internal resistance to the illegal
acts. The focus on aggressive resistance is made to maintain the
illegitimacy of such acts by denying the said actors any acquies-
cence that might legitimize their path of operation. This type of
resistance to illegality is an internal mechanism for enforcing the
international norm.
One can wonder whether, in the absence of criminal pros-
ecution, the non-criminal prosecution mechanisms within the
United States, together with any external mechanisms, are
enough to enforce the international norm. For example, with re-
gard to high-level civilians, whether and how to address the risk
of criminalization of policy differences is of concern. 211 The logic
of this analysis appears to be that policy differences are healthy
and thus, the product of the policy formulation process (by its na-
ture done by high-level persons) should not be criminalized. On
the other hand, implementation failures may be sanctioned cri-
minally as these failures are the result of incompetence or crimi-
nal misapplication of policy at the lowest level. Thus, so the ar-
gument runs, persons at the policy making level and higher
levels of strategy implementation are appropriately at little risk
of prosecution. Put more structurally, this prosecution of a few
low-level personnel, with the absence of prosecution (removal or
administrative reprimand at most, but no risk of deprivation of
liberty) for higher-level military and civilian authority is an op-
timal solution. For those who believe in international law, the
hope is that creative alternatives to deprivation of liberty will
have the effect of assuring high-level compliance with interna-
211 See David Johnston, The Pardons; Bush Pardons 6 in Iran Affair, Aborting a Wein-
berger Trial; Prosecutor Assails 'Cover- Up', N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1992, at Al (commenting
on President Bush granting six full pardons, most notably to former Defense Secretary
Caspar W. Weinbergek) ; see also Jack Kemp, The Right Thing to Do, TOWNHALL.COM,
Apr. 3, 2007, available at http://www.townhall.com/Columnists/JackKemp/2007/04/03/
the-righLthingto.do (pointing out several cases of pardons from Clinton and Bush I.).
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tional norms. In addition, in order to recruit people willing to
take on these high-level positions, it might be optimal not to have
them bear any risk of prosecution for their actions in defining
policy. This freedom of movement might be viewed as the con-
sideration for their years of loyalty, patriotism or other values
that might be highly prized by the President.
I believe that, in circumstances where Congressional acts
are sought to be interpreted consistent with international law ob-
ligations of the United States and the President seeks to comply
with those norms (let us call this Charming Betsy times),212 hav-
ing a high-level group with policy impunity certainty, coupled
with another lower-level group bearing some criminal responsi-
bility risk, is problematic and smacks of unfairness, but it is
workable. The reason is that from an International Law (IL)
compliant perspective, the choices of policies of such a group in
Charming Betsy times are more likely to be consistent with well-
accepted traditions with regard to international law obliga-
tions.213
But, there is the question of the non-Charming Betsey
times when new paradigms seduce and departures from the
highest norms of international law are considered and enacted.
My concern is with situations like the present in which the politi-
cal branches of United States federal government (Executive and
Congress) embark on a policy of war in the name of security, the
American public provides at least initially enthusiastic support,
and the Judiciary is extraordinarily deferential to Executive pre-
rogatives. When the policy and conduct of the United States be-
gin to appear to foreign and domestic commentators as violating
jus cogens or peremptory norms, the concern is that we are em-
barking on acts that are not only violations of high-level norms of
212 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). See generally Ingrid
Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming
Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293 (2005). The effort to interpret, to the extent possible,
Congressional action consistent with international law is an internal process. From the
external view, the Congressional act either complies with international law obligations of
the United States or breaches them.
213 In such times one can imagine a traditional form of international legal analysis be-
ing done by the political branches and the Supreme Court in analyzing questions that
arise, to wit 1) Is there an international legal obligation?, 2) Has it been breached in a
manner attributable to the state?, 3) Is there an excuse for the wrongful act?, 4) What
type of remedy should be provided?, and, assuming no agreed procedure is foreseen, 5)
What procedure should be used and how can it be put in place?
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international law, but violation of norms for which no excuse (ne-
cessity, public emergency, and proportionality, for example) is
permitted as a matter of positive international law. I seek, as a
citizen, ways to harness countervailing forces under our Consti-
tutional structure so that high-level civilian authority and mili-
tary generals who designed the policy and planned the imple-
mentation of that policy can be sent to jail and suffer the gravest
consequences commensurate with the gravity of their departure
from what might be termed civilized conduct. I seek to resist le-
gitimizing these acts. That we would seek to send such persons
to jail is because they have entertained and enacted such gross
departures from acceptable activity as a matter of international
law, demonstrating the failure of the non-criminal prosecution
approaches to countervail their international law violative pro-
pensities.
My concern is that, notwithstanding other means of en-
couraging United States compliance with international law
norms, this lack of criminal prosecution of high-level civilians
and military generals in the United States domestic courts may
be a significant omission from the United States' domestic hu-
man rights arsenal. Further, this situation raises a difficulty for
the United States and the international community in maintain-
ing absolute bans against barbaric acts.
I thus posit a continuum between times when, as a matter
of international law, a breach of an international law obligation
may have an excuse (normal times) and when a breach occurs of
a high-level international law obligation without the possibility,
as a matter of international law, for an excuse (abnormal times).
Much like the ubiquitous pendulum swing, criminal prosecution
in abnormal times is an extreme reaction to an extreme depar-
ture from high-level norms. It would help to temper the worst
departures from the most fundamental international norms en-
shrined in positive international law.
To put this another way, the well-known Youngstown tri-
logy2 14 of the late Justice Robert H. Jackson concurring opinion
214 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring opinion). The model discussed in this section about the intersection be-
tween U.S. foreign relations law and international law also is apt for those more focused
on Curtiss-Wright situations where the allegations are that the acts fall within Presiden-
tial commander-in-chief powers. Curtiss-Wright analysis begs the question of whether the
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that seems to guide the courts in these delicate areas of separa-
tion of powers has a fundamental flaw when it comes to the reali-
ty of international law. The Youngstown trilogy is a Constitu-
tional analysis of the first order, but that is also its limit. While
the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the Land, it is not the
Supreme Law of all the lands or states. Rather, it is the con-
struction through which the United States projects its sovereign-
ty among the other sovereigns of the world. In order to better
harness what is at stake, it is therefore necessary to create an in-
tersection between the Youngstown trilogy and international law.
That intersection however must not be done through a lens of
U.S. foreign relations law because the predicate of that type of
analysis is the supremacy of the constitutional structure rather
than the idea of statehood and state responsibility that derives
from the international law sphere.
What occurred to me is that through a form of dedouble-
ment analytique or second vision, it is possible to understand the
Youngstown trilogy within four different international law envi-
ronments: (1) where the United States is complying with interna-
tional law; (2) where the United States is breaching an interna-
tional law obligation but there is a rule of international law that
applies which permits an excuse of that breach and the United
President (or for that matter any other organ of the United States federal government
alone or in combination with the President or other organs) is above the United States
and its obligations freely entered into on the international plane.
As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies, acting as a unit,
the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies sev-
erally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United
States of America. Even before the Declaration, the colonies were a unit in for-
eign affairs, acting through a common agency -- namely the Continental Con-
gress, composed of delegates from the thirteen colonies. That agency exercised
the powers of war and peace, raised an army, created a navy, and finally adopted
the Declaration of Independence. Rulers come and go; governments end, and
forms of government change; but sovereignty survives. A political society cannot
endure without a supreme will somewhere. Sovereignty is never held in sus-
pense. When, therefore, the external sovereignty of Great Britain in respect of
the colonies ceased, it immediately passed to the Union. . . . That fact was given
practical application almost at once. The treaty of peace, made on September 23,
1783, was concluded between his Brittanic Majesty and the "United States of
America."
U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936). Even a king is con-
strained by the international obligations falling upon his state and him that form the law
of nations that apply to all the states and all the kings - let alone to a President or other
organ emanating from the internal law of a given state.
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States meets that rule of excuse; (3) where the United States is
breaching an international law obligation, there is a rule of in-
ternational law that applies that would excuse the breach BUT
(very important) the United States is not in compliance with the
requirements for that excuse to apply; and (4) where the United
States is breaching an international law obligation for which in-
ternational law does not provide a possibility of excuse. I would
posit that, as a matter of international law, the Youngstown tri-
logy can operate in all four of these environments with differing
consequences occurring for the United States and the world.
In the first setting, where the United States is complying
with international law, there is complete harmony as a matter of
compliance with international law externally because the United
States is in compliance with its international law obligations.
The key is that as a state, the United States is in compliance
with its international law obligations. 215
In the second setting, where the United States is breach-
ing an international law obligation but there is a rule of interna-
tional law that applies which permits an excuse of that breach
and the United States meets that rule of excuse, the key point is
that externally the breach may be of a lower level norm of inter-
national law for which excuses are foreseen (necessity or distress,
for example) that will excuse the state's responsibility for the
breach. In this setting, while the United States has violated a
rule of international law, it has done so in a manner that is con-
sistent with a just as well-recognized rule of excuse of that
breach in international law that may reduce the need for a reme-
dy, if a remedy is deemed necessary at all.
In the third setting, where the United States is breaching
an international law obligation, there is a rule of international
law that applies that would excuse the breach BUT (very impor-
tant) the United States is not in compliance with the require-
ments for that excuse to apply, the United States is beginning to
215 This setting might be one where a combination of Congressional and Executive deci-
sions has to be tempered by Judicial inventiveness to interpret statutes in a manner that
is consistent with the United States' international law obligations. See, e.g., United States
v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1471 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2006). The
Hamdan Court struck down a departure from an international norm in the President's
military order that was neither supported by the then language of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice nor permitted under the Authorization to Use Military Force. Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006).
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make a departure from its international obligations in a manner
that is not excused. This result would mean that one would ex-
pect that some type of remedy (restitution, indemnity or satisfac-
tion and reprisals (if permitted), reciprocal measures or retor-
sion) would be foreseeable if another state were willing to assert
in the proper forum such a breach of the international law norm.
Here, because the norm was one that did foresee excuse but
where even the excuse was not provided, the remedy that would
be expected could begin to become substantial for any injured
state. The reason is that the American behavior would have de-
parted even from the confines of a rule which contained an
excuse. We might call this kind of action a form of petty lawless-
ness by the United States.216
In the fourth setting, where the United States is breach-
ing an international law obligation for which international law
does not provide a possibility of excuse, the departure is the most
significant from international norms. These types of norms
would be considered the peremptory norms from which no dero-
gation is permitted. In this setting, the United States as a sove-
reign state would be engaging in gross lawlessness with regard to
our international law obligations.
It is important to keep in mind that in all four settings
above, the separation of powers may act consistent with any of
the three levels of Youngstown. However, unless the Judiciary is
willing to integrate more robustly the external international law
vision in the manner the Judiciary conducts itself under the
Youngstown trilogy as played out in each of the four settings, one
can see that the Judiciary can contribute to the United States
acting with gross lawlessness with regard to our international
law obligations. 217 Similarly, Congress and the Executive can
contribute to the United States acting with gross lawlessness
with regard to our international law obligations. Youngstown
alone does not solve the problem because it fails to capture the
216 1 recognize that a substantial departure in such a setting could rise to a gross law-
lessness as described hereafter. See sources infra notes 219-20. The walls are permeable
between these settings, but it is a manner that is useful to articulate a series of alterna-
tive legal situations in which the Youngstown trilogy is called to operate.
217 1 recognize the judiciary's dilemma in "respon[ding] to military authority in a time of
grave national peril." Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The President's Power to Detain "Enemy
Combatants" Modern Lessons From Mr. Madison's Forgotten War, 98 NW. U. L. REV.
1567, 1568 (2004).
2008]
ST JOHN'S JOURAAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 23:3
international law aspect of the United States obligations. The
Constitution merely allocates the powers of the state in our fede-
ralism, but that separation of powers does not ensure that the
United States will be in compliance with its international law ob-
ligations.218
I would posit that this is the essential tension between the
U.S. foreign relations law vision and the international law vision
within the United States.2 19 As a matter of being citizens of the
218 I have sometimes thought that one reason for this failure of efficacy on the interna-
tional plane of Robert H. Jackson's Youngstown opinion was that he may have made a
distinction between internal threats to the United States for which Constitutional rules
would apply and how to treat external threats on the international plane. Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 635-36 (Jackson, J., concurring). Having been the prosecutor at Nuremberg,
he clearly had the experience of prosecuting international crimes committed by leaders of
others states. He also recognized that what he was starting would redound to the benefit
or detriment of the United States at a future date. Possibly, he had only a vague sense of
what that future would look like. He was acting in an environment where the rules of in-
ternational human rights and international criminal law (leaving to the side the progress
in international humanitarian law) as a whole were much less well defined then today in
treaty and custom. At that time, the United States was generally expected to comply with
the laws of war. Further, Jackson had lived through a horrendous world war in which the
survival of mankind had been in question as had the survival of the United States. In that
environment, the manner in which he evaluated an United States' injury to external per-
sons may have been based on a view that the correctives of the Youngstown trilogy would
be enough because the United States would generally be in compliance with international
norms. Or, if the United States departed from an international norm it would be done in a
setting where there was a recognized excuse. He may not have imagined the kind of po-
tential petty lawlessness or gross lawlessness by the United States that the four settings
of the model above capture, but he could, of course, foresee such petty lawlessness or gross
lawlessness, particularly from uncivilized states. He may also have measured external
threats in a manner that did not expect as many constraints on the United States as he
would have readily expected from a threat that was internal as the price of having a con-
stitutional order. I wonder if this undervaluing of those abroad is a problem that arises
today in my country. See generally Jack Goldsmith, Justice Jackson's Unpublished Opi-
nion in Exparte Quirin, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 223 (2006).
219 See generally Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump U.S.
Domestic Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 327 (2000). The problematic Youngstown trilogy interac-
tion with the four settings of international law is not only true in the arena of torture.
One can imagine other areas of international law, such as human rights, where the Unit-
ed States engages in petty lawlessness, or even gross lawlessness, with regard to its own
citizens or residents. Those who push a United States foreign relations law vision within
the Youngstown trilogy leave minorities and other disaffected and oppressed persons in
the United States to stand on the shifting sands of state and federal statute and constitu-
tional jurisprudence within the whims of the internal political process. For blacks, 350
years of open hostility towards our equality, and fifty-seven years of narrowing the prom-
ise of Brown, does not presage some utopia in the United States just because of our pecu-
liar form of separation of powers and federalism that is considered, I think in error, the
'nirvana" of those seduced by the United States' foreign relations law suspicion of treaty-
based or customary international law human rights. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954). Our common history demonstrates so eloquently that it is not the Constitu-
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United States, those of both schools might think of how our sys-
tem is to operate to prevent the United States from engaging in
gross lawlessness, at a minimum, and petty lawlessness as de-
scribed in the four settings above. I recognize one solution is to
change the law (move the goalposts) so that what was once petty
or gross lawlessness is now capable of being excused as a matter
of international law. The United States does have power to seek
to try to change those rules. However, particularly with what
would be covered by gross lawlessness, I have a sense that such
high-level norms are there for a reason based on human history.
These norms are not precatory language but rather speak to
something fundamental in determining when humans are civi-
lized or barbarians. Thus, changing the law as regards them
merely makes us barbarians. Not foreigners in the Greek sense
but in the current sense of uncivilized.
tion, but the commitment of the people of the United States to constitutionally-based civil
rights that determines the value of the United States' constitutional structure. In this re-
gard, the international human rights that can come into the United States through a re-
equilibrated use of the Judicial power as regards treaties, and back to even the modest
Paquete Habana approach as to customary international law, provide means to allow the
individual citizen to assert civil rights and human rights against his state and hostile ma-
jorities. That connection with the international plane is a means to change the relations of
power for the burdened and downtrodden. That connection reminds the United States'
leadership of these international obligations to its own citizens. It is precisely the fear of
that international connection that led to the infamous Bricker amendment efforts seeking
indirectly to cast out blacks from the protections of international human rights, which
would have caused a further reduction in the then second-class citizenship of blacks.
Moreover, those who are so quick to dismiss international human rights must have as
their primary assumption that the state will never act against them and those who are
dear to them. To think in terms of that assumption, one must be at a level of security in
the American hierarchy that does not imagine a threat from the state. By definition, that
kind of sense of personal security, in a world of profound insecurity, would only be with
those of a privileged and powerful elite, or those who were willing to kowtow to such a
privileged and powerful elite. I take little comfort from those in such elite positions who
argue so strenuously to decouple ordinary citizens from the international connection that
serves as a protection. Their protestations leave me cold, as do the images of torture of
those external to the United States, such as the one which graces the beginning of this
article. The reason is that dissent from the views of the privileged and powerful elite is
the lifeblood of change and protection of civil rights in our polity, not acquiescence to a
status quo that was perfectly content to keep one always on the bottom. Maybe, over 40
years ago, the idea was most clearly expressed as "...domestic courts must struggle to be-
come their own masters in international law cases." See RICHARD A. FALK, PREFACE, THE
ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER xi-xiii (1964); see also
BENEDETTO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS
9, (1993), for the expression of a European vision, particularly on the violation of interna-
tional law and its consequences.
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From the above one can see that an illegal act can derive
from several situations in three of the four settings where com-
pliance does not occur with regard to a given international norm.
Now, in the absence of protest of the breach, the question that
remains is whether persons in a state or those outside of that
state acquiesce in that breach. Acquiescence can happen in all
three of the settings of breach giving some level of legitimacy to
the breach. As one moves to higher norms for which no excuse is
available in international law, one also requires the acquiescence
to cover what appears to be a greater degree of lawlessness by
the breaching state in order to provide the same level of legitima-
cy. Yet in doing that, the state or person who is acquiescing is
trying to formulate some type of political excuse in the absence of
a legal excuse. In that sense, the state or person is also encour-
aging the weakening of the high-level norm whose violation
would be considered gross lawlessness. This would seem to be a
regression to a less civilized state. Depending on the type of ac-
tivity involved, we each have to determine whether we are will-
ing to allow our state to regress in that manner. Having seen the
pictures as regards torture and cruel inhuman or degrading
treatment, a mechanism that aggressively resists legitimizing
that barbarity would seem in order. In the internal system of the
United States, the method that best seemed to do that would be
the criminal prosecution of the high-level civilians and generals
who put in place such barbarity. The need for enhanced resis-
tance is present to deprive the actors that made the decisions
that cause the illegal act from having any legitimacy in internal
or international law. Or, to put it another way, to have them in-
cur individual criminal responsibility for the gross lawlessness
that they caused their state to do.
The reasons for invoking this concept of enhanced resis-
tance to the illegal act are not the sole concerns motivating the
need for refluat stercus. In the next section, using a managerial
vision of the policy, planning, and implementation process, I try
to highlight the structural concerns that arise in the periods of
extreme departure (gross lawlessness) with regard to the gov-
ernment which might also militate for a criminal prosecutive ap-
proach to redressing the situation.
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I. Modeling why Refluat Stercus
Taking a more managerial view of addressing torture and
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment than an absolutist or
relativist approach, below I present a model for understanding
my thinking about the need for these high-level prosecutions. I
then apply that model in the context of torture to test the model.
1. Theory of Policy/Planning/Implementation 220
While there are many gradations in civilian and military
authority, I would submit that there are in essence three tasks
that are to be accomplished: policy, planning and implementation
(Figure A). Policy development is primarily a civilian task with
feedback and assistance from the uniformed military for the De-
partment of Defense and political appointees in other depart-
ments, who provide input to help the higher-level policy decisions
to be made. Beyond policy determination, there is a need to mus-
ter the appropriate resources to meet the policy objectives and
that is done through the planning process, which breaks out just
how the policy will be implemented. This task would be done at
the level of the general officers of the military (with assistance of
lower level officers to the extent appropriate but with the ulti-
mate responsibility for the plans lying with the generals) and po-
litical appointees with the assistance of some career employees.
Finally, the actual task of putting the policy into action, the im-
plementation step, would be done by the lower-level officers and
service persons in the military and their equivalent civilian per-
sons in other agencies.221
220 I received both my J.D. and M.B.A. from Harvard in 1983. Consequently, I think of
process in both the legal sense of legal process and the management sense of statistical
process flow analysis, such as that of W. E. Deming. It is the fusion of these two views in
my training and experience that informs the functional/structuralist realities I am at-
tempting to describe in this section.
221 Even with the advent of civilian contractors, I would submit that the policy and
planning tasks design the extent to which civilian contractors will be part of the overall
plan that is to be implemented. Thus, unless there is broad delegation by the higher-ups,
which may even be illegal in itself, the civilian contractors serve merely as implementers
and not as policy makers or planners.
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Figure A
Policy/Planning/Implementation
General Stream
Policy = Planning = Implementation
Whatever policy is set, it will fall on a continuum from full
compliance to non-compliance with regard to international law,
similar to the four settings described in the previous section. For
purposes of this analysis, due to the problem of the number of po-
tential outcomes expanding rapidly, I have divided the four set-
tings described above into two settings: (1) IL compliant: where
there is compliance with an international law rule or, if there is a
breach of an international law rule, there is a permissible excuse
of said breach that is recognized in international law, and (2) IL
non-compliant: where there is a breach of an international law
rule and the excuses that are permissible are not availing or, al-
ternatively, there is a rule of international law whose breach is
never excused as a matter of international law.222 Whatever the
policy and wherever it lies on that scale, the planning as a result
of that policy will attempt to implement that policy effectively or
not. Whether the planning is effective or not, the implementa-
tion of that plan by the lower levels will either be effectuated
consistent with the policy and planning or not. To demonstrate
this series of relations, see Figure B.
222 While imperfect, I do believe this model captures the idea of a hierarchy of norms for
international law in an elegant manner.
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Figure B
Policy/Planning/Implementation
Examples of Options
IL Compliant Effective Consistent
Policy =) Planning ) Im lementation
IL Non-compliant Ineffective Inconsistent
Policy =) Planning =) Implementation
The key aspect of this structure is the interactions between
the three steps of the process. While recognizing that there can
be gradations, for the purposes of this theoretical model, I will fo-
cus only on the extreme cases. One can find 8 potential relation-
ships that can occur (Figure C). The likely outcomes from those
relationships are described below.
Figure C
Policy/Planning/Implementation
Potential theoretical International Law (IL) outcomes
Policy Planning Implementation Risk of IL
Criminality
IL Compliant Effective Consistent Very
Policy Planning Implementation Low Risk of
violation
IL Compliant Effective Inconsistent Low Risk of
Policy Planning Implementation violation
IL Compliant Ineffective Consistent Low to
Policy Planning Implementation Medium Risk
of violation
IL Compliant Ineffective Inconsistent Medium Risk
Policy Planning Implementation of violation
IL Effective Consistent Very
Non- Planning Implementation High Risk of
compliant violation
Policy
IL Non- Effective Inconsistent High Risk of
compliant Planning Implementation violation
Policy
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IL Ineffective Consistent Medium to
Non- Planning Implementation High Risk of
compliant violation
Policy
IL Ineffective Inconsistent High Risk of
Non- Planning Implementation violation
compliant
Policy
1. IL Compliant Policy, Effective Planning, Consistent
Implementation: Under this scenario, high-level, mid-
level and lower level actors are operating in a consistent
pattern to be compliant with IL with the result that the
risk of non-compliance would appear to be lower. A few
cases of violation would appear possible from the actions
of a "few bad apples."
2. IL Compliant Policy, Effective Planning, Inconsis-
tent Implementation: Under this scenario, the inconsis-
tent implementation would suggest that lower-level actors
are acting in a manner that raises the risk of violations.
One would expect that feedback from these inconsistent
actions would reach the policy and planning levels to pu-
nish the lower level persons for their inconsistent acts.
This would bring the lower level back into compliance. In
the absence of such feedback mechanisms, there is a risk
the low-level errors will expand. That raises the problem
of lack of discipline being endemic to force implementa-
tion. Thus, there is a low risk of violations.
3. IL Compliant Policy, Ineffective Planning, Consis-
tent Implementation: The combination of ineffective
planning and consistent implementation appears to raise
further the risk of violation simply because the effects of
the ineffective planning are magnified by the consistent
lower level blind allegiance to those plans.
4. IL Compliant Policy, Ineffective Planning, Inconsis-
tent Implementation: Curiously, the inconsistent im-
plementation of ineffective planning raises the prospect of
low-level actors complying with policy notwithstanding
the mid-level planning step. This could verge on insubor-
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dination but appears more to be a situation where the
lack of coherence makes for risks of violations to be
present. However, there is also the possibility of temper-
ing any detrimental incoherencies coming from the inef-
fective planning.
5. IL Non-compliant Policy, Effective Planning, Con-
sistent Implementation: This is the scenario with the
highest risk of international law violating behavior. The
entire structure is operating in a manner that leads to vi-
olations.
6. IL Non-compliant Policy, Effective Planning, Incon-
sistent Implementation: Similar to scenario 4, the risks
of violations remain because of the higher level pressure
and effective planning in response to that pressure. How-
ever, the inconsistent implementation likely reduces the
risk of violations from the very high-level.
7. IL Non-compliant Policy, Ineffective Planning, Con-
sistent Implementation : In this setting, the resistance
of the planning staff to follow the policy serves as a buffer
to the lower level implementing group with the effect that
the risk of potential violations are reduced. However, the
removal of ineffective planning and replacement by more
effective planners can change this situation into a high vi-
olation environment.
8. IL Non-compliant Policy, Ineffective Planning, In-
consistent Implementation: Verging on indiscipline or
revolt, the mid-level to low-level actions that are incohe-
rent with the policy likely reduces the risks of violations
at the risk of other goals such as discipline. On the other
hand, the IL non-compliant policy causes pressure for vi-
olations to rise. One feels one is in a chaotic environment
with few parameters for low-level person. Lower-level
persons would be guided by their personal ethics as much
as the discipline coming down from on top. In situations
where there is application of force, the risk is that there
would be significant force drift (use of excessive force) in-
creasing the possibility of violations that might override
personal ethics. One fears having created an anarchic
situation and thus a higher-risk environment.
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2. Overlay - Feedback mechanisms and Law as constraint
a) Feedback mechanisms
While the risks of violation of International Law appear
dependent on the interaction of the policy, planning and imple-
mentation processes, these interactions do not happen in stasis.
Thus, adjustments to the policy, planning, and implementation
can happen in real time. Higher-level responses can be affected
by the feedback from the lower level actions. Those feedback me-
chanisms are described below.
1) Adjudications or nonjudicial punishments of low level
implementing persons: To the extent information in the
form of complaints rise about the performance of the
lower level staff, the disciplinary proceedings against
them are a source of information for the higher ups.
2) Inspector General (or other similar type of) reports:
When information arises about what are considered dys-
functions in implementation of the policy and planning,
the Inspector General can analyze the behavior and
make recommendations to senior staff on what the next
step should be to repair what may be construed as a sys-
temic problem.
3) Reporting to Congress/Congressional Oversight: Indi-
rect feedback mechanisms to Congress can trigger more
extensive Congressional oversight and result in adjust-
ments.
4) Judicial oversight: actions by private parties injured
by the policy (habeas cases for example) can lead to the
courts specifying or not the legal obligations of the poli-
cymakers, planners, and implementers, so as to identify
constraints on them.
5) Vertical enforcement - public opinion: information ga-
thered by non-governmental organizations and the press
that is disbursed to the United States public can shift
public opinion and influence the direction of the policy.
That hydraulic pressure helps reduce secrecy and create
debate which may push the key political actors and judi-
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ciary towards compliance with the high-level norm.
6) Horizontal enforcement - other states: Information
gathered by other states and the diplomatic dialogue be-
tween the United States and other states on the policy,
planning and/or implementation can influence the
movement of the policy. The willingness of other states
to prosecute United States citizens also is to be kept in
mind, as should be those states' diplomatic protection of
their nationals in United States custody.
7) Horizontal enforcement - international and regional
organizations: Organizations that play roles on an inter-
national plane with regard to the subject matter of the
policy may independently evaluate the policy, planning
and implementation and provide that information to the
United States to encourage adjustments as necessary.
Prosecutorial decision by such entities may also influ-
ence the United States policy.
Each of these seven potential sources of adjustment in the
policy is also subject, however, to countervailing force by the poli-
cy makers and their supporters. Thus, in each of these fora, the
policymakers can exercise their skill to persuade the adoption or
continuation of the policy, whether it is International Law com-
pliant or not. The policymakers, particularly when they include
both political branches, 223 with a deferential Judiciary, can exer-
223 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Presidential powers are
not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of
Congress."); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981) (discussing the
"never-ending tension" between the President's executive authority to deal with new glob-
al challenges and the constraints of the constitutional system of checks and balances); see
also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 712 (1900) (stating that a declaration of war by
Congress followed by a presidential proclamation "clearly manifest[ed] a general policy" of
the United States Government); Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) ("By the
Constitution, laws made in pursuance thereof and treaties made under the authority of
the United States [by the President] are both declared to be the supreme law of the land,
and no paramount authority is given to one over the other."); see also Edye v. Robertson,
112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (declaring that if statutes passed by Congress and treaties made
by the President conflict, the law favors acts in which both political branches participate);
see also United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1464 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) ("Under our constitutional system, statutes and treaties are both the supreme law
of the land, and the Constitution sets forth no order of precedence to differentiate between
them." (citing Chew Heong v. U.S., 112 U.S. 536 (1884)); see also DUNOFF ET AL. Casebook,
supra note 95, at 267 ("[M]ost international legal questions are resolved in the United
States and other domestic legal systems through the interactions of different branches of
government.").
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cise great power and influence to shape the understanding of the
policy, the planning, and the execution both domestically and in-
ternationally. Through op-eds, presentations to international
panels, etc., they can attempt to shift the terms of the debate to
their favor.
b) Law as constraint
Deviations (through policy, planning, or implementation)
in actions from what international law seems to require will raise
risks of international law violations. Divergences between the
international law rules and the rules considered applicable as a
matter of domestic law will also create tensions. Being able to
ascertain divergences between the international law rule and the
domestic law rule as a person internal to the United States is to
have the capacity to do what I have termed dedoublement analy-
tique, or second vision. In order to free one to do this analysis,
one must take to heart the fundamental rule of international law
that "no state may extract itself from its international obligations
through its domestic law."224 Being able to make this separation
helps one to see to what extent the international obligation is
vindicated within the domestic law system.
One key tension that arises concerns which persons acting
at each level are subject to which law or laws. Thus, the un-
iformed military are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice (as well as federal and state law) in contrast to civilians who
are subject to federal and state law. 225 The Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice was written to bring domestic law into compliance
with the Geneva Conventions. Other laws of the United States
have also been written to comply with international law, but they
have been changed in the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (and
224 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 181, art. 27 ("A party may
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty.").
225 See Charles H.B. Garraway, Responsibility of Command - A Poisoned Chalice?, re-
printed in INT'L HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE 21ST CENTURY'S CONFLICTS 117 (Roberta
Arnold & Pierre Antoine-Hildbrand eds., 2005) ('Th[e] growing emphasis on leadership
personalities mean[s] that there w[ill] be less emphasis on the perpetrators of the crimes
and more on those who planned and ordered the attacks."); cf. Christopher A. Britt, Note,
The Commissioning Oath and the Ethical Obligation of Military Officers to Prevent Sub-
ordinates from Committing Acts of Torture, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 551, 558-59 (2006)
(discussing the special duty of the military officer to "ensure that [the officer's] subordi-
nates follow the Constitution" and other bodies of law in the context of the war on terror).
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in other legislation) and may be less International Law com-
pliant. Depending on the divergences between those laws and
what type of potential defendant one is examining (military or ci-
vilian), one's anxiety about being International Law compliant
varies.
A second aspect is the type of discipline meted out to those
who are at the bottom of the hierarchy as compared to higher-
level civilian authority or general officers. The strictures of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice are not uniformly applied (col-
loquially referred to as "different spanks for different ranks") 226
nor are federal law and state law applied equally to the high-
level civilian authorities. One's sensitivity to International Law
compliance may be affected by that reality.
At the policymaking level, we must keep in mind the power
of policymakers to change the domestic law (not affecting the in-
ternational law obligation, however) to have it conform to the
type of policy that they seek to put into practice. Thus, if there
are concerns about International Law liability by policymakers,
they have the power and wherewithal to simply have the law
changed at the federal level in order to protect themselves.
Whether such changes will lead to judicial hurdles remains a risk
- but the policymakers are in a position to shape said modifica-
tions in a manner that also attempts to shield them from the pos-
sibility of judicial review. For example, a case in point appears to
be the Military Commissions Act of 2006, redefining aspects of
the War Crimes Act in a retroactive matter, limiting habeas peti-
tions and limiting access to the courts for those with such peti-
tions.
To summarize, then we have two sets of processes operat-
ing as demonstrated in figure D - the poli-
cy/planning/implementation and the adjustment mechanisms
(feedback and law as constraint).
226 See Smith III, supra note 24, at 693 (positing that "there are two systems of military
justice: One for enlisted soldiers and another for commissioned officers" and describing
this "disparity in military justice based on rank" as "different spanks for different ranks").
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Figure D
Dynamic Adjustment
Policy/Planning/Implementation and Adjustment Mechanisms
Policy = Planning Implementation -)
(= Feedback Mechan-
isms
(= Law as constraint
This dynamic can cause shifts between International Law com-
pliant and International Law non-compliant policy, in the effec-
tiveness of the planning and in the consistency of the implemen-
tation.
3. Defense/CIA/State/Justice in the Model
By thinking of some parts of the Federal Government
through the lens of the policy/planning/implementation model,
one can begin to see how the process and its feedback mechan-
isms work.
Figure E - Government Department/Essence of Role
Process Chart
Defense CIA State Justice Essence of Role
Political Political PoliticalCMlian Appointees Appointees Appointees Policy
Generals Senior Senior Senior PlanningStaff Staff Staff
Lower Lower Level Lower Level Lower Level Implementation
Uniformed Staff Staff Staff
Taking the Essence of Role Schema from the right column
of Figure E and placing it as the starting point of Figure F - one
can see how feedback mechanisms that are internal to the de-
partment or external to the department can cause problems to
rise to the policy making level and lead to adjustments. While it
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is possible for each department to have this process occur sepa-
rately, the feedback mechanism can also operate across depart-
ments. The President, especially in the unitary executive vision,
is the obvious place to harmonize approaches across depart-
ments. Congressional oversight - to the extent it is consistent -
can also help to harmonize across departments. Private actions
on a piecemeal basis that lead to judicial decisions can also lead
to Supreme Court rules that have consequences to encourage
harmonization across departments.
Figure F - Integration of the feedback mechanisms
Essence of Role Feedback Mechanism Disciplinary Mechanism
Policy Intedor Exterior
Congressional Criminal ProsecutionInspector Oversight
Planning General Retirement
Court Decisions Administrative Discipline
Implementation President
If we bring back Figure C, we can now compare the situa-
tions which raise the highest risk of IL criminality. The highest
risk environments are when there is an IL Non-compliant Policy
with varying degrees of effectiveness as to planning and consis-
tency as to implementation.
Figure C (again)
Policy/Planning/Implementation
Potential theoretical International Criminal Law (IL) outcomes
Policy Planning Implementation Risk of IL
Criminality
IL Compliant Effective Consistent Very Low Risk
Policy Planning Implementation of violation
IL Compliant Effective Inconsistent Low Risk of
Policy Planning Implementation violation
IL Compliant Ineffective Consistent Low to
Policy Planning Implementation Medium Risk
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IL Compliant Ineffective Inconsistent Medium Risk
Policy Planning Implementation of violation
IL Non- Effective Consistent Very High Risk
compliant Policy Planning Implementation of violation
IL Effective Inconsistent High Risk of
Non-compliant Planning Implementation violation
Policy
IL Ineffective Consistent Medium to
Non-compliant Planning Implementation High Risk of
Policy violation
IL Ineffective Inconsistent High Risk of
Non-compliant Planning Implementation violation
Policy
If we imagine the feedback mechanisms indicating that IL
non-compliance is occurring, a deformity occurs simply because
the IL non-compliance is precisely what the policy is seeking.
Where IL non-compliance is considered irrelevant to other objec-
tives, the feedback mechanisms traditionally present may not be
sufficiently countervailing. Depending on how pressure is as-
serted and where feedback is from, to the extent that there are
planners that act inconsistent with the IL non-compliant policy,
they may be forced from the process through retirement or some
discipline. To the extent that there are low level implementers
who violate law, criminal prosecution or disciplinary action oc-
curs as these expendable persons become human bargaining
chips in a process of reducing the pressure of the feedback me-
chanisms without necessarily forcing a change of policy on all the
actors. An iterative process of feedback mechanism operates to
evolve the policy without necessarily being strong enough to en-
sure IL compliance. The rogue policy may be self-preserving.
Changes can occur where the external feedback mechan-
isms (Congress, the President and the Judiciary through private
suits) change due to elections or a change of the Supreme Court.
Absent the change of Presidents, however, the existing President
dampens the impact of any Congressional and Judiciary move-
ment. It is not so much that the mechanism stays broken in a
non-IL compliant form, but that the mechanism cycles back in a
manner where self-correction is not a major attribute. One pre-
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fers to hide the error of the policy rather than change it - thus a
greater risk of secrecy and heightened dysfunctionality.
We can note that the individual department feedback me-
chanisms typically focus within a department - there is an in-
spector general for the Department of Justice but that inspector
general is not also the inspector general for the Department of
Defense. Thus, the focus of analysis of such a feedback mechan-
ism will be on the activities of the department. Similarly, when
Congress exercises oversight, the committees involved typically
have jurisdiction over a specific part of the work of the Executive
and are giving feedback on that mechanism. Individual senators
or congresspersons who are on a number of committees or sub-
committees may be able to amass a range of expertise to be able
to "connect the dots" across the departments involved (whether or
not they use that knowledge is a separate question).227a However,
structurally, that is an ad hoc process dependent on the proclivi-
ties of such persons. Turning to civil process by private parties,
having such process cover the actions of a number of depart-
ments is possible, but the case is likely to be dismissed on stand-
ing or other doctrine grounds (Westfall immunity). So this judi-
cial approach would not capture cross-department activities. In a
criminal prosecution, the typical question with regard to lower-
level persons is whether their hierarchy ordered them to do a
given thing. In moving up the hierarchy, the focus would be on
those with responsibility for those below (command responsibility
as a term of art from the military or other responsibility). Under
the logic of a policy level IL-non-compliant policy, it would seem
those at the policy level would work to minimize their own liabili-
227a Cf. Walter Pincus, CIA in 2003 Planned Destruction of Tapes, WASH. POST, Jan. 4,
2008, at A03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/01/
03/AR2008010303544.html (describing the February 2003 CIA disclosure to Congress that
it planned to destroy videotapes of harsh interrogations as "an account that adds detail to
recent CIA statements about the circumstances surrounding the tapes' destruction"); see
also Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, Tapes by CIA Lived and Died to Save Image, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, at Al (stating that CIA officials told members of congressional over-
sight committees about the CIA's interest in destroying interrogation tapes for "security
reasons," however members of the House Intelligence Committee thought destroying the
tapes would be 'legally and politically risky"); see also Benjamin Davis, Op-Ed., Congress,
Torture, and Romain Gary's 'Chien Blanc, JURIST, Dec. 10, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu
/forumy/2007/12/congress-torture-and-romain-garys-chien.php [hereinafter Chien Blanc]
("The members of Congress and others who have tut-tutted about the torture done all
these years since 9/11 ... we know now were in fact briefed on what was going on and in
fact approved of it and encouraged it.").
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ty for things done below. In order to do that, one solution is to
pick persons out of the chain of command in the same depart-
ment or across departments who are seen to have informal au-
thority to induce the persons at low levels to act consistent with
the IL-non-compliant policy. In this idea (as pointed out in Fig-
ure G below), the policy level protection is assured since the feed-
back mechanisms are unable, for jurisdictional reasons, to follow
the circuitous routes of the defacto chain of command as the
feedback mechanisms concentrate on the dejure chain of com-
mand. Thus, the IL-non-compliant policy can be implemented
while - at the same time - the policy level persons are able to re-
duce "blowback" directly upward from any IL-non-compliant
events below. The structures of review are out-flanked by the
structures of putting in place the IL-non-compliant policy. Only
the person at the center (most likely the President or persons
close to the President)227 can see the full picture.
Figure G - De facto interception of De jure Chain of Command
Defense CIA State Justice Essence of Role
CMIian Political Political Political -1Appointees Appointees Appointees Policy
Generals Senior-_ nior Senior PlanningStaff- Staff Staff
Lower Lower Level Lower Level * Lower Level Implementation
Uniformed Staff Staff Staff
4. Heightened dysfunctionality - torture
When the policy/planning/implementation, feedback me-
chanisms, and law as constraint fail to move the poli-
cy/practice/implementation towards International Law com-
pliance by the United States, what is to be done? The level of
power of the United States in the world system is significant and
227 See e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 156, at 22. Goldsmith describes the "War Council"
as a "secretive five-person group with enormous influence over the administration's anti-
terrorism policies." Id. Further, Goldsmith states that the "War Council" would "plot legal
strategy in the war on terrorism ... sometimes to the exclusion of the interagency process
altogether." Id.
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unparalleled - American exceptionalism considering itself only
marginally constrained by International Law. Other than the
mechanisms described above, is the criminal prosecution of high-
level civilian and military general officers a possible path to
cause IL compliance, notwithstanding this sense of exceptional-
ism? Let us look at the question of Torture.
a. Torture in Detainee Treatment
i. Policy
As has been reported in a number of places,228 in the period
after September 11, 2001 and up to the Presidential Military Or-
der of February 7, 2002, a policy formulation process went for-
ward within the administration as to what to do with detainees.
Subsequent to their revelation, extensive criticism of the deci-
sions not to apply the Geneva Conventions to the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda were made. Over the next four years, key decisions of the
Supreme Court in Rasul, Hamdi and Padilla clarified detainee
rights. In December 2005, with the Detainee Treatment Act, fur-
ther clarifications as to detainee rights were made. With the
Hamdan decision of June 29, 2006, key decisions were made stat-
ing that, at a minimum, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Con-
ventions apply to Al-Qaeda pursuant to the construction of the
statutory language of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
as a matter of international law. By that decision, the United
States Supreme Court confirmed what others had argued that
the policy that had been formulated and expressed in the Febru-
ary 7, 2002 Presidential Military Order was IL non-compliant.
By the Military Commission Act of 2006, the United States tem-
pered the impact of the Hamdan decision.
ii) Planning
As detailed in press reports, pursuant to the President's
Military Order and other policies of the Global War on Terror,
planning was done to develop the Guantanamo prison, as well as
various military installations in Afghanistan and Iraq at which
detainees would be held and interrogated. An extraordinary
228 See articles cited infra note 275. These articles discuss a detailed analysis of the
common plan.
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rendition program was developed to render individuals captured
around the world to third countries or other unidentified places.
Negotiations were done to create what has been termed CIA
Black Sites. Planning was made to put in place the appropriate
assets to conduct all aspects of detention and interrogation con-
sistent with the President's military order.
iii) Implementation
Hard assets as well as persons were put in place who pro-
ceeded to detain and interrogate prisoners around the world in
accordance with the President's Military Order and other policies
of the Global War on Terror.
b. Feedback Mechanisms
With the Abu Ghraib pictures, information came out that
low-level uniformed soldiers were acting in an IL non-compliant
manner and in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
i) Adjudications or nonjudicial punishments of low level imple-
menting persons: Complaints arose from low-level members of
the armed forces with regard to treatment of detainees at Abu
Ghraib and elsewhere. This culminated in a series of courts-
martial, as well as discipline for several persons involved.
ii) Inspector General (or other similar type of) reports: When in-
formation arose from Abu Ghraib, a series of reports were re-
quested at the policy level to examine the systemic issues poten-
tially present in order to adjust detainee treatment.
iii) Reporting to Congress/Congressional Oversight: Congression-
al ranking members may have been aware of the detainee policy
prior to the Abu Ghraib scandal erupting in the news media.
Upon that scandal erupting, a series of hearings occurred and
legislation was developed ostensibly to make more clear what
could be done with detainees (Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
and the Army Field Manual).
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iv) Judicial oversight: habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf of
inmates at Guantanamo and elsewhere had the effect under
Hamdan of determining that Common Article 3 did apply to Al-
Qaeda detainees.
v) Vertical enforcement - public opinion: significant numbers of
writings by press and private citizens have inundated all con-
cerned over the past few years to highlight the non-compliance of
the detainee treatment policy with domestic law and interna-
tional law. Although it helped lead to a change in Congress, the
feedback can take time.
vi) Horizontal enforcement - other states: Information gathered
by other states and the diplomatic dialogue between the United
States and other states on the policy, planning and/or implemen-
tation in the recent visits by top level American diplomats and
the President to key allies has had an influence on the United
States actors. Individuals can influence the movement of the pol-
icy. Other states decline to go after high-level persons (Germany
case) and witnesses who observed violations are also encouraged
not to be whistleblowers.
vii) Horizontal enforcement - international and regional organi-
zations: The United Nations Human Rights Committee takes a
look at length at what the United States is doing. Organizations
that play roles on an international plane with regard to the sub-
ject matter of the policy may independently evaluate the policy,
planning and implementation and provide that information to
the United States to encourage adjustments as necessary. For
example, the International Committee of the Red Cross has pro-
vided a report on the CIA black sites interrogation that states
that the practices are torture.229
c. Seeking acquiescence to gain legitimacy
Policy level resistance to change of the IL non-compliant
policy is heightened by the fact that the IL non-compliant policy
229 See Mayer, supra note 27 ("[T]he Red Cross described the [CIA's] detention and in-
terrogation methods as tantamount to torture, and declared that American officials re-
sponsible for the abusive treatment could have committed serious crimes.").
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was what likely led to the behavior of the low-level implemen-
ters. Put another way, the high-level persons are smart enough
to understand that at least some of the polity may think they
have committed a crime and this makes them vulnerable.230
However, they cannot change the past so this creates pressure to
seek acquiescence from the polity while at the same time not re-
vealing the crime. One aspect of this is the drafting of the Mili-
tary Commission Act of 2006 to attempt to protect themselves.
Another aspect is to prevent any information about the torture
from seeing the light of day in any of the court proceedings or
military commissions that hear the complaints of detainees. As-
suming the policy is that of the President, the Presidential asser-
tion of the importance of the policy creates countervailing forces
to those in Congress and the Judiciary who wish to change the
policy. Carefully orchestrated participation by the Congressional
leadership (or at least the ranking members on key committees)
and Judiciary (through the encouragement of deference) helps to
blunt reformist efforts at the federal level with regard to the
most significant aspects of the IL non-compliant policy. Such ac-
quiescence is helped when all or most branches of government
have majorities from the same party. All this orchestration is the
effort to have acquiescence to the illegal act - thereby gaining le-
gitimacy.
d. Resistance to ensure illegitimacy
i) Resisting through criminal prosecution of high-level civilians
and military generals
The willingness to criminally prosecute high-level civilians
and generals for IL non-compliant policy, and therefore the level
of resistance to the non-compliance, 231 is directly tied to the abso-
luteness of one's vision of the need for high-level peremptory
norm compliance (or, put another way, the need to attack what
appears to be gross lawlessness at high-levels). Torture may be
230 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 227, at 151-52 (describing that palpable fear).
231 1 am indebted to a discussion at the Ohio Legal Scholars Workshop at Capital Law
School on June 23, 2007 for suggesting this path. Breach of a low level norm was de-
scribed in the sense of a contractual breach whose remedy might be an apology. Breach of
a high-level norm, on the other hand, would have the quality of an international crime -
repugnant to the international community as a whole.
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viewed, to quote the President, as something that the United
States does not condone. Under a zero tolerance/scorched earth
mentality, the willingness to criminally prosecute persons who
put in place such a policy would be the ultimate conduct consis-
tent with the President's words.
ii) Splitting the unitary executive
Given the great difficult in charging a sitting President or
Vice President for a crime, the prosecutors serve at the Presi-
dent's pleasure, the President and Vice-President have to be con-
cerned with being charged with a crime after completing their
terms. During their terms, if they have put in place an IL non-
compliant policy, they have to wonder whether impeachment is
possible. In the absence of a possible impeachment of a sitting
President or Vice President and in the absence of a special inde-
pendent prosecutor, it would seem that the task during a given
Presidency is to make the unitary Executive of two minds or
splitting the unitary Executive. Prosecutors in the Justice De-
partment Criminal Division and the Defense Department Court-
Martial system have to be willing to bring cases against members
of the Executive (including prosecution of those outside their de-
partment). The President has to tolerate the prosecution of his
most loyal present or former appointees who executed his policy
in exchange for preserving the President's legacy. This calculus
appears essential for the criminal prosecution of these high-level
persons to occur in our Constitutional structure.
To get to the point that there is such a prosecution, it ap-
pears that civil society must take on a significant role in bringing
hard to obtain evidence of the IL non-compliant policy. That ef-
fort would seem to include also placing evidence before investiga-
tors and prosecutors in such a manner that it makes it politically
extremely difficult for the President not to allow some type of in-
vestigation and prosecution to take place. This would also entail
contacting the relevant convening authorities for courts-martial,
as well as civilian prosecutors with regard to non-uniformed per-
sons. It would require an evidence gathering task by those con-
cerned about this subject and communication of this evidence to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, accompanied with pressure
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on Congress to assert strict oversight over the pacing of the in-
vestigation and prosecutions. The role of the press in keeping
the attention on the problem might be important, even in these
times of short news cycles. This external evidence gathering task
would countervail efforts by the policy making persons to white-
wash their actions internally.
The cold calculus for the President would be that the Pres-
ident has to tolerate this effort in exchange for diminishing the
likelihood of the President being prosecuted after leaving office.
There is a possibility that the President would be tempted to
pardon persons at the end of his term. On pardons, it would seem
that aggressive prosecution of many high-level policy persons
would present the spectre that the President, by the sheer num-
bers of pardons, was acting in a very unseemly manner. The ex-
ecutive clemency threat could be blunted by the President under-
standing there is a threat of post-term criminal prosecution of
the President if he too freely exerts his Constitutional preroga-
tive. Referring to the President (or Vice President) as an un-
indicted coconspirator or as a material witness might have an ef-
fect of causing the President (or Vice President) to hesitate to
block the criminal prosecutions.
J. Summary at this point
In the first part of this section I have attempted to lay out
the applicable substantive rules applicable to the laws of war and
detainee treatment and have looked at those rules through the
lenses of pacta sunt servanda and internal law non-effect on in-
ternational law obligations of positive international law that are
under-examined in the debates about torture. Beyond moral or
utilitarian visions about the subject matter, I demonstrated there
is a positive law obligation of the highest order on the United
States that is absolutist in nature. I further demonstrated that
the internal processes of separation of powers either work to
cause compliance with that international law obligation or leads
the United States towards breach of norms for which there is no
excuse in international law. With regard to acts which lead to-
wards breaches that cannot be excused or do not meet interna-
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tional law excuses, they are illegal acts that are petty lawless-
ness or gross lawlessness. As illegal acts, the question is wheth-
er, internal and external acquiescence will prevail, leading to le-
gitimacy for the illegal act. On the other hand, when resistance
is present, there is increased likelihood that the illegal act will
remain illegitimate. For the type of illegal act that is the concern
of this article, the more aggressive efforts at resistance are sug-
gested, with the criminal prosecution of high-level civilians and
generals as precisely that type of effort within the American poli-
ty.
In the second part of this section, I looked at the problem
from a managerial perspective. I describe a model for mapping: 1)
policy, planning, implementation; 2) IL compliant or IL non-
compliant outcomes; and 3) feedback mechanisms. Based on that
model, I look at the question of torture and show the difficulty of
rooting out high-level policy deformations in favor of torture
through traditional feedback mechanisms. In line with an ag-
gressive approach to the problem, I suggest why criminal prose-
cutions of U.S. high-level civilians and generals in U.S. domestic
courts is a necessary strategy to countervail those tendencies,
even if the same party controls all the departments/branches.
On either positive law or managerial grounds, I demon-
strate, with complete indifference to moral or utilitarian argu-
ments, why such criminal prosecutions should be done. In the
prior section, I demonstrated why the international tribunals or
U.N. Security Council would not be equipped to provide the insti-
tutional framework - at this juncture - for such prosecutions in
an international tribunal. All that appears left is a criminal
prosecution in U.S. domestic courts in order to demonstrate ag-
gressive resistance to what are illegal acts of gross lawlessness.
Whatever the rationalizations, these U.S. high-level civilians and
generals are to be seen as defendants who organized torture and
cruel, inhuman and/or degrading treatment in violation of the
law and are to be prosecuted. In the next section, I present how
these criminal prosecutions can be done in the United States.
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PART III. HOW AND WHERE TO REFLUAT STERCUS?
A. Theory of the case or cases - command responsibility is not
enough.
As noted in the prior sections, the United States has not in
the past prosecuted U.S. high-level civilians or military generals
for violations of international humanitarian law and/or interna-
tional criminal law in U.S. domestic courts. The method for vin-
dicating such rules in the United States is to find a domestic law
equivalent that - more or less - addresses the international obli-
gation. The domestic law rule may meet or exceed the interna-
tional law standard or may not. If it falls beneath the interna-
tional law standard, it is the best that we can do in the present
set of circumstances to vindicate such a norm within the United
States' structure and in the absence of an international criminal
tribunal.
On the international plane, terms have developed to ad-
dress what we are considering. At Nuremberg the terms were "a
common plan." With Yamashita, the concern was with "com-
mand responsibility." In the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia, the term "joint criminal enterprise" has been elabo-
rated. Aiding and abetting type language is a way to introduce
the concept of conspiracy as an international crime. Much like
the classic linguistic notion, each of these phrases is not the thing
- they are imperfect constructs (as are the laws) consistent with
the rule of legality to capture individual criminal responsibility
for international crimes on the international plane.
Moving to the internal United State plane, the ability to
find what vindicates the international rule (which, as described
above, can be only an imperfectly articulated word to describe the
thing to be prosecuted) requires evaluating the crimes available
under U.S. law to see which, alone or in combination, would cap-
ture the alleged criminal acts of the high-level civilian and mili-
tary generals that are the focus of this paper. The danger one
faces in examining this problem internally is that one will jump
to certain concepts - from domestic or international law - and try
to say they reflect each other. Take for example, the term "com-
mand responsibility". In the case of General Yamashita, the
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standard of "know or reason to know" was used to establish his
criminal liability for war crimes. Yet, in the case of Captain Me-
dina, in internal U.S. law, the standard was adjusted to "know,
or if negligent in his command, reason to know," a very impor-
tant difference as it permitted his acquittal (as no one contested
he had acted as a proper soldier) in contrast to Lieutenant Wil-
liam Calley.232
As happens in many cases in the law, turning to latin has
helped me in thinking about what is meant by engaging in the
types of prosecutions that are to be described here. For another
example, the words respondeat superior capture part of the no-
tion of holding the higher ups accountable for the things done for
them by their lower level agents. However, we might seek to
capture both the higher-level and lower-level criminal liability.
In such a case, respondeat superior, while not precluding it, does
not capture all that we seek to do. Conspiracy certainly captures
some of the notion of the common plan and has the benefit of be-
ing a flexible crime that would be useful in this setting. But one
should also keep in mind accessory liability. Also, accomplice
liability should be kept in mind. Additionally, the range of
crimes for cover-up, 233a such as perjury, obstruction of justice, de-
struction of evidence, and the improper use of classified materials
(together with conspiracies for those crimes), would all be ways
in domestic law to vindicate the international law rules. Princip-
al liability would also form a part of this analysis. Criminal lia-
bility of legal advisors is of interest. For example, advice that is
given after a decision has been made, or to dress up a predeter-
mined decision into something that gives the impression of being
a deliberative process, may not at all have been relied upon by
key high-level persons. Instead, such advice forms part of a plan
to persuade others. Where such advice is patently unreasonable,
even for the others who might be seen as accessories after the
232 See the excellent discussion of this point and command responsibility in internation-
al law and domestic law in Hansen, supra note 79. Justice Stevens spoke with disdain of
the Yamashita precedent. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 619 (2006). He said, "The
most notorious exception to the principle of uniformity, then, has been stripped of its pre-
cedential value." Id.; see also Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina and Beyond: Com-
mand Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155 (2000).
233- Thomas H. Kean & Lee H. Hamilton, Op-Ed., Stonewalled by the CIA, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2, 2008, at A17.
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fact, that advice would be of no effect as a possible "reasonable
reliance" defense.
We also need to think about the effect of a decision taken
by the President allegedly pursuant to his constitutional or sta-
tutory powers. To the extent that the interpretation of the Presi-
dent is one that says the President can order the violation of an
international obligation of the highest level, it would seem evi-
dent that the President is acting without legal sanction as a mat-
ter of international law and is causing the United States to act in
violation of its international obligation. The same would be true
of such a violative act by Congress or a judicial decision. We
need to examine whether the cumulative effect of all those acts is
the inability to successfully prosecute internally, notwithstand-
ing the illegality as a matter of international law. This decision,
ultimately, would depend on the Judiciary's willingness to ad-
dress the intersection of the Youngstown trilogy and internation-
al law in situations I have termed above as gross lawlessness.
Looking at judicial immunity, in the absence of any mens
rea and actus reus while a sitting judge, with regard to torture
and cruel, inhuman and/or degrading treatment, it would seem
that judicial immunity would preclude any prosecution of a sit-
ting judge for the acts done as a judge. Acts that might be crimes
done by the judge prior to being on the bench or in getting to the
bench might however be prosecutable. 233 As to participation of
members of Congress, the situation appears more complex. If
members of the Executive Branch in briefing Congress made
members of Congress such as the ranking Majority and Minority
members of key Committees 234 (or all Committee members)
aware of facts during the closed door hearings that amount to vi-
233 For example, the non-disclosure of participation in meetings related to detainee
treatment if questioned on such a matter under oath during the confirmation hearings
leading to a perjury charge might be a case where a sitting judge could be prosecuted for
that action in getting on the bench. In addition, if the person had participated in a con-
spiracy or other acts that were crimes prior to entering the bench, we would expect that
they might be prosecuted.
234 For example, the Senate or House Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, and/or Armed Ser-
vices Committee hearings or even informal discussions. See Chien Blanc, supra note 227a;
Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, supra note 227a. I recognize there may be Speech and De-
bate clause concerns which are beyond the scope of this article. At a minimum, if evidence
led to these persons they might be characterized in criminal pleadings as unindicted co-
conspirators with the political consequences of such an appellation on the sitting member
of Congress.
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olations of criminal law, there would be a confidential record of
those disclosures. If the members of Congress apprised of these
facts were to demonstrate an enthusiasm and agreement with
the Executive persons detailing the illegal conduct, it appears
that at some point it might be possible to establish accomplice or
conspiracy type criminal liability for those members of Congress
as to those acts. Of course, concerns of legislative immunity are
present here, but the point is that the contours of that immunity
would have to be a subject of careful evaluation. Ultimately, it
might be that the members of Congress could be seen as un-
indicted co-conspirators or material witnesses, and that would be
the way their presence would be signaled in such a prosecution
without necessarily being in a position to have the member of
Congress placed in the docket. Such assertions of immunity
might also be sought in the Executive. The key point of such a
prosecution, as opposed to a civil action, is that the prosecutor
serves as a filter that is part of the state that is seeking to
cleanse the state of alleged criminality in a manner that vindi-
cates a background international law rule. As such, it is the so-
vereign accepting to review itself. Such review, of course, has to
be done consistent with the prerogatives that derive from the se-
paration of powers.
Another aspect of this complexity is establishing the facts.
The investigatory entities and the substance to be investigated
would now act after a period of time when those entities have
looked already, at least partially, at the question of facts and
guilt of individuals. Inspector Generals and others have done in-
vestigations and made reports that are supposed to be definitive.
Congressional hearings have occurred in open and closed ses-
sions and under oath with testimony given. Immunities have
been given and imperfections in the prior investigatory process
have led to persons no-longer being prosecutable (for example,
most recently, Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan for Abu
Ghraib). Low-level persons have been prosecuted for what they
were alleged to have done, and some have been court-martialed,
convicted and sentenced based on the procedures developed.
Those procedures required that a set of facts have been analyzed
under a certain legal standard. Given the structured analysis
discussed above and the potential for high-level persons to seek
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to protect themselves based on history, there is a reasonable pos-
sibility that the investigations that have been run by persons un-
der the ultimate control of the high-level civilians or generals at
the heart of this analysis are divergent from complete accuracy.
The ease of finding links for those at low-levels to violative con-
duct through their physical actions (we have pictures), as com-
pared to the greater difficulty of finding the trail to higher-ups,
may have tended to orient resource limited investigations to-
wards the lower-level persons where the prosecutorial task was
easier to document. This point is not to say that the lower-level
persons that were convicted were not guilty, but rather that it
was easier to convict them than higher-ups. In addition, absent
encouragement from above, the internal mechanisms give abso-
lutely no (formal or informal) incentives for an investigator to
seek out higher levels in or outside the relevant chain of com-
mand. Given that the persons above are our potential defen-
dants, one can see the pressure on prior investigations to not
reach too high.
The task we are foreseeing steps out of those concerns and
focuses on the higher-level rather than the lower level persons -
the hardest cases to crack, so to speak. As with every prosecu-
tion, what is needed is a theory of the case that synthesizes the
good facts and bad facts into a simple idea (preferably 25 words
or less) that the prosecution will refine as it digests the results of
its investigations and determines the specific theories of the case
for individual prosecutions against particular defendants. 235
While refluat stercus is an elegant way to express a simple idea
of criminal prosecution of U.S. high-level civilians and generals
in U.S. domestic courts, it does not express precisely what would
be the overarching theory for such a case. The best overarching
theory that has occurred to me would be the following:
"Whatever the rationalizations made, these high-level
civilian and military general defendants organized
torture and cruel, inhuman and/or degrading treat-
ment in violation of United States law. We will prose-
cute, convict and sentence them for their crimes. We
keep our honor clean when we fight wars."
235 I thank Professor Joseph Daly for his insights about constructing the theory of the
case.
[Vol. 23:3
REFLUATSTERCUS
The "whatever the rationalizations made" phrase of the overarch-
ing theory attempts to recognize that various arguments might
be made in defense by these defendants in order to avoid convic-
tion. Rather than ignore those difficulties, this theory recognizes
there will be creative arguments made by the potential defen-
dants, but those arguments will not prevent the prosecution of
these individuals. The "these high-level civilian and military
general defendants" phrase points directly at the individuals that
are to be indicted. It also shows that the focus is not on finding
low-level scapegoats but on the principals, whatever their title,
whatever their power. The "organized torture and cruel, inhu-
man and/or degrading treatment" language places an emphasis
not only on the acts and the ordering of acts but also on the or-
ganization and marshalling of policy and planning that permitted
the acts of torture and cruel inhuman or degrading treatment.
The "in violation of United States law" places the emphasis on
the fact that the result of the activities of the defendants was to
complete prosecutable acts that - under the principal of legality -
are violations of U.S. criminal law. The "we will prosecute, con-
vict and sentence them for their crimes" phrase presents the will
of the state to bring to criminal justice those who have violated
its laws. It also represents the will of the state to open itself up
to inspection to prosecute its high-level agents that have violated
United States law. Finally, the "We keep our honor clean when
we fight wars," in addition to being a veiled reference to stanzas
of the Marine hymn, reminds us of the obligation on a state to
comply with law - laws of war or laws of peace - as it confronts
enemies, even mortal enemies.
In the following sections, we will look at generic groups of per-
sons who were high-level civilians or generals and their potential
prosecution.
B. The President
Putting aside questions of the impeachment of a President
as a political process for removal from office without a depriva-
tion of liberty, we first must raise the issue of criminal prosecu-
tion of a present or former President as part of the examination
of criminal prosecution of high-level civilians or generals in U.S.
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domestic courts. In thinking about criminal prosecutions at this
level, there is a generic first question as to whether the President
should be examined as a principal or accessory to the given
crime. It seems that there are two levels of analysis. First, is the
question of whether one can develop the indictable offense
against the President. Second, assuming one has developed an
indictable offense against the President, would one seek to indict
the President and, if so, when? For the purposes of this analysis,
I think it is simpler to focus first on the question of indictable of-
fenses for all the potential high-level civilians and generals in-
cluding the President. The reason is that the question of indict-
ment arises only if one thinks the charge can be made. After
finding who might be the chargeable group, if the President
forms part of the group, it is a secondary question as to what to
do with the President. I recognize that the indictment of a Presi-
dent raises several thorny issues, from the jurisprudence in the
Nixon and Clinton eras, that point to the difficulty of the courts
permitting criminal prosecution (as contrasted with civil proceed-
ings) to proceed against a sitting President.236 But those issues
are more focused on the opportunity and tactics rather than the
more primary issue of whether there is an offense that is indicta-
ble.
C. Federal Criminal Prosecution
High-level US civilian authority can be charged in federal
court by the federal prosecutor (whether appointed by the Presi-
dent or a special prosecutor) for federal crimes or they can be
236 The Ford pardon suggests that such a prosecution would not be a difficulty for a
former President. See President Gerald R. Ford's Proclamation 4311, Granting a Pardon
to Richard Nixon, Watergate.info, Sept. 8, 1974, http://www.watergate.info/ford/pardon-
proclamation.shtml. The Proclamation stated,
As a result of such acts or omissions occurring before his resignation from the
Office of President, Richard Nixon has become liable to possible indictment and
trial for offenses against the United States. Whether or not he shall be so prose-
cuted depends on findings of the appropriate grand jury and on the discretion of
the authorized prosecutor. Should an indictment ensue, the accused shall then be
entitled to a fair trial by an impartial jury, as guaranteed to every individual by
the Constitution.
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charged in state court by state prosecutors for state crimes. 237 In
this section we focus on the federal prosecution of such persons
for federal crimes or federal assimilated crimes.
1. High-level civilian criminal prosecution in Federal Court
Goldsmith portrayed the senior officials with whom
he regularly met as unremittingly fearful of another
terrorist attack and determined 'to act aggressively
and preemptively.' At the same time, he wrote, they
feared that they could one day be prosecuted for en-
gaging in tactics that pushed legal boundaries. The so-
lution was for lawyers 'to find some way to make what
[Bush] did legal,' Goldsmith wrote.238
Whether the defendants are viewed as principals, 23 9 or accesso-
ries after the fact,240 when trying to vindicate international law
within U.S. domestic law in the War on Terrorism, the natural
first law to examine is the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
Retroactive back to 1997 so that it covers the relevant period of
concern for this article, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 de-
tails a number of crimes that might be of interest to our discus-
sion.
a. Common Article 3 War Crimes (per the Military
Commissions Act of 2006)
Looking at the high-level civilians in any department, it is
unlikely that these persons would be chargeable with torture,
cruel or inhuman treatment, murder, mutilation or maiming, in-
tentionally causing serious bodily injury, rape or sexual assault
or abuse, whether as principal or accomplice or for an attempt of
one of these acts. However, high-level civilians in any depart-
ment could be charged with conspiring to commit these offenses.
The manner in which such conspiracy might be seen is based
237 For an effort to look at federal and state crimes to vindicate human rights in U.S.
courts, see FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN, CHALLENGING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS:
USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U. S. COURTS (2001).
238 Dan Eggen & Peter Baker, New Book Details Cheney Lawyer's Efforts to Expand Ex-
ecutive Power, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2007, at Ai, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wpdynlcontent/article/200709/4/AR2007090402292.html.
239 See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2008) (providing the statutory definition of "Principals").
240 See 18 U.S.C. § 3 (2008) (listing the statutory definition of "Accessory after the fact").
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upon an agreement of two or more persons to have others do the
offenses. The act by one or more of the initial persons to effect
the object of the conspiracy would be, for example, writing an in-
correct memo explaining why the Geneva Conventions did not
apply, writing an incorrect memo interpreting the terms of the
law in a manner that is very narrow as a means of providing
what has been termed an "advance pardon," incorrectly specify-
ing types of interrogation techniques that one wrongly thinks are
perfectly permissible under such a narrow standard, writing an
incorrect memo that shows why the Convention Against Torture
or Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment does
not prevent the extraordinary rendition of people to countries
where we know or have reason to know they will be tortured, and
other acts of this type might be seen as further means to reach
these types of persons for these types of crimes. 241
b. Non-Common Article 3 War Crimes
If one considers that Common Article 3 is not the only as-
pect of the four Geneva Conventions that may apply to persons
who have been detained (the Hamdan decision concluded only
that Common Article 3 applied, at a minimum, to our conflict
with AI-Qaeda), 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (c)(1), which is un-amended by
the Military Commissions Act of 2006, includes as war crimes
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 242 Pursuant to Gene-
va Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
241 See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2008) (defining "Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud
United States"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2008) (providing the definition of "War
crimes").
242 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(1) does not refer to Common Article 3 alone as does § 2441(c)(3).
See supra note 170. As used in this section, the term 'war crime' means any conduct "(1)
defined as a grave breach in any of the international conventions signed at Geneva 12 Au-
gust 1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a party .... " 18
U.S.C. § 2441(c)(1) (emphasis added); see Johannes van Aggelen, A Response to John C.
Yoo, The Status of Soldiers and Terrorists under the Geneva Conventions, 4 CHINESE J.
INT'L L. 167 (2005); see also Benjamin G. Davis, Keeping Our Honor Clean: A Response to
Professor Yoo, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 167 (2005); but see, John C. Yoo, The Status of Sol-
diers and Terrorists under the Geneva Conventions, 3 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 135 (2004); John
C. Yoo and James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 207 (2003); Georg
Schwarzenberger, Terrorists, Guerrilleros, and Mercenaries, 1971 TOL. L. REV 71 (1971)
for an earlier discussion of the issues in the debate that leans in favor of the responses as
did the Supreme Court in Hamdan.
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(GCIII POW's) Article 130243 and Geneva Convention relative to
the protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GCIV Civi-
lians), Article 147,244 torture and inhuman treatment, willfully
causing great suffering or injury to body or health, unlawful de-
portation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected per-
son, are types of grave breaches that are made offenses under 18
U.S.C. § 2441 outside of the Common Article 3 setting. Combin-
ing this with the general federal conspiracy statute 18 U.S.C. §
371,245 one can imagine a charge of conspiracy to commit the of-
fense of non-common Article 3 War Crimes by two or more per-
sons. The overt act of the high-level civilian in this setting would
be similar to the acts under the Common Article 3 War Crimes
above,246 but directed at persons in an armed conflict of an inter-
national character under GC III POW's andlor GC IV civilians
and security detainees.
243 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 130, Aug. 12
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, available at http://www.unhchr.chlhtml/menu3b/91.htm ("Grave
breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the follow-
ing acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: willful
killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in
the forces of the hostile Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair
and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.").
244 Geneva Convention relative to the protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art.
147, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3lb/
92.htm.
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving
any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by
the present Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including
biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body
or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a pro-
tected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile
Power, or willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular
trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive de-
struction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
Id.
245 18 U.S.C. § 371.
246 See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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c. Conspiracy or Solicitation to commit a crime of violence
(Section 373) (Common Article 3 Grave breaches or
Non-Common Article 3 Grave Breaches)
Under the federal solicitation statute (18 U.S.C. § 373
(2007),247 we can look at the Common Article 3 War Crimes and
Non-Common Article 3 War Crimes and imagine the high-level
civilians doing the kinds of act that amount to solicitation for
such offenses through their memos and actions discussed under
war crimes above. 248 In addition, using the general federal con-
spiracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 371) with the solicitation statute, one
can see how the high-level civilian agreement and overt acts to
induce others to follow the path that leads to the types of crimes
of violence subject to the solicitation act would be another means
by which to charge these high-level civilians.
d. Conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or
damage property in a foreign country
High-level civilians could also be subject to 18 U.S.C. § 956
(2007)249 with the overt acts being the authorization, planning
memos etc that lead to any of the crimes described. Thus, none
of the high-level persons would kill, kidnap, maim, or injure per-
sons or damage property in a foreign country directly. Rather,
they would be found guilty of the acts forming a conspiracy to do
these offenses through their organization of the torture and
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment described as killing,
maiming, and injuring persons in a foreign country.
e. Conspiracy to Kidnap or Kidnapping
With regard to persons held in the United States (Padilla
or Hamdi) or protected persons (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's
children being held), there might be a possibility for conspiracy to
kidnap under 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2007).250
247 18 U.S.C. § 373 (2007).
248 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (2007) (providing the definition of "Principals").
249 18 U.S.C.A. § 956 (2007).
250 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (2007).
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f. Conspiracy to Torture and Torture
To the extent that torture occurred outside the United
States, torture or conspiracy to torture might also be chargeable
offenses against these high-level civilians under 18 U.S.C. §
2340, et seq.251
g. Conspiracy to Assault and Assault
Conspiracy under the general conspiracy statute coupled
with assault might be another way to capture these high-level ci-
vilians .252
h. Conspiracy to Maim and Maiming
Conspiracy to Maim would appear to be a further possibili-
ty. 253
i. Deprivation of rights under color of law or Conspiracy to
deprive of rights under color of law254
Leaving aside the question of willfulness, the questions
that will arise are: (1) the nature of the detainee's rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or (2) subjecting such detainee to dif-
ferent punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such per-
son being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are pre-
scribed for the punishment of citizens. This statute might be a
powerful tool through which to prosecute federal officers provided
that the due process concerns of fair warning do not block such
prosecution (see the discussion under state prosecutions, below).
j. "Cover-up" type crimes
Alternatively, if it was determined that persons were en-
gaged in a cover-up based on a comparison of what they have
251 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340 (2007).
252 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 113 (2007) (defining "Assaults within maritime and territorial ju-
risdiction").
253 See 18 U.S.C.A § 114 (2007) (providing the definition for "Maiming within maritime
and territorial jurisdiction").
254 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 242 (2007) (defining "Deprivation of rights under color of law").
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said in prior investigations and what would be examined now,
one could imagine crimes relating to a cover-up. 255
k. State law crimes incorporation
To the extent the above federal statutes did not provide a
basis for prosecution the incorporation of appropriate state law
offenses would be another avenue to seek federal prosecution. 256
1. Other crimes
A possible but somewhat unlikely crime would be mispri-
sion of a felony.257
m. Definitions 258
While the geography of the crimes may be external to the
United States, between the conspiracy and offense definitions,
provided the shape of the conspiracy includes persons and acts
happening in the United States, the definitions would not appear
to create any impossible hurdles to this type of criminal prosecu-
tion in U.S. domestic courts of the high-level civilians.
2. Military General Officers - Federal Court and Uniform Code
of Military Justice
Military general officers can be prosecuted in courts-
martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, in federal
court for federal crimes by a federal prosecutor, or in state court
for state crimes by a state prosecutor. A person could be charged
on the same facts for different crimes on both the federal level
and state level without raising a problem of double jeopardy. In
practice, state and federal courts defer to the military court-
martial
process. 25
9
255 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1519 (2007) (providing the definition for cover-up crimes).
256 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 13 (2007) (containing the heading: "Laws of states adopted for
areas within Federal jurisdiction").
257 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 4 (2007) (defining "Misprision of felony").
2,8 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 5 (2007) (providing the definition of "United States"); see also 18
U.S.C.S. § 3261(a) (2007) (containing the heading: "Criminal offenses committed by cer-
tain members of the Armed Forces and by persons employed by or accompanying the
Armed Forces outside the United States").
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As to federal crimes, the crimes described for high-level ci-
vilians, described above, might be applied to military general of-
ficers who were either no longer on active duty or in a status un-
der which the military justice system could not reach them (for
example, retired without a pension).
While there is some discussion about whether the doctrine
of command responsibility is properly captured under the puni-
tive provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 260 our ef-
fort is to look more broadly than just at command responsibility
in the effort to vindicate the international law rules of concern.
In this light, several punitive provisions of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice could be applied to military general officers to
vindicate international law rules, such as: Article 81 - Conspira-
cy (conspiracy by both uniformed and civilians would be a man-
ner within the Uniform Code of Military Justice to capture some
of the crimes that would have been entered with high-level civi-
lians.), Article 93 - Cruelty or Maltreatment, Article 107 - False
Official Statements, Article 118 - Murder, Article 119 - Man-
slaughter, Article 120 - Rape and carnal knowledge, Article 124 -
Maiming, Article 125 - Sodomy, Article 128 - Assault, Article 131
- Perjury, Article 133 - Conduct unbecoming an officer and gen-
tleman and Article 134 - General Article. These generals would
be treated as Article 77 - Principals or Article 78 - Accessories
after the fact.261
3. State prosecution of high-level civilians and/or military
generals
Given the dearth of such prosecutions, it might appear that
political will is not available and that high-level civilian authori-
ty and military generals are unlikely to be prosecuted at the fed-
eral level. Congressional oversight also may be tame as many
members of Congress may have been complicit in the violations
(knowledge gained in closed door briefings to the Intelligence and
259 See 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a) (explaining the relation between federal and Uniform Code
of Military Justice jurisdiction for uniformed military).
260 Hansen, supra note 79; Smith III, supra note 24.
261 For all of the sections discussed please see Manual for Courts-martial United States,
Part IV Punitive Articles (2008), available at http://www.au.af.millau/awc/awcgatelaw/
mcm.pdf.
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Armed Services Committees and acquiescence). Is there another
possibility in the criminal courts of the fifty states?
At the risk of stating the obvious, state criminal law in-
dictments are brought by state prosecutors under state criminal
law, not federal or military law. I am not aware of any state war
crime legislation that imitates federal war crime legislation, 262
but there may be state crimes that are codified (as opposed to
federal crimes that are codified) that capture aspects of what is
covered in federal war crime or torture legislation, treaty and
customary international law. For example, assault, murder and
conspiracy statutes.
In addition, a few states (Florida is one) still recognize
common law crimes. 263 While a subject of controversy, one theory
of U.S. foreign relations law is that customary international law
is part of state common law.264 Thus, bringing state prosecutions
for common law crimes in those states against federal officials
theoretically could include violations of customary international
262 See generally BRIDGET J. WILSON, A MODEL STATE CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE FOR
THE NATIONAL GUARD NOT IN FEDERAL SERVICE: JUSTICE FOR THE MILITARY'S MINOTAURS
(on file with author) (outlining that there are diverse state military justice systems; that
members of the National Guard may be subject to state military justice for significant
portions of their tenure rather than the Uniform Code of Military Justice; and stating
that a model state code of military justice and state manual for courts-martial for the Na-
tional Guard not in Federal Service has been developed by a National Guard Bureau
Working Group).
263 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 106-O8 (2d ed. 2003). LaFave
states that "in recent years a great many states have enacted comprehensive new crimi-
nal codes, and in the process they have usually but not always abolished common law
crimes." Id. at 107. As to the District of Columbia and state common law crimes in federal
areas, it has been noted that:
It has long been settled that there are not federal common law crimes; if Con-
gress has not by statute made certain conduct criminal, it is not a federal crime.
In spite of this general proposition, Congress has provided for common law
crimes in the District of Columbia and Congress has provided that state criminal
law (and this would include state criminal law of the common law variety in the
states retaining common law crimes) applies (in the absence of a federal criminal
statute) in those "federal enclaves," or islands of federal territory (e.g., army
posts, naval bases), located within states.
Id. at 107-08.
264 See generally Jack L. Goldsmith & Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815
(1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARv. L. REV.
1824 (1998); Julian G. Ku, Customary International Law in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT'L
L. 265 (2001); Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control
Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457 (2004).
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humanitarian and/or international criminal law (including tor-
ture) under state common law. Another avenue for prosecution
of state crimes would be through the Federal Assimilative
Crimes Act (state crimes on federal territory prosecuted by fed-
eral prosecutors and assimilated as federal crimes to make them
federal crimes).265
Once a state prosecutor brings a state prosecution against
a federal official, the Federal Officer Removal Act 266 can be in-
voked by the high-level civilian or general to have the matter re-
moved from the state court to the federal court. At that point,
however, the Justice Department has to determine whether it
will defend the accused (if Justice considers the defendant was
operating within the law) or leave the accused to defend
him/herself (Justice determines there is a serious question about
the legality of what the accused did under state law).
Where high Justice officials are implicated in the torture
policy, one can imagine five possibilities: 1) Justice says it will
prosecute the person on federal crimes and the federal court
might stop the state prosecution under a federalism doctrine, 2)
Justice says it will prosecute but due to conflicts, it is constrained
to give the matter to an independent counsel that again stops the
state proceeding, 3) Justice says it will defend the accused in the
federal court as s/he was acting within the law with the state
prosecutor bringing the case forward in the federal court, 4) Jus-
tice says it will not defend the person and leaves them to defend
him/herself in the proceeding in federal court run by the state
prosecutor, and 5) if there is no automatic removal, the whole
case would go forward in the state court.
In any setting where the state prosecution goes forward,
the state prosecutor could attempt to have the accused plead out
and provide evidence of wrongdoing of higher ups for further pro-
ceedings against them. Assuming Justice seeks to defend the ac-
265 See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2007) (containing the section heading: "Laws of States adopted
for areas within Federal Jurisdiction"); Julian G. Ku, Structural Conflicts in the Interpre-
tation of Customary International Law, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857 (2005) (exploring
whether the federal courts have the final authority to interpret customary international
law and if so, the consequences of federal courts' usage of customary international law);
see also Julian G. Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380 (2006) (positing
that under this system state governors can be preempted, but not commandeered, by fed-
eral authorities).
266 28. U.S.C. § 1442 (2007); 28 U.S.C. § 1442a (2007).
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cused, I would imagine motions to delay the criminal proceeding,
defenses of immunity, necessity, etc that can be raised by the de-
fendant in all these settings, but the defenses are not the key
here. The point of this process is to get the case to a prosecutor
who gets it into a court. This process is not necessarily about
achieving a guilty verdict but it could be about a plea bargained
agreement and receiving cooperation from the accused.
In the real world, enormous federal pressure would be
placed on the state prosecutor. However, the state prosecutor
angle (particularly elected as opposed to appointed state prosecu-
tors) challenges the monopoly on prosecutorial discretion at the
federal level and creates countervailing pressure that reminds
me of "subsidiarity" or "vertical federalism" in the European Un-
ion. Such state prosecutions would help all understand that the
United States Constitutional Founder/Framers provided a struc-
ture that would permit the people to be able to have criminal
prosecution of alleged Federal gross lawlessness where the sepa-
ration of powers at the federal level had failed. Those in the fed-
eral government who thought they could act with impunity with
regard to international humanitarian law and/or international
criminal law would find themselves in error.
If the area of state prosecution of a federal officer for al-
leged criminal conduct is an under-examined area of the law,267
said state prosecution for alleged criminal conduct that violates
international law rules on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment (or other international humanitarian law or inter-
national criminal law) poses a particular subset of challenges.
From the international law perspective, the allocation of sove-
reign power between the federal government and the states in
our constitutional structure is an issue of internal law, not inter-
national law. Each state is free to structure itself internally in
the manner that it seeks. But we are seeking to vindicate inter-
national law rules within the United States so we are obliged to
look further within the structure of United States federalism and
its dual (and possibly dueling) sovereigns.
267 See generally Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Fed-
eral Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195 (2003).
This article provides an excellent presentation of the issues in a U.S. internal law pers-
pective and hints at the U.S. foreign relations law dimension. I am seeking below to think
through some of the ideas expressed in this article.
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Recognizing that treaties are federal law (and the constitu-
tional concerns that preclude states entering into treaties), we
need to look at customary international law. If customary inter-
national law is seen as federal law, then the Supremacy Clause
operates to make such law applicable to the states. However, I
recognize there is a theory that customary international law is
not federal law binding on the states through the Supremacy
Clause but state law consistent with the state's Tenth Amend-
ment sovereignty. This approach might lead to some interesting
situations. Under the "customary international law is state law"
theory, in settings where a treaty to which the United States is a
party which has language that codifies customary international
law, the logical conclusion would be that said treaty language
forming part of a treaty that is federal law that is (or is not) self-
executing would also be, as an independent manner, state custo-
mary international law. In the setting of said treaty being de-
clared non-self-executing, such as human rights treaties, the log-
ical result of the "customary international law is state law"
approach would be that the state would be able to apply the cus-
tomary international law as state law. In states that recognize
common law crimes and include customary international law
within the common law, one can imagine those state law crimes
would vindicate customary international law obligations that fell
on the United States as a matter of international law. Moreover,
under the federal Assimilative Crimes Act, said state common
law "customary international law" crimes would be federalized in
the appropriate locations. Through this mechanism, the lan-
guage of a non-self-executing treaty would become first state law
through state customary international law. Then, in the relevant
areas of operation, said state law would be assimilated to federal
law. 268
268 1 imagine the main limit possible on this would be some type of congressional dor-
mant preemption phenomenon since no law had been passed by Congress to implement
the treaty. In the cases where the Congress had passed implementing legislation for the
treaty, there would still remain the question of whether the treaty language that is also
customary international law would still be state customary international law. That state
customary international law would be preempted by contrary federal law in the imple-
menting legislation, but if said federal law did not cover aspects of that state customary
international law, then one could imagine that the state customary international law
would retain some power to prescribe conduct independent of federal law. Of course, then
the problem gets very interesting when there is a situation where the federal Assimilated
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To bring this question home, what if a federal officer is act-
ing in clear violation of the treaty obligation that is also customa-
ry international law (such as Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions) or Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights covering torture and cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment that the United States has declared is non-
self-executing (and has filed RUDs as regards the cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment aspect as discussed above)? To answer
this question as to a state prosecution, we need to look at (a) fed-
eral prosecution and then (b) a state prosecution as the workings
of our federalism and federal officer immunity operate on both
levels.
a. Federal Prosecution
Leaving to the side the elements of the crime, in a federal
prosecution of such a federal officer, one would expect that the
prosecution would have to face the due process requirement of
fair warning that is sometimes considered coextensive with the
idea of qualified immunity as regards federal officer immunity
from state prosecution. The essence of such due process re-
quirement of fair warning is notice. In criminal prosecution of
high-level civilians and generals for torture and cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment, one aspect of looking at the idea of no-
tice is to view the actions to create novel interpretation of stan-
dard international law as a means to confuse matters sufficiently
so that lack of notice can be argued. The seduction of asserting
new paradigms is not just a question of power or complexity of
the situation, but it becomes a means to be able to argue one has
not had fair warning of the crime that one is doing.
Crimes Act applies. In such a case, the state customary international law rule would be-
come federal law. The result would be that between the state customary international law
assimilated as federal law and the federal law enacted, the actual content of the federal
law would be broader than the limiting language of the federal law language implement-
ing the treaty. When we begin to think of treaties as containing customary international
law of the highest level, then one can begin to see a glimmer of a manner in which the
power of the international law obligation can refract through the state and federal sys-
tems. I suspect that these consequences of customary international law being considered
state law have not been thoroughly analyzed by those proponents or antagonists to the
idea of state customary international law. It would seem some interesting permutations
are possible that are not within the scope of this paper.
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It would seem that such efforts to escape fair warning con-
cerns can be countered by the prosecutor making the point that
exotic interpretation by the protagonists formed part of the com-
mon plan (malfeasance) - not that the interpretations were made
innocently (misfeasance). 269a
Maybe another way of looking at this would be to say that
the limit on courts employing novel theories that is at the heart
of the fair warning notice requirement is a limit on the court.
However, the court itself does not bring the prosecution. The
prosecutor does. To the extent the arguments of the prosecutor
can be asserted by the defendant to be novel theories, the federal
officer heightens his ability to argue a fair warning basis for im-
munity if prosecuted and, on appeal, if convicted. To be able to
do that, the federal officer would have created interpretations of
the law as part of the commission of the crime of which he was
charged that would change the way we think of the rule under
which the prosecution is bringing the charges against the official.
Said federal officer would of course be powerful and most likely
therefore high-level - without having to be the President. To the
extent that the prosecutor might demonstrate the instrumentali-
zation of interpretation of the law (or the acts of lawfare to use a
neo-Carl Schmittian term for "total war") that formed part of the
common plan of the high-level civilians or generals, the prosecu-
tor would be able to demonstrate that the charged federal offic-
er's interpretations are the exotic ones, not the more traditional
ones of the prosecutor. In that sense, the fair warning require-
ment would then be of no avail to the federal officer defendant.
This becomes very important when one begins to think of
the federal officer as creating policy and planning in a manner
that permits the torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment. Every action should be reviewed to understand
whether an effort to create novel interpretations of the law are
truly innocent or part of a larger scheme to reduce the risk of
prosecution (a "smokescreen" or "fog.") Such novel interpreta-
tions, if accepted, would serve truly as "advanced pardons" only if
they are permitted to become a conventional wisdom.
269a Getting to this kind of finding appears to be part of the object, at least indirectly, of
the recent suit by Jose Padilla against John Yoo personally. See Complaint, Padilla v. Yoo
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008), available at http:/Ihowappealing.law.comlPadillaVsYooComplaint
.pdf.
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Beyond these concerns of instumentalization of the law is
the issue of the extent of immunity the court would be willing to
provide in assessing the action in a color of law analysis. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this at length, but the
key point appears to come down to the Youngstown trilogy con-
cerns in the setting of gross lawlessness by the federal official
under color of law. The concern is the extent to which the federal
court is willing to vindicate the background international law
rule in its assessment of the immunity of the federal officer. In
the absence of an international law component to that analysis,
the U.S. foreign relations law vision would lead to a primacy to
the political branches, even if they are participating in gross law-
lessness. The devastating consequences on the law of such defe-
rence by the Judicial power to such lawlessness would appear at
least as great a concern as the effects of the court stepping into
an arena that concerns foreign relations in a manner that was
more robust than it traditionally has sought to do. At a mini-
mum, if too deferential, from an international law perspective,
the Judicial power would be engaged in assisting the other
branches in putting the United States in breach of significant in-
ternational obligations through the manipulation of a judicial
doctrine, not even statutory law. It is a troubling possibility for
which we must await developments.
b. State Prosecution
If the state prosecutor were to seek to make the prosecu-
tion of the federal officer, the federal officer would seek removal
similar to what has been discussed at the beginning of this sec-
tion. The options as to what would happen as regards such re-
moval process are described above. The novelty with state com-
mon law crimes being considered state customary international
law crimes would be that the intersection of the Judicial power
with international law would not now be as a matter of separa-
tion of powers concern, but would also be a question of federal-
ism. In that setting, the Judicial power is constrained to ponder
again whether the challenge to the alleged federal officer gross
lawlessness in violation of an international norm that is coming
from the state is something that so steps on federal prerogatives
as to need to be squelched at its inception. I do not underesti-
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mate the severity of the constitutional concerns that are present
in this state/federal tug of war within our system. I think though
that the four settings analysis above might assist the Judicial
power in measuring the circumstances where doctrines should be
understood in a manner that would hinder gross lawlessness, ra-
ther than enable it. Again, we must await developments.
4. Investigation concern
A significant hurdle to any of these prosecutions is a proper
investigation and gathering of evidence for such a prosecution.
For the reasons described in Section III above, the Inspector
Generals and other mechanisms are subject to high-level civilian
authority who have no interest in having investigations and sub-
sequent prosecutions go forward. But beyond that significant
hurdle, the question is how in our United States federalism sys-
tem such a prosecution can be done. One rich source of potential
evidence would be the information coming out of the habeas cor-
pus petitions and the lower level prosecutions of military, gov-
ernment civilians, and civilian contractors. A second source
would be to use the distributed network effect of all the civil so-
ciety concern domestically and internationally to help gather the
relevant information in order to come to an understanding of the
facts as to which persons were indictable. Together with the tra-
ditional means of evidence gathering, this civil society comple-
ment also serve the purpose of demonstrating the public will and
thus building the political will for the prosecutions to go forward.
In the next section, I list a number of persons of interest
who might possibly be considered the accused. In addition, per-
sons not listed with extensive knowledge (William V. Taft IV269 or
Alberto Mora 270 as examples) might testify as to what they had
269 William V. Taft, IV, Address at the American Society of International Law Proceed-
ings: Ethics, Legitimacy, and Lawyering: How Do International Lawyers Speak Truth to
Power? (Mar. 30, 2007), reprinted in 101 ASIL PROC. 325 (2007).
270 See Geoffrey S. Corn, Pentagon Process Subverted? The Lost Battle of Alberto Mora,
JURIST, Feb. 22, 2006, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/02/pentagon-
process-subverted-lost-battle.php (discussing Mora's lost battle within the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense); see also Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the
Abuse and Torture of Detainees was Thwarted, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/02/07/O60227fajfact (commenting on Mora's ef-
forts against top administration officials challenging their tactics in fighting terrorism);
Memorandum for Inspector General, Department of the Navy, Statement for the Record:
Office of General Counsel Involvement in Interrogation Issues (July 7, 2004), available at
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seen occurring. Moreover, some of these persons of interest
might be encouraged to provide testimony in exchange for im-
munity ("flipping" a potential defendant). Finally, lower-level
persons might be encouraged to describe how they received or-
ders and knew what to do (explaining how a defacto or dejure
chain of command led to their actions of torture and cruel inhu-
man and degrading treatment) in exchange for immunity.
PART IV. WHEN TO REFLUAT STERCUS?
Other than the President, and provided appropriate inves-
tigations have procured the necessary evidence, criminal prose-
cutions of any of the high-level civilians or military generals in
question could occur while they remained in office. They might
be forced to resign as a result of the indictment.271
As to the situation where the President would be prosecut-
ed, it appears extremely difficult to have such a prosecution ongo-
ing for a sitting President. However, one could imagine the Pres-
ident being considered an un-indicted coconspirator or a material
witness to proceedings occurring against other high-level civi-
lians or generals. To the extent the President is implicated in
the actions of these other persons, these lower level cases would
provide evidence that might be used in an impeachment. The
President may be tempted to provide executive clemency under
the Plenary pardon power. However, it is important that the
prosecutor make it clear that the lack of indictment of the Presi-
dent during the term of the President would not prevent such an
indictment from occurring after office. It would seem possible for
the prosecutor to receive the assistance of the President in the
investigation and prosecution by proposing that in exchange for
(1) access to persons and classified materials (getting around the
Classified Information Procedure Act concerns), (2) waiver of pri-
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/mora-memojuly-2004.pdf ("[I]t became evident to me
and my OGC colleagues that the Working Group report being assembled would contain
profound mistakes in its legal analysis, in large measure because of its reliance on the
flawed (Office of Legal Counsel) memo").
271 Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Assistant to the President of the United States, Chief of Staff
to the Vice President of the United States, and Assistant to the Vice President for Nation-
al Security Affairs resigned after he was indicted for Obstruction of Justice, False State-
ments, and Perjury. Indictment, United States v. Libby (4th Cir. Oct. 31, 2003), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/osc/documents/libby-indictment-28102005.pdf.
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vilege and immunity defenses that the executive may seek to in-
voke to complicate the proceedings, and (3) for not pardoning
those below, the prosecutor would not prosecute the President.
This, of course, is completely unfair, but it may be the practical
solution needed to achieve the prosecutions and convictions. At
least it would move the level of unfairness up from the current
point of low-level persons to the much higher level of the high-
level civilians and military generals.
As an example of how the President can facilitate the pros-
ecution by declassification for the purposes of criminal trial, as to
establishing the torture, it would be very useful that the United
States Government simply released the International Committee
of the Red Cross report on the CIA Black Sites. 272 From articles
in the media, it appears that report condemns the U.S. practices
at the black sites as being torture. As such, that report is one
piece of evidence that would strongly rebut efforts that might be
expected by defendants to attempt to use the same type of nar-
rowing of definitional terms (as regards the approved techniques
or other techniques in use at those CIA Black sites) to argue that,
in effect, what they were seeking was not torture or cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment.
272 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) report appears to provide am-
ple evidence of the torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. For Iraq, see
International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Treatment by Coalition Forces of
Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During
Arrest, Internment and Interrogation, Feb. 2004, available at http://www.humanrights
first.org/Iraq/ICRC-Report.pdf. The report finds that "ill-treatment ... during interroga-
tion was not systematic" for security detainees in Iraq, and "physical and psychological
coercion ... in some cases, [was tantamount] to torture." Id. Status review of detainees,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/detainees/status-review_080204.htm. For the
CIA Black Sites, the ICRC has provided the United States Government a report that has
not, as of the date of this article, been released to the public. The information concerning
that report in the press appears to be consistent with torture and cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment having occurred in those black sites. Finally, we have anecdotal in-
formation of persons who have been extraordinarily rendered to other countries such as
Syria and Egypt or persons who have brought unsuccessful civil suits in the United States
for their treatment in theaters of battle that show a considerable consistency as to the
type of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment to which they have been
subjected. References have been made to the 24 techniques approved for use by the Presi-
dent of which waterboarding has only recently been taken off the list. Waterboarding has
been a method of torture for centuries. In addition, the ICRC report about the CIA Black
sites where these techniques have been used considers these techniques to amount to tor-
ture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Mayer, supra note 27.
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In addition, by Executive Order, the current President or
the next President could order the declassification of detainee
treatment traffic in the Executive Branch with regard to: (1) the
CIA black sites; (2) the extraordinary rendition of detainees
around the world; (3) all aspects of the treatment of detainees in
areas of armed conflict (War in Afghanistan, War in Iraq); (4) the
detainee protocol for persons who have been held as enemy com-
batants in the United States; and (5) any other places still un-
known in which detentions and interrogations are occurring at
the instigation of the United States or in association (in the
broadest sense of the word) with the United States. This type of
360 degree transparency would help us be able to see the me-
chanisms that led to the current situation.
Another approach, borrowing from the experiences at the
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, is to propose immunity for persons who are
at the equivalent level of a Lieutenant Colonel in the military in
exchange for their coming forward with their information about
the detentions in which they had participated. By doing this, the
guards, the extradition teams for CIA flights, and the other foot-
soldiers who implemented the policies under question here can be
assured that they will have immunity. At the same time, the
higher level perpetrators, the ones who designed and planned the
policy, would remain subject to criminal liability for their acts.
This source of information might be complimented by evidence
drawn from the research of members of civil society or govern-
ment agencies to try to paint an accurate picture of the responsi-
bility of each person at a high-level, whether civilian or general.
I would suggest that the Attorney General of the United
States, like Judge Mukasey in the current Administration,
should be confronted with the issue of starting such prosecutions
immediately rather than waiting until a new administration.
The reason is that the delay comes at a cost. The issue that con-
fronts such an Attorney General is whether s/he is going to act in
ways that permit crimes to continue (primarily conspiracy and
obstruction of justice but there may be more), and by those ac-
tions, become a member of the conspiracy as principal or accom-
plice, or should they act in ways that exculpate themselves from
any criminal enterprise in a manner that would not be ques-
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REFLUATSTERCUS
tioned by a future Attorney General. Unless persons such as the
Attorney General are placed before the dilemma by a request for
them to, they are not forced to determine what they will do, and
as a result might be able to obscure for a future Attorney General
their own role in perpetuating a criminal violation. In an elec-
tion year, such pressure should come as early as possible to avoid
the traditional hesitancy for the Attorney General to pursue
prosecutions of persons prior to an election.
PART V. WHO TO REFLUAT STERCUS ?
Under the crimes described above under federal law, based
on the publicly available information about torture and cruel in-
human or degrading treatment of detainees, it would seem that
persons of interest would be:
" President George W. Bush,
* Vice President Richard Cheney,
* Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey
" Vice President Chief of Staff David Addington
" Former Attorney General and White House Counsel Al-
berto Gonzales,
* Former Deputy to the White House Counsel, Timothy E.
Flanigan
" Fran Townsend, Former Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counter-Terrorism
* L. Paul Bremer III, Former U.S. Administrator of Iraq
* Former Attorney General John Ashcroft
" Former Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
Counsel Jack Landsman Goldsmith,
* Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Office
of Legal Counsel John Yoo,
" Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Office
of Legal Counsel, Patrick Philbin
* Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal
Counsel, Stephen Bradbury
" Secretary of State and former National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice,
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* Department of State Legal Adviser and former Chief
Counsel of the White House National Security Council,
John B. Bellinger III
" Former Secretary of State Colin Powell
* Former Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State Lawrence
Wilkerson
* Former Counselor of the Department of State, Philip D.
Zelikow
• National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley,
• Secretary of Defense Richard Gates,
• Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
" Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen
Cambone
* Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J.
Feith
" Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Af-
fairs Matthew Waxman
* General Counsel, Department of Defense, William J.
Haynes II
* Judge Jay S. Bybee, United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, Former Assistant Attorney General for
the Office of Legal Counsel
* Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
George Tenet,
• Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Porter
Goss,
* Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, General Mi-
chael Hayden
" Former Executive Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, A.B. Krongard
* Former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy, John C. Gannon
" Former Director of the National Clandestine Service of
the Central Intelligence Agency, Jose A. Rodriguez, Jr.
* Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency,
John L. Helgerson
" Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy, John Rizzo
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* Former General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy, Scott W. Muller
* Secretary of Homeland Security and former head of the
Criminal Division, Department of Justice Michael Cher-
toff
• Director of National Intelligence John Mike McConnell
* Former Director of National Intelligence, John Negro-
ponte
* Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard
Myers,
* Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace
* Former General John Abizaid
* Former Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez
* Major General Barbara Fast
* Major General Walter Wojdakowski
* Rear Admiral Jane G. Dalton, USN (Ret.)
* Former Army Major General Geoffrey Miller
* Former Army Brigadier General Janis Karpinski
* U.S. Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency of the United States of America
It has been suggested that I present in this section an ex-
planation for each of the persons of interest above as to why I
would put them on this list. If I was the prosecutor, I would be
required to gather from the variety of investigations and sources
that have occurred since the breaking of the Abu Ghraib story,
the information that ties these persons into the "common plan"
that has been described in great detail by others. I would have to
marshal the facts that relate to each crime and present them to a
grand jury seeking an indictment. I am not that prosecutor.
I am a citizen calling for an investigator and prosecutor to
do that task. I am also calling on persons of goodwill to assist
such investigators and prosecutors in developing such a file as
was done in the first and second German complaint (the latter of
which I participated in through the filing of an affidavit).273 The
273 See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, GERMAN WAR CRIMES COMPLAINT AGAINST
DONALD RUMSFELD, http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/german-war-crimes-
complaint-against-donald-rumsfeld,-et-al (last visited Feb. 12, 2008); CTR. FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, AFFIDAVIT OF BENJAMIN G. DAVIS, GERMAN WAR CRIMES
COMPLAINT AGAINST DONALD RUMSFELD (2006), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/
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reasons that I call for that to be done and why I list the persons
above is because of the publicly available information that I have
seen and read since 2003 on the manner in which detainees have
been treated.
The above persons all have been involved as a high-level
civilian or military general in some aspect of the policymaking
and planning of the detainee treatment for part or all of the pe-
riod from the inception of the armed conflict in late 2001 that is
known as the Global War on Terror until today. The significance
of each of their roles no doubt differs. What is clear is that access
to the "inside story" is not available to the ordinary citizen. In
this regard, I feel much like the descendants of the Koreans at
No Gun Ri, who were convinced higher-ups were involved, but
had difficulty procuring the proof because it was concealed. 274 I
am looking for a person like General Peers who would be in a po-
sition to look at the internal classified memorandums as well as
the publicly available information and determine to what extent
any of these persons of interest should be indicted and prosecut-
ed. It would be naive to think that the detainee treatment we
have seen over the years since the start of the War on Terrorism
was the result of unfortunate mistakes as the 2001 No Gun Ri
review attempted to say about that event.
The suggestion is that the evidence 275 gathered through the
investigatory methods of the government and the efforts of a con-
Ben%20Davis%20Affidavit.pdf.
274 It has been said that type of secrecy is particularly of concern in the past few years.
See generally JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE THAN WATERGATE: THE SECRET PRESIDENCY OF
GEORGE W. BUSH (2004).
275 For gathering of only some of the facts, see Benjamin G. Davis, A Citizen Observer's
View of the U.S. Approach to the "War on Terrorism", 17 IOWA J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 465 (2008). JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY
OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS
(DOUBLEDAY 2008); PHILIPPE SANDS, THE TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S
MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES, (2008); JORDAN PAUST,
BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN
THE "WAR" ON TERROR (2007).
For a detailed analysis of the common plan, see Paust 3, supra note 27; see also Paust 1,
supra note 27; Paust 2, supra note 27. For a discussion of C.I.A. black site torture and the
recent devastatingly critical International Committee of the Red Cross report on those
black sites, see Mayer, supra note 27. One of the techniques used on, at least, Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed was waterboarding. For a detailed discussion of the history of water-
boarding as a method of torture according to the United States Courts, see Evan Wallach,
Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 468 (2007). For a stunning critique of the legal bases for the extraordinary
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rendition and torture, see Jose E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
175 (2006); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture Under the
Bush Administration, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 389 (2006). For a discussion of the inte-
raction of law and torture, see Jamie Mayerfeld, Playing by Our Own Rules: How U.S.
Marginalization of International Human Rights Law Led to Torture, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 89 (2007). For international research on the C.I.A. Black Sites, see EUR. PARL. Doc.
(A6-9999) (2007), available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edulpdf/tdipfinalreporttext.doc; Ex-
traordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic Rela-
tions: J. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations, Human Rights and
Oversight and Subcomm. on Europe of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs H.R., 110th Cong. 1
(2007) (statement of Jonathan Evans, MEP); see also Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners
and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 309 (2006); see also Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantanamo: The Law of Inter-
national Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 657 (2006). For a discussion of enhanced
interrogation techniques that are considered torture by the International Committee of
the Red Cross, see Mayer, supra note 27; Bush: CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Pris-
ons, CNN.COM, Sept. 7, 2006, available at http://www.cnn.comI2006fPOLITICS/09/06/
bush.speech/index.html; Press Conference, President George W. Bush, The Creation of
Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://www
.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html. The President stated, "In addi-
tion to the terrorists held at Guantanamo, a small number of suspected terrorist leaders
and operatives captured during the war have been held and questioned outside the Unit-
ed States, in a separate program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency." Id. Moreo-
ver, "[t]his program has been subject to multiple legal reviews by the Department of Jus-
tice and CIA lawyers; they've determined it complied with our laws. This program has
received strict oversight by the CIA's Inspector General." Id. The secret prisons remain in
operation. Linzer's article states:
An Iraqi man accused of being a key aide to Osama bin Laden and a top leader of
al-Qaeda was arrested late last year on his way to Iraq and handed over to the
CIA, the-Pentagon announced yesterday, in what became the first secret overseas
detention since President Bush acknowledged the existence of such a program
last September.
Dafne Linzner, CIA Held Al-Qaeda Suspect Secretly, Officials Disclose Use of Overseas
Prisons Resumed, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2007, at A16, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wpdynlcontent/article/2007/04/27/AR2007042700729.html. The Unit-
ed States reporting to the United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human
Rights is available at http://www2.ohchr.org/englishfbodies/cat/index.htm. For regularly
updated primary sources, reports, case histories concerning torture and cruel inhuman or
degrading treatment in the War on Terror, go to the relevant sections of the websites of
the American Civil Liberties Union, www.aclu.org; Human Rights First, http://www.
humanrightsfirst.org; Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org; The Center for Constitutional
Rights, www.ccrjustice.org; Amnesty International, www.amnesty.org; The Project to En-
force the Geneva Conventions, www.pegc.us. For protagonists discussing their work in
the War on Terror in the Bush Administration, see GOLDSMITH, supra note 156; see also
GEORGE TENET, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: MY YEARS AT THE CIA (2007); see also
JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AFTER 9/11 (2005); see also JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF
THE WAR ON TERROR (2006). For the story of an Army interrogator in Iraq, see TONY
LAGOURANIS & ALLEN MIKAELIAN, FEAR UP HARSH: AN ARMY INTERROGATOR'S DARK
JOURNEY THROUGH IRAQ (2007). For key documents regarding torture in the War on Ter-
rorism, see KAREN J. GREENBERG & JOSHUA L. DRATEL, THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD
TO ABU GHRAIB (2005). For debate on torture, see KAREN J. GREENBERG, THE TORTURE
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cerned citizenry to support the elements of the crimes should be
brought together at appropriate grand juries to determine
whether indictments should be handed down for some or all of
the persons of interest with them then becoming defendants. If
that evidence leads to other crimes than those suggested above
and other potential persons of interest 276 who are high-level civi-
lians or generals, the above list of persons of interest would be
revised. While I am aware of various defenses that high-level ci-
vilians might assert (see the Torture memos for example), I pre-
fer to leave in this paper the subject of their defenses to others
and/or a further paper.277 I would suggest that in reviewing such
DEBATE IN AMERICA (2005); see also SANFORD LEVINSON, TORTURE: A COLLECTION (2006);
see also DANNER, supra note 188; see also Harold Hongju Koh, A World Without Torture,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 641 (2005); see also Charles H. Brower II, The Lives of Ani-
mals, the Lives of Prisoners and the Revelations of Abu Ghraib, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1353 (2004); see also Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the
White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005). For a direct attempt to affect customary
international humanitarian law, see Letter from John Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S.
Dep't. of State, and William J. Haynes, General Counsel, U.S. Depart. Of Defense, to Dr.
Jakob Kellenberger, President, International Committee of the Red Cross Regarding Cus-
tomary International Law Study, 46 I.L.M. 514 (2007). For a discussion of numerous as-
pects of the legal strategy of the United States in the war on terrorism, see American So-
ciety of International Law, ASIL INSIGHTS, www.asil.org. For United States Government
reports of investigations concerning detainee treatment, see U.S. Dep't of State, Second
Periodic Report of the United States of America to the Committee Against Torture, annex
1 (May 6, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/45738.htm; see also Scott
Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations,
N.Y. TIMES, October 4, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2O07/10/O4/washington
/04interrogate.html? r=l&oref=sloginl; see also David Johnston & Scott Shane, Congress
Seeks Justice Dept. Documents on Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, October 4, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/1O/04/washington/14cnd-interrogate.html; White House de-
nies relaxing torture ban, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 4, 2007, available at http://ori.msnbc.
msn.com/id/21133278; see also David Johnston and Scott Shane, Debate Erupts on Tech-
niques Used by C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007
/10/05/washingtonlO5interrogate.html?hp; see also OVERSEAS JURISDICTION ADVISORY
COMM., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAW JURISDICTION OVER
CIVILIANS ACCOMPANYING THE ARMED FORCES IN TIME OF ARMED CONFLICT, Pub. L. No.
104-106, § 1151 (1997), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/ojac.pdf; see also
Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, C.I.A. Watchdog Becomes Subject of C.I.A. Inquiry., N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9E06E3DF143FF931A25753C1A9619C8B63&s; see also Stephen Grey, CIA Rendition:
The Smoking Gun Cable, ABCNEWS, Nov. 6, 2007, http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/
2007/1 1/cia-rendition-t.html.
276 For example, doctors, see Nancy Sherman, Holding Doctors Responsible at Guanta-
namo, 16 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 199 (2006), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals
kennedy-institute-of-ethicsjournalv016/16.2sherman.pdf.
277 I am, however, aware of the likely ones that would be asserted such as immunity,
necessity, obeying orders, public authority, "reasonable" reliance on legal advice, constitu-
tional power, "good soldier" defense etc. They do not convince. For example, see Michael
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defenses, focus be kept on the fact that we are attempting to vin-
dicate the international law obligations of the United States
through the domestic law mechanisms. This would appear im-
portant so that, to the extent such prosecutions break new
ground, we would hope that the ground would be broken in a
manner that was consistent with the international law obliga-
tions of the United States (under my formula, resistance to the
illegal act of gross lawlessness) rather than in a matter that
seeks to legitimize, through acquiescence, the illegal acts alleged.
As Robert H. Jackson said in his seminal speech of April 13, 1945
to the annual meeting of the American Society of International
Law: if the evidence is not there to support a conviction, the indi-
vidual should be acquitted.278
PART VI. SUMMARY
"The dagger of the assassin was concealed beneath the
robe of the jurist. ''279
High-level civilians and military generals can be charged
for organizing torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment in the War on Terror. Under Federal Law, the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, and State Law, it is possible to find
crimes that appear to be appropriate bases of indictment based
on publicly available facts. It is possible to see how a federal
(even if not a special prosecutor), military and/or state prosecutor
might be able to introduce procedures with regard to these per-
sons and have such persons convicted of such crimes or plead
guilty to such crimes. It appears also unlikely that any of the in-
ternational criminal law institutions or another nation, through
universal jurisdiction, would be willing to take on such prosecu-
tions.
For reasons related to resisting aggressively the legitimiz-
ing of the illegal acts suspected with regard to peremptory norms
H. Hoffheimer, Codifying Necessity: Legislative Resistance to Enacting Choice-of-Evils De-
fenses to Criminal Liability, 82 TUL. L. REV. 191 (2007).
278 Henry T. King Jr., Remarks at the Conference on the International Humanitarian
Law Dialogs, (Aug. 29, 2007) (on file with author).
279 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 50 (2007),
available at http://www.mazal.org/archive/nmt/03/NMTO3-TO985.htm (last visited Feb.
17, 2008).
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that are part of the positive international law, I have argued for
such prosecutions in this article. I am trying to meet the extreme
prejudice to the United States with a form of extreme repudiation
of those who would cause such an extreme prejudice to the Unit-
ed States through violation of positive international law.
CONCLUSION
When one looks at the statutes of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunals that have been put in place to address internation-
al crimes, those statutes have provided a mandate to look for
those with the greatest responsibility or the most serious respon-
sibility. To a person who has been tortured, no doubt, the memo-
ry of the torturer is vivid and that person is considered the most
responsible. However, when we attempt to look at the injury
done to the United States by this torture, we can see that the in-
jury by the torturer in the booth is significant, but that the
greatest responsibility is on those who have built the entire edi-
fice and put in place the procedures that have caused that tortur-
er to act. Without the meaningful possibility of having a foreign
or international tribunal take on that task for my country, this
citizen has attempted to show how we might take on this task for
ourselves.
In a sense, this citizen is professing one of the essential
slogans of the 1968 Student Riots in Paris: "Be realistic, demand
the Impossible." 28 0 Yet, we should keep in mind the comments of
Professor David Crane at Chautauqua, New York on August 29,
2007 on the occasion of the announcement of the First Chautau-
qua Declaration, "'No one is above the law. The law is fair, and
the rule of law is more powerful than the rule of the gun . ... "'281
Reminding us of what was at stake 60 years ago at Nuremberg,
we can remember what Harold Nickelson, a British journalist
later wrote:
280 See Slogans of May 68, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.orglw/index.php?title=Slogans
ofMay-68&oldid=191810632 (last visited Feb. 19, 2008) (translating the phrase from its
original French, "Soyez r6aliste, demandez l'Impossible"); see also SEAN HAND, MICHEL
LEIRIS: WRITING THE SELF 183 (2002) (identifying the phrase as "one such famous slogan"
inspired from the "graffiti of May 1968").
281 Nora Boustany, War Crime Prosecutors Issue Call for Action, WASH. POST, Sept. 1,
2007, at A21.
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"... in the court room at Nuremberg something more
important is happening than the trial of a few cap-
tured prisoners. The inhuman is being confronted
with the humane, ruthlessness with equity, lawless-
ness with patient justice, and barbarism with civiliza-
tion."
28 2
Or, maybe even more appropriately, I suggest I leave the last
word to Dr. Henry T. King, Jr., one of the prosecutors at Nurem-
berg:
Much progress has been made, but the United
States, which through Jackson created Nuremberg, is
fighting a rear-guard action against the advance of the
Nuremberg principles. Jackson's position that the
Nuremberg principles should be applied in judging the
conduct of all nations and their leaders is being disre-
garded by the United States today. The US has
turned its back on the International Criminal Court
which would institutionalize Nuremberg, and the US
has disregarded the Geneva Conventions of 1949 go-
verning the treatment of prisoners taken in the course
of hostilities by holding them without trial and sub-
jecting them to torture. Progress is using our re-
sources to create a better, more just world, not mani-
pulating language and digging for loopholes to lower
the minimum standards of decency.
The abuse at Abu Ghraib revolted the civilized world
just as they did Americans across the country, but the
overwhelming response was not a call for America's
destruction, but a plea for us to return to our core
American values.
What is needed now is a revival of the spirit of Nu-
remberg. 28 3
282 FRANCIS BIDDLE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 294
(1947).
283 King Jr., supra note 278. See, e.g., David Crane, A Day at Chautauqua: Justice for a
Better World, JURIST, Oct. 2, 2007, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/IO/
day-at-chautauqua-justice-for-better.php (commenting on the "first annual International
Humanitarian Law Dialogs").
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In order to keep the faith with this shining legacy of an in-
ternational tribunal, 28 4 not through force or strength but through
the spirit of Nuremberg in U.S. domestic courts, the most appro-
priate means to demonstrate aggressive resistance to torture and
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment that was and is orga-
nized by U.S. high-level civilians and generals is refluat ster-
CUS.
284 Cf. Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacer-
bate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777 (expressing criticism of the deter-
rent effect of ICT prosecution); Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal
Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 92 (2003) (arguing that unless "oppressive regimes" join in
ratifying the ICC, then it will continue to "simply fail to address the most serious human
rights cases"); John D. Altenburg, Jr., Rhetoric or Reality? Winning the Battle of Ideas, 7
BARRY L. REV. 145, 162 (2006) (observing that "[i]f we cannot show that we follow our own
rules of war, we cannot expect moderate Muslims to have any reason to trust us").
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ANNEX 1
ASIL INSIGHT MAY 19, 2006
THE ASIL CENTENNIAL ANNUAL MEETING
ADOPTS A RESOLUTION ON THE USE OF VOLUME 10, ISSUE
ARMED FORCE AND THE TREATMENT OF 12
DETAINEES
BY MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL
[Insight Editor's note: This Insight differs from the usual ASIL
Insight in that it concerns an action taken by the ASIL itself.
The action is significant because the American Society of Inter-
national law, a nongovernmental organization with 4,000 mem-
bers worldwide, rarely takes positions on substantive issues as a
body, and because the matters covered in its resolution on the
use of armed force and the treatment of detainees are central to
the establishment and maintenance of international relations on
the basis of law and justice - one of the primary objects of the
ASIL. The resolution is accessible on line at
www.asil.org/events/am06/resolutions.]
On March 30, 2006, for only the eighth time in its 100-year histo-
ry, the American Society of International Law adopted a resolu-
tion on a subject of international law. The Resolution restates
fundamental principles regarding the resort to and conduct of
armed force, as well as to the rights of persons in detention. The
Resolution received overwhelming support at the Annual General
Meeting.
The topic of each paragraph of the Resolution was identified
through active discussion over several months on the ASIL elec-
tronic Forum, facilitated by Ben Davis of the University of Toledo
College of Law. Each topic relates to government action, both in
the United States and abroad, that has either violated interna-
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tional law or has challenged the validity of a principle. It was to
respond to these actions, to provide a clear restatement of the
law, that the Resolution was proposed. The Resolution also re-
sponds to the implicit charge that international law is endlessly
malleable, that its content can hardly be known or is rarely
agreed upon, and, therefore, need not be respected. Adoption of
the Resolution indicates that members of the American Society
stand by these principles in this the Society's hundredth anniver-
sary year.
This Insight provides basic legal authority for each paragraph of
the Resolution.
1. Resort to armed force is governed by the Charter of the United
Nations and other international law (jus ad bellum).
One of the greatest accomplishments of the Twentieth Century
was the outlawing of the use of force by states as an instrument
of national policy. The United Nations Charter is the principal
source of legal rules on resort to armed force today. It is a multi-
lateral treaty binding currently on 191 states.j1] It has been
binding on the United States since 1945. The Charter was
drafted largely by the United States following the Second World
War to create an institution and a set of principles dedicated to
the maintenance of peace and security in the world. The U.S.
and its allies succeeded in creating a legal regime on resort to
force that has withstood challenges for over 60 years. The Char-
ter's core principle, the general prohibition on the use of force
found in Article 2(4),[2] has evolved to the point that in 1986 the
International Court of Justice recognized it as a principle of jus
cogens, a peremptory norm-one not subject to contrary agree-
ment by treaty.[3] The only exceptions to Article 2(4) provided in
the Charter are the right to use force in self-defense, per Article
51, and the right to use force with Security Council authoriza-
tion, as provided in Chapter VII. In September 2005, the vast
majority of UN members re-affirmed their commitment to the
Charter in general, and the rules on the use of force in particular,
at the World Summit held in New York. [4]
In addition to the Charter, certain principles of customary inter-
national law and other treaties also contribute to the regulation
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of the use of armed force. For example, a state acting in lawful
self-defense must use only such force as is necessary to defend it-
self. In other words, the right to use force even in lawful self-
defense is not unlimited.[5] This principle is implicit in the
Charter and is an established norm of customary international
law. Thus, this paragraph of the Resolution refers to the jus ad
bellum to incorporate all customary and conventional law that
regulates the resort to force.
2. Conduct of armed conflict and occupation is governed by the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and other international
law Gus in bello).
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions, like the UN Charter, are
multilateral treaties enjoying near-universal state adherence, in-
cluding by the United States.[6] According to common Article 2 of
the four Conventions, they apply in cases of armed conflict and
occupation involving parties to the Conventions. Their purpose
is to protect the victims of armed conflict,[7] and they are in-
tended to be applied generously with that purpose in mind. The
ASIL Resolution cites the 1949 Geneva Conventions because of
their importance and centrality to the jus in bello, parallel to the
importance and centrality of the Charter to the jus ad bellum.
In addition to the 1949 Conventions, a number of other treaties
and rules of customary international law are relevant to the con-
duct of armed conflict. These are referenced in the Resolution by
the collective designation, the 'Jus in bello." It is well known that
such important law as the Hague Regulations of 1907,[8] the
1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Conventions,[9] certain
arms control conventions,[10] and principles of customary inter-
national law[11] are included in the term 'Jus in bello."
The International Court of Justice in its 1996 advisory opinion on
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons said the fol-
lowing about the jus in bello:
The extensive codification of humanitarian law and the extent of
the accession to the resultant treaties, as well as the fact that the
denunciation clauses... have never been used, have provided the
international community with a corpus of treaty rules the great
majority of which had already become customary and which re-
flected the most universally recognized humanitarian principles.
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These rules indicate the normal conduct and behavior expected of
states. [12]
3. Torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of any
person in the custody or control of a state are prohibited by inter-
national law from which no derogation is permitted.
The ASIL Resolution restates that torture, cruelty, inhumanity
and degradation against persons in custody are unlawful under
international law, whether in situations of armed conflict or
peace.[13] Under Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention (on
prisoners of war), "No physical or mental torture, nor any other
form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure
from them information of any kind whatever."[14] Under Article
31 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (on civilians): "No physical
or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in
particular to obtain information from them or from third par-
ties."[15] At a minimum, all persons detained in an international
armed conflict are entitled to the protections of Additional Proto-
col I, Article 75. Article 75 is part of customary international
law, and, therefore, binding on all states. It prohibits torture as
well as other violence to the life, health or well-being of persons,
and outrages upon personal dignity. In non-international armed
conflict, common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions also
prohibits torture as well as other violence to life and person, in-
cluding cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity.
These are absolute prohibitions; there are no exceptions.
Outside of situations of armed conflict, peacetime human rights
law regulates interrogation. It, too, prohibits torture, cruelty,
inhumanity, and degradation. Article 5 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights states that "no one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment."[16] This principle has been reconfirmed, restated and ela-
borated in a series of important treaties, including the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (Article
7)(the United States is a party);[17] the American Convention on
Human Rights (Article 5),[18] the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article
3),[19] the Convention Against Torture (Articles 1, 2 and 16)(the
United States is a party), [20] and the African (Banjul) Charter on
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Human and Peoples' Rights (Article 5).[21] The customary inter-
national law of human rights also prohibits torture as well as
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. [22]
The Convention Against Torture (CAT) disallows necessity and
other excuses as defenses to torture. Article 2(2) provides: "No
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or
a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture." The
CAT does not specifically disallow necessity as an excuse for less-
er violations of the Convention, i.e., for cruel, inhuman and de-
grading treatment. The International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (ICCPR), however, in providing for derogations
during emergencies, prohibits derogation from Article 7 as a
whole. In addition, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe affirmed in July 2002, that "[t]he use of torture or of in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment is absolutely pro-
hibited, in all circumstances, and in particular during the arrest,
questioning and detention of a person suspected of... terrorist
activities, irrespective of the nature of the acts that the person is
suspected of. .. ."[23] Thus, torture, cruel, inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment are all considered non-derogable prohibitions even
in times of national emergency. [24]
As part of customary international law, these principles bind
states wherever they act. There is in customary international
law no geographic restriction on the prohibition on torture or
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of persons in custody.
4. Prolonged, secret, incommunicado detention of any person in
the custody or control of a state is prohibited by international law.
Again, the sources of this principle are found principally in the
jus in bello for armed conflict situations and general human
rights law applicable in the absence of armed conflict. [25]
To protect those lawfully detained in armed conflict, the 1949
Geneva Conventions on Prisoners of War and Civilians set out
conditions of detention, including, most importantly, the right of
Protecting Powers or the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) to visit those detained. There is a provision in the
Civilians Convention, Article 143, which allows a brief delay in
gaining access to prisoners:
2008]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
Such visits may not be prohibited except for reasons of impera-
tive military necessity, and then only as an exceptional and tem-
porary measure. Their duration and frequency shall not be re-
stricted....
The ICRC's practice has been to accept no more than a two-week
delay for access to individuals under the terms of Article 143's al-
lowance for "imperative military necessity." This practice coin-
cides with Article 136 of the Civilians Convention that requires
notifying information bureaus and the ICRC (as the Central In-
formation Agency) of measures taken respecting any protected
person "within the shortest period possible." This applies to any
person to be detained for more than two weeks.[26] In addition to
reporting measures taken against protected persons, Article 136
also requires that a Detaining Power provide information bu-
reaus and the ICRC "promptly with information concerning all
changes pertaining to these protected persons, as, for example,
transfers, releases, repatriations, escapes, admittances to hospit-
als, births and deaths." Article 136 contains no exception for mil-
itary necessity.
In peacetime, persons in detention, again, are covered by the se-
ries of human rights treaties discussed above with respect to tor-
ture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The ICCPR al-
lows for derogation from the detention protections found in
Article 9 during a national emergency, but formal steps must be
taken if derogations are claimed. The United States has not for-
mally derogated from its ICCPR detention obligations. [27] Even
when a state derogates, however, derogation is lawful only "to
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situa-
tion."[28] This restriction has led courts to apply a test of propor-
tionality as to the length of time a person may be held in preven-
tive detention. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
decided in 1999 in Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru that a 30-day period,
15 days renewable once, of incommunicado preventive detention
violated Article 7(5) of the American Convention (requiring that
any detained person be brought promptly before a judge) despite
Peru's derogation with respect to that article. [29] Other limits on
permissible detention even under declared states of emergency
are discussed in two advisory opinions of the Inter-American
Court: Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations and Judicial
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Guarantees in States of Emergency. [30]
The European Court of Human Rights has reviewed preventive
detention, but not in cases where no judicial remedy was availa-
ble. In Brogan it found that a period of about four days without
being brought before a judge was inconsistent with the European
Convention on Human Rights, Article 5, even as an anti-
terrorism measure.[31] In response to this decision, the UK dero-
gated from Article 5 and ICCPR Article 9. The Court found in a
subsequent UK case, Brannigan, that a six day period of preven-
tive detention did not violate the Convention, given the proper
derogation in place. The UK, however, provided a right of habeas
corpus.[32] In December 2004, in the Belmarsh Detentions case,
the United Kingdom House of Lords ruled that indefinite deten-
tion pending deportation was disproportionate even in a time of
emergency, and, thus violated ICCPR Article 9 (on the rights of
those deprived of liberty). [33]
The UN Human Rights Committee, the body that administers
the ICCPR, issues General Comments interpreting key provi-
sions of the Covenant. In one of its General Comments it said,
"Measures derogating from the provisions of the Covenant must
be of an exceptional and temporary nature."[34]
There is a question whether the ICCPR applies to a government's
acts outside its own territory. The Human Rights Committee,
however, takes the position that states parties to the Covenant
must apply its provisions to anyone within their effective control,
even if not situated within their own territory. [35]
5. Standards of international law regarding treatment of persons
extend to all branches of national governments, to their agents,
and to all combatant forces.
The law of state responsibility provides the rules for determining
when a state has committed a wrong under international law-
whether a human rights violation or other type of wrong. The
law of state responsibility makes clear that the acts of the state
extend to organs exercising "legislative, executive, judicial or any
other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of
the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central
government or of a territorial unit of the state."[36] Acts of state
are also those of persons or entities "empowered by law" to exer-
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cise elements of governmental authority. [37] And of great impor-
tance:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered
an act of a State under international law if the person or group of
persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direc-
tion or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct. [381
The case of Prosecutor v. Tadic from the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) provides an additional
ground for finding the acts of an armed group to be the responsi-
bility of the state:
"[t]he control required by international law may be deemed to ex-
ist when a State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, the party
to the conflict) has a role in organizing, coordinating or planning
the military actions of the military group, in addition to financ-
ing, training and equipping or providing operational support to
that group."[39]
When the United States and United Kingdom held Afghanistan's
de facto government responsible for the acts of al Qaeda in 2001,
the attribution appeared to meet the test in Tadic. Few if any
states protested the claim of responsibility.
The Resolution also restates that international law applies di-
rectly to "all combatant forces." "Combatant forces" is a broad
term that encompasses anyone engaged in an armed con-
flict.[40] An armed conflict exists when there is significant fight-
ing by organized armed groups and when the armed groups ei-
ther have a connection to a state or exercise control over
territory. The 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court
makes clear that international law, in particular the jus in bello,
applies to groups engaged in armed conflict. [41]
6. In some circumstances, commanders (both military and civi-
lian) are personally responsible under international law for the
acts of their subordinates.
Under the doctrine of command responsibility in international
law, leaders may be held criminally liable for the acts of subordi-
nates:
The doctrine encompasses two different forms of liability. The
first is direct or active command responsibility-when the leader
takes active steps to bring about the crime by, for example, order-
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ing his subordinates to do something unlawful....
The second type of command responsibility (and the one to which
people usually refer when they speak generally of "command re-
sponsibility"), involves "indirect" or "passive" command responsi-
bility. Because direct proof that a commander actually ordered
his troops to commit crimes is not always forthcoming, the second
type of command responsibility is more significant in both theory
and practice as a distinct theory of liability. [42]
At the time of writing, the latest precedent as to the standard of
command responsibility under international law is found in a de-
cision of the ICTY, Prosecutor v. Timor Blaskic. The case con-
cerned criminal liability for indirect or passive command respon-
sibility during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
The Appeals Chamber... holds that a person who orders an act
or commission with the awareness of the substantial likelihood
that a crime will be committed in the execution of that order, has
the requisite mens rea for establishing liability under Article 7(1)
[of the Statute of the ICTY] pursuant to ordering. Ordering with
such awareness has to be regarded as accepting that crime. [43]
7. All states should maintain security and liberty in a manner
consistent with their international law obligations.
The International Court of Justice has stated in several cases
that international law prevails over the domestic or municipal
law of states. It is a "fundamental principle that international
law prevails over domestic law."[44] If a rule of domestic law and
a rule of international law are in conflict with each other, a na-
tional government might act lawfully under its own domestic law
but will still be responsible at the international level for violating
any conflicting rule of international law.
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